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This thesis deals with the circumstances that lead to a fragmented 
implementation of post-conflict justice and security reforms and their negative 
impact on institutional capacity to provide justice and security for citizens.  It 
strenghtens the existing critique of SSR by employing liberal peacebuilding 
critique to examine the development of the SSR agenda within the security-
development nexus mainstream and the difficulties in learning from SSR 
experience.  The main research question concerns the factors affecting the 
coherence and sequencing of justice and security system reforms, and is 
addressed through a case study of Mozambique.  The analysis identifies 
power dynamics surrounding formal and informal interactions that impact 
institutional change, and showcase the vulnerability of justice and security 
system reforms to co-optation by powerful international and national players.  
Throughout, patterns of critical juncture and path dependence are identified 
that have influenced the adaptation of powerful local players to external and 
domestic pressures which resulted in political and institutional bricolage.  The 
thesis also looks at how the sequencing of Mozambique’s triple transition, in 
which economic liberalisation prevailed over peacebuilding and 
  ii 
democratisation, shaped the post-civil war direction and pace of the defence, 
police and justice reforms.  The 1992 peace agreement and the public sector 
reform programme are investigated with regards to the failure of driving 
substantive SSR and of imparting it coherence and sequencing in the short, 
medium and longer term.  Finally, lessons are proposed for future reform in 
Mozambique, and recommendations are drawn for improving the design of 
strategy and implementation of SSR in general. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
 
 
‘There can be no peace without understanding’ 
Senegalese Proverb 
 
 
 
A - Genesis, rationale and relevance of the research topic 
1.1 Setting the scene 
Developed under the security-development nexus discourse Security Sector 
Reform (SSR) has increasingly taken centre-stage in Western donor discourse 
and policy.  However, when the SSR concept was first introduced in the late 
1990s it occupied a marginal position despite the potential that it represented 
in terms of aligning human security and state security.  Anchored in a problem-
solving paradigm, the SSR policy agenda became focused on immediate 
conflict resolution through global peacekeeping and much less on the role 
SSR could play in the prevention of conflict in the first place.  Furthermore, 
instead of concentrating on governance of the security sector through 
development of internal and external oversight mechanisms the focus of SSR 
programmes was put on building efficiency of the security forces through the 
provision of training and equipment.  Political transitions towards 
democratisation, which did not entail armed conflict, were also sidelined in the 
SSR agenda (Bryden and Olonisakin 2010: 10).  This supports the argument 
that SSR has developed based on the premise that post-conflict environments 
are more conducive to rapid change (Collier and Pradan 1994: 133), and 
therefore provide more fertile ground for implementation. Two United Nations 
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Secretary General (UNSG) reports (UNSG 23/01/2008 and 13/08/2013) and 
the first landmark resolution of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on 
the security sector (UNSC resolution 2151, 28/04/2014) illustrate the 
prominence of the post-conflict paradigm.  This direction has been either 
preceded or complemented by increasing SSR research and policies by other 
multilateral organisations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee (OECD-
DAC), the European Union (EU), and the African Union (AU).1  
 
Despite the idea that SSR could best be implemented in immediate post-
conflict environments the reality of peace operations has not always supported 
the theory.  Dismantling existing security forces and creating new ones from 
afresh, or merging different armed groups into a unified army, and reinforcing 
police units are tasks that are relatively easy to implement from a technical 
viewpoint.  Governance reforms, however, which are inescapably political in 
nature, are rarely dealt with, and a lack of local ownership hinders the changes 
implemented, often undermining sustainability.  Local actors have displayed 
resistance to rapid change (Goor and van Veen 2010: 90), and the likelihood 
of occurrence of unintended consequences has been higher (Peake et al 
2006), including potential for backlash and further insecurity (Sedra 2010: 27).  
                                                
1 The AU Policy Framework on SSR (2013), in addition to post-conflict peacebuilding, foresees the 
possibility for implementing SSR in contexts of democratisation and as a measure of conflict prevention 
(AU PFSSR 2013, arts 11, 16(g)).  Yet, it is too early to tell whether this provision will take root in 
practice.  
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Part of this discussion therefore must revolve around the question of what the 
ideal conditions for SSR implementation actually are from a timing perspective 
(Mugah and Downes, 2010, Ball, 2010).  Many of the current peace operations 
take the form of stabilisation, i.e., are deployed with the goal to restore a 
minimum of security and stability in an environment where fully-fledged 
combat operations persist.  In such precarious conditions, any SSR 
programme may be too ambitious, beyond sensitising the leadership and the 
wider society to the importance of the SSR agenda once conditions are less 
volatile.  Iraq and Afghanistan offer examples of questionable outcomes of 
implementation of SSR, which have oftentimes endangered the very peace 
they were supposed to help create, maintain, or enforce (Rathmell et al, 2005, 
Perito, 2011, Sedra, 2006, Friesendorf, 2011). The probability of unexpected 
outcomes is high as demonstrated by the current violent and protracted 
conflicts in Syria, Libya and Yemen.  Stabilisation operations have also been 
prominent elsewhere in Africa, as illustrated by successive UN missions in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), or AU missions in Somalia (2007-), Mali 
(2012-) - following the French intervention deployed as an emergency to stop 
the advance of the Northern Islamists - and Central African Republic (2013-).  
It is therefore worthwhile to pursue an investigation on the contributions and 
limitations of SSR in such environments, even if that is beyond the scope of 
analysis of this thesis. 
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Whilst the examples above tend to be compelling for an investigation of such 
contexts, care must be taken with regards to generalisations derived from 
these case studies, since they represent charged stabilisation environments 
with extreme levels of coercion, distinct from other conflict-ridden situations.  
At the same time most peace operations - including those in more benign 
contexts - have been beleaguered by severe strategic and operational 
deficiencies around issues of policy coherence amongst different international 
actors, and disparity between the analysis by those on the ground and the 
decisions taken at headquarters.  Rivalry and insufficient coordination 
amongst donors (Wulf 2004: 23, 24, Peake et al 2006: 251, Brzoska, 2006) 
have also been compounded by the inadequate preparation of foreign 
personnel (Chuter 2006: 2).  Other complicating factors have included the 
dearth of knowledge about national contexts and the nature of each country’s 
conflict (Chanaa 2002: 61, Cooper and Pugh 2002: 5-6), as well as the 
widespread tendency to neglect the specifics of local political struggles 
(Woodward 2003: 276-301, Cawthra and Luckham, 2003: 325, Hutchful and 
Fayemi 2005: 84, Olonisakin 2006: 333).   
 
These variables, especially those concerning politics, are equally challenging 
in the application of SSR in non post-conflict countries - whether fragile or mid-
income - which face challenges of implementing reform in post-authoritarian 
states (Hills 2010: 178).  Evidence of this is provided by research carried out 
on security reforms in Ghana (Hutchful, 2002, 2003), Nigeria (Fayemi, 2003) 
and Indonesia (Muna, 2008), amongst others.  Security challenges associated 
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with violent Islamic extremism such as those experienced by Nigeria and 
Kenya, also demonstrate the relevance of SSR contribution to balance the 
adoption of heavy-handed security responses with democratic and 
governance based security and justice decision-making.  This is increasingly 
relevant for Africa, where the majority of countries, whilst not experiencing 
open combat hostilities, still fall short in providing physical safety and security 
to their people, given the combination of domestic vulnerabilities and 
transnational security threats, strongly rooted in shattered institutions, 
dysfunctional local governance, and poor service delivery. Hence, there is a 
strong case for both policy and research to award more attention to the 
challenges of SSR in non post-conflict contexts, given the potential 
contribution towards understanding the role of SSR as part of wider conflict 
prevention strategies.  In addition, learning about contextual specifics that 
entail different levels of depth and pace of change, but which also face issues 
concerning the structure, management, governance and performance of the 
justice and security apparatuses, is beneficial to advance the field of SSR.2  As 
such, it is the goal of this thesis to contribute to the field of SSR through a 
case study of security and justice reforms in Mozambique from 1990 to 2009.  
Strong empirical research underlines the case study and traces the influence 
of the country’s particular national history, political trajectories and 
contestations, as well as the impact of political economy and conflict dynamics 
over security and justice reforms over time.  A long-term investigation of SSR 
                                                
2  In the context of this thesis field refers to a set of policy, practice and concepts, which despite lacking 
coherent theoretical development and being marked by patchwork contributions and contested 
interpretations, come together to form a distinctive area of analysis.  
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in Mozambique prevents excessive emphasis on immediate post-conflict 
analysis and allows for the development of understanding about unfolding 
power interactions over time. Finally, this thesis affords the opportunity to gain 
knowledge from a relatively benign, although not totally uncontroversial, case 
of security and justice reforms.  
 
1.2 The state of research  
In the last decade an abundant body of SSR research has developed, 
identifying flaws and inconsistencies between policy and practice, and also 
seeking to address these gaps.3 The majority of research produced, and 
considered relevant by global SSR players, has been geared towards problem 
solving and development of practice-oriented instruments.4  Whilst these 
works have contributed to explain, clarify, and advance SSR, they were 
carried out from the predominant understanding of SSR as a technical field 
(Petovar 2005: 126, Ball 2006: 328, Andersen 2006: 6).  This has been 
pointed out in the literature as a limitation, given that it has obscured the 
                                                
3 Examples of conceptual reviews include Chanaa, 2002, Brzoska, 2003, Hadžic, 2004, Edmunds, 2004, 
Chuter, 2006, Bryden and Olonisakin, 2010. Sector specific analysis has been carried out, amongst 
others by: 
- Defence: Alagappa, 2001, Koonings and Kruijt, 2002, Williams, Cawthra and Abrahams, 2002,  
  Rupiya, 2005, Augé and Klaousen, 2010.  
- Police: Hills, 2000a, 2009, Baker, 2007, 2009. 
- Justice: Méndez, O’Donnell and Pinheiro, 1999, Mani, 2002, Call, 2007. 
- Intelligence: Hannah, O’Brien and Rathmell, 2005, Africa and Kwadjo, 2009.  
 
4 Examples of such policy-oriented instruments are: the ‘Parliamentary Handbook of the Security Sector’ 
(DCAF, 2003), ‘Security Sector Governance in Africa: A Handbook’ (Ball and Fayemi, 2004), ‘Democratic 
Governance of the Security Sector: An Institutional Assessment Framework’ (Ball, Bouta and van de 
Goor, 2003), ‘OECD-DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice’ 
(OECD-DAC, 2007, 2008), ‘Security Sector Reform Integrated Technical Guidance Notes’ (UN, 2012).  
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the African Union are currently 
producing and the AU is producing Operational Guidance Notes on SSR/G.  
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political nature of the agenda and avoided systematic questioning of the 
underlying assumptions of SSR from its start (Egnell and Haldén 2009: 28, 
Jackson 2010: 118).  It furthermore prevented understanding about the role 
and pressures exerted by the political economy of aid in which countries 
undergoing SSR were immersed (Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 17, OECD-
DAC 2005: 62). 
 
Most research and policy attention has been devoted to identifying challenges 
for donor development agencies with security and justice programmes, and 
little attention has been given to the actors of the implementing countries.  The 
impact of fast-paced security changes in the implementing countries, the limits 
of externally driven reform, and the conflicting mandates of different donors 
have been acknowledged as a hindrance to the comprehensive 
implementation of SSR (Hendrickson, 1999).  Early criticism of SSR stressed 
the lack of systematic knowledge about the context and the relationships 
between formal state structures and informal layers of power in countries 
undergoing reform (Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 17, Brzoska 2003: 48, Hills 
2005: 183-202, Peake et al 2006: 251-252, Chuter, 2006, Egnell and Haldén, 
2009).  For example, pioneer studies of non-state security actors in Africa 
mainly treated these as independent from, and constituting a threat to, state 
actors (Reno, 1998, Cilliers and Mason, 1999, Musah and Fayemi, 2000, 
Mandel 2002).  Recently, general recognition that state and non-state actors 
and public and private spheres are not absolute categories, has spurred 
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research that interrogate the fluidity between formal and informal power 
dynamics (Lund, 2006, Menkhaus, 2006, Boege et al, 2008, Baker, 2010). 
Concepts emerging from the literature on peacebuilding, such as hybrid 
political orders (Boege et al, 2008) and friction (Tsing 2005) have further 
reinforced research on security and justice reforms addressing power as a 
relational concept (Dexter and Ntahombaye, 2005, Chopra, 2008, Sriram, 
2010, Luckham and Kirk 2012: 13, Ball et al, 2012, Millar, 2013). Overall, 
however, SSR lags behind the profusion of studies produced in other fields of 
peacebuilding (Schroader and Chappuis, 2014).  A special number of 
International Peacekeeping (2014 21(2)) focusing on SSR through the 
analytical lenses of hybridism has been a welcome addition to the sprouting 
literature (Podder, 2013, Gordon, 2014).  
 
The emergence of these lines of enquiry is important because it helps to 
overcome the mainstream technical and problem-solving approaches that 
portrayed SSR as free of power dynamics, contributing to a narrow 
understanding of its conceptual and operational limitations.  It brings the 
‘political’ to the centre-stage of security and justice analysis, and assists in 
understanding its constructed meaning, contested nature and implications, 
helping to generate better informed engagement on SSR.  Despite the 
renewed trend of decoding meanings and implications of local ownership in 
the context of SSR (see for e.g. Bendix and Stanley, 2008, Panarelli, 2010, 
Gordon, 2014), a practical contribution from global SSR actors is still faltering.  
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This state of affairs stems from the fact that the intertwining between security 
and politics, and the understanding of the contestations in this space, keeps 
being overlooked by mainstream policy actors, despite reiterated calls for 
attention to this aspect.  Rhetoric has changed but practice has not followed; 
concern with security politics tends to gain currency when new crises emerge.  
Over time interest tends to wane or be directed to the new hotspot without 
sufficient investment in in-depth empirical research detailing and learning from 
the power politics of reform in the country at stake.   
 
The generality of SSR research (both policy-oriented and academic driven) 
still suffers from a degree of superficiality, relying excessively on anecdotal 
evidence and case study chapters based on secondary sources (Luckham and 
Kirk 2012: 48).  Moreover, even when fieldwork enables a deeper 
understanding of the situation, a flaw that tends to persist is that case studies 
usually address only a partial dimension of security and justice reforms, and 
do it predominantly within isolated short-time frameworks.  Such works allow, 
for instance, the unearthing of recommendations for programmatic purposes, 
but constrain the identification of trends, outcomes and lessons concerning 
issues central to SSR, such as the particularities of institutional development 
dynamics and oversight and accountability challenges.  This is a central 
reason why SSR literature is limited in its analysis of the interactions and 
struggles between different security and justice actors, and of how these 
shape the process of accommodation, co-optation and resistance to reform.  
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Despite mounting efforts on learning from SSR implementation, not enough is 
known about what drives the development of specific policies and the design 
of particular programmes, what determines success or failure, who the losers 
and the winners of the process are, and whether, and to what extent, citizens 
benefit from the programmes (Luckham and Kirk 2012: 48). 
 
Against this background, this thesis aims to add to the growing body of SSR 
literature that engages critically with the political contestations of security and 
justice reforms, and which treats these as comprehensive processes, 
enmeshed in global, regional, national and local power dynamics.  This is 
done in the literature review by employing existing critique of liberal 
peacebuilding to analyse the development of the SSR agenda within the 
security-development nexus mainstream.  This analysis enables an 
understanding of the factors that shaped the stripping of politics and political 
factors from SSR design and implementation, which led to the neglect of 
central components such as ownership and sustainability.  Engagement with 
liberal peacebuilding critique also adds value by explaining the difficulties in 
learning from SSR experience.  Explanations include the subsuming of this 
agenda to other competing policies, to the strategic security and development 
interests of powerful international actors, and to the unpredictability of the 
results of interactions between international, national and local actors during 
implementation. Importantly, the adoption of the liberal peacebuilding critique 
helps to shed light on the reasons behind discrepancies between discourse, 
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policy and implementation of SSR, and the similar disjuncture between the 
levels of political commitment, strategic conceptualisation, programming and 
implementation.  
 
In addition, this thesis aims to overcome the treatment of SSR as an event via 
research on the politics of reform in a long-term framework.  This is done in 
two ways: 1) through developing a comprehensive empirically based analysis 
of the security and justice reforms implemented in Mozambique in the period 
1992-2009; and 2) by looking back to the period of independence to 
understand the dynamics of security and justice reforms as embedded in the 
process of state building.  
 
To understand the politics of reform of the different periods the concepts of 
institutional bricolage (Cleaver 2000, 2002), critical juncture and path 
dependence were adopted as case study specific analytical tools.  The notion 
of bricolage, in particular, bears some resemblance, from the point of view of 
the analysis that it enables, to that advanced by the concept of ‘hybrid political 
orders’ (Kraushaar and Lambach 2009: 8).  Hence, the selection of 
institutional bricolage adds value by complementing the more generic 
examination of SSR based on the liberal peacebuilding critique.  Institutional 
bricolage, critical junctures and path dependence allow the contextualisation of 
prevailing practices alongside new developments, and provide pointers for 
analysing the piece-meal and improvisational approaches in institutional 
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reforms in the defence, police and justice sectors in Mozambique.  In addition, 
their employment emphasises the agency of multiple interacting institutional 
actors and their methods of coping with pressure for change, including the 
dynamics of negotiation and strategies of cooperation, resistance, and 
accommodation. This is remarkably useful for understanding the resilience of 
Mozambique’s political actors and security sector institutions and stakeholders 
through reforms that were mainly externally influenced under the project of 
liberalisation.  Not least important is that the use of institutional bricolage has 
allowed a closer look into bottom-up processes and local agency, and how 
these shaped people’s everyday lives, in spite of higher-level institutional 
security and justice reforms.         
 
Further to the above, this thesis provides a detailed account of the factors that 
impact security and justice institutional reforms.  This is done through a triple 
level analysis, namely: 1) macro-level - scrutinising Mozambique’s triple 
transition, 2) meso-level - focusing on SSR integration with simultaneous 
peacebuilding initiatives, and 3) micro-level - addressing coherence and 
alignment of defence, police and justice reforms.  By bringing to light the 
inherent complexities, this thesis contributes to the demystification of the 
transformational and emancipatory stand of SSR, paving the way for a much 
more seasoned and pragmatic politics of SSR. 
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1.3 SSR concept and practice: genesis and synopsis of the existing 
critique 
 
1.3.1 The Concept of SSR  
This thesis adopts the understanding of SSR as provided by the OECD-DAC 
definition.  Rather than reinforcing security sector reform as a catch-word, it 
adopted the terminology of Security System Reform defined as ‘transformation 
of the security system, which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities 
and actions, working together to manage and operate the system in a manner 
that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good 
governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework’ 
(OECD-DAC 2005: 20). 
 
The early concept of security sector reform that emerged in the late 1990s 
concerned the promotion of efficiency and the management of the security 
forces, conforming to democratic principles and good governance, all 
designed to contribute towards reducing poverty (Ball, 1998, Short, 1999).  
The originality of the concept resided in the fact that it captured the 
comprehensive nature of security, providing a coherent framework within 
which to address interrelated security problems in line with development 
strategies (Lilly and Page, 2002).  In addition, SSR potentially provided a basis 
for constructive engagement with state security and that of the individual in a 
mutually reinforcing and interdependent relationship.  Based on the premise 
that security is a public good, its main aim was the creation of professional, 
well-governed and accountable security sectors.  The original use of the SSR 
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concept can be traced back to research (Ball, 1998) and policy statements 
(Short, 1999, United Kingdom’s Department for International Development - 
DfID, 1999) where the security sector was described as comprising: 
Core Security Actors: armed forces; police; paramilitary forces; 
gendarmeries; presidential guards; intelligence and security services 
(both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs 
authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national 
guards, militias)  
 
Security Management and Oversight Bodies: the Executive; National 
Security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; 
ministries of defence, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and 
traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, 
budget offices, financial audit & planning units); and civil society 
organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints 
commissions)  
 
Justice and Law enforcement institutions: Judiciary; Justice Ministries; 
prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights 
commissions and ombudsmen, customary and traditional justice 
systems 
 
Non-statutory Security forces: liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private 
bodyguard units; private security companies, political party militias  
(DfID, 1999). 
 
Whilst this characterisation alluded to a comprehensive understanding of SSR, 
the different contexts facilitated distinct implementations, leading to a 
proliferation of catch-phrases: security sector reform (Ball, 1998, Hendrickson, 
1999), security sector transition (Hills, 2000) security sector transformation 
(Smith 2001: 16, Cooper and Pugh, 2002, Ball and Fayemi, 2004, Williams, 
2005), justice and security sector reform (United Nations Development 
Programme- UNDP, 2002, Call, 2007), security sector management (Journal 
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of Security Sector Management, 2003; Hänggi, 2004: 3), security sector 
governance (Hänggi and Winkler, 2003, Ball and Fayemi, 2004), security 
sector reconstruction (Bryden and Hänggi, 2004), and security system reform 
(OECD-DAC, 2005).  This multiplicity of labels is far from innocuous and, in 
addition to symbolising the disputed character of the concept, it represents a 
pre-announcement of different policy directions and corresponding contextual 
practices.  One of the most disputed issues over time has been about how the 
rule of law and justice fit-in with security reforms in this systemic approach.  
For a long time not enough was done to incorporate rule of law dimensions 
into SSR, even if at the policy level the issues had been integrated (Oakley et 
al, 1998, Holm and Eide, 2000, Mani, 2002, Call 2007: 7).  For example UN 
missions only began to consistently attempt to integrate efforts from both 
areas from 2007 onwards (Hänggi and Scherrer 2008: 11). 
 
Furthermore, the rooting of the SSR concept within a holistic framework, 
although allowing for a comprehensive understanding of the subject, led to the 
formation of an overly ambitious policy agenda (Scheye and Peake, 2005, 
Egnell and Haldén, 2009, Sedra, 2010).  It also inadvertently underscored the 
‘conceptual-contextual’ divide between the goals of SSR policy and its 
corresponding implementation, which is far from being comprehensive.  The 
reasons for this are numerous. They range from the dearth of political will of 
the leadership of implementing countries and of donors, to the existence of 
limited financial resources, and to the resistance of certain institutions and 
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their professionals to submit to fast change under externally-driven agendas 
(Williams 2000: 4, Edmunds 2003: 139).  In addition, the ways these dynamics 
play out in a given context have been compounded by diminishing, yet still 
present strategic deficits in the field of SSR.  Amongst these are insufficient 
dialogue between security and development professionals, and between 
practitioner and academic communities around the growing SSR evidence 
base that ought to allow learning.  Yet another important aspect is the plethora 
of disjointed actors involved, which hinders the achievement of coherence and 
sequencing in implementation (Isima, 2010).  
 
1.4 Research question  
Besides the general assertion that the multiplicity of SSR actors hinders 
coherent implementation not enough is known about sequencing in and of 
SSR. Several authors have pointed out this deficit across time as well as the 
fact that in practice sequencing of SSR activities occurs randomly (Lilly et al 
2002: 9, Forman 2004: 206, Lalá 2004: 12, Brzoska 2006: 12, Lalá 2006: 59, 
Isima 2010: 336, Schnabel and Born, 2011: 26).  There is recognition that the 
limited information available is tangential, the existing analysis is insufficient, 
and theoretical knowledge lacks backing by serious empirical investigation 
(Isima 2010: 336).  Hence, this thesis aims to contribute to fill-in this gap. 
 
Drawing on prominent liberal peacebuilding scholar work, an important 
premise suggested is that in terms of sequencing, institutionalisation should 
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precede liberalisation.  This means that institutions of the country emerging 
from war should first be built or strengthened, and only afterwards should 
democratisation and market reform processes be incrementally implemented 
(Paris 2004: 7,159).  Whilst at first sight this appears a plausible argument, in 
most post-conflict environments institution building cannot be dissociated from 
liberalisation, because the former needs to adopt a particular shape to become 
an optimal vehicle for implementation of the latter.  Thus far liberalisation has 
been the main goal, using institution building as a mere instrument. 
 
A study of sequencing of post-conflict reconstruction programmes, departing 
from the premise of a mutually reinforcing security-development relationship, 
has argued that security should come first in a hierarchy of priorities (Timilsina, 
2007).  Activities such as supply of peacekeepers and restoration of order, 
restoration of essential infrastructure, and DDR and SSR should come first.  
Humanitarian and relief efforts, governance programmes, economic 
stabilisation, democratisation, large-scale infrastructure, and long-term 
development should follow.  However, this research has conceded that the 
reforms do not necessarily need to be implemented consecutively.  Rather, the 
distribution of resources amongst them needs to be mindful of the fact that ‘if 
higher order objectives are not met, lower order achievements will ultimately 
prove transitory’ (Timilsina 2007: 137).  This study also advanced that holistic 
SSR including police, army, penal and judiciary sector reforms should continue 
in later stages of the reconstruction process, but it did not look into how and 
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when these reforms should be articulated.  This is probably because 
sequencing is better analysed, and needs to be adjusted to the specific 
context in question.   
 
Sequencing is essential for SSR, for at least three central reasons. The first is 
that sequencing impacts outcomes in light of the timing and order (or lack 
thereof) in which security and justice reforms occur, whether that refers to a 
consecutive, parallel or random process.  The second is that an adequate 
understanding of sequencing helps to identify entry-points for security reforms 
across time, and to seize opportunities to articulate the SSR agenda with other 
ongoing governance initiatives.  The third is that strong knowledge about 
sequencing has potential to help in the definition of policy and programming 
priorities (Brzoska, 2006, UNSG, 11/06/2009, Isima, 2010).  Hence, in light of 
its importance and given the dearth of insight about sequencing, this topic has 
been elected as the central line of investigation of the case study on 
Mozambique.  In order to generate knowledge about the design, planning and 
implementation of security and justice reform strategies, the main research 
question guiding the case study is: 
How did reforms in the defence, police and justice sectors in post-civil 
war Mozambique evolve in the short, medium and long-term, and what 
factors affected the coherence and sequencing of these changes, and 
the ability of these institutions to fulfil their missions?  
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A sub-set of questions complements the overall thesis’ analysis, namely: 
 
1. How do the roots of SSR in the liberal peace paradigm constrain its 
capacity to attain the goals set in the policy agenda, and is there 
potential to overcome these flaws? 
 
2. How did Mozambique’s post-independence political economy and 
justice and security reforms contribute to the outbreak of the civil war?  
How did they compare with, and influence reform immediately 
following the civil war and, later, in the longer-term process towards 
democratisation? 
 
3. How did Mozambique’s triple transition shape the context and direction 
of SSR in the post-civil war period? 
 
4. How did coherence and sequencing (or lack thereof) of post-civil war 
reforms in the defence, police and justice sectors impact changes in 
these institutions, in the short, medium and long-term?  
 
5. What opportunities for change existed beyond those provided by the 
peace agreement entry-points for SSR, and how could security and 
justice reforms be approached in a comprehensive and home-grown 
manner? 
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6. What broad lessons can be identified for future reform in Mozambique 
and what recommendations can be made to improve the design and 
implementation of SSR in general? 
 
1.5 Levels of analysis and timelines  
The case study on Mozambique is diachronic and analyses mainly reforms 
that took place between 1992 and 2009; however it also considers events 
between 1975 and 1992 for historical context purposes.  The examination of 
the period 1992-2009 takes place at three main levels in which the coherence 
and sequencing of SSR are analysed:  
 
1) At the macro level, the coherence and sequencing of wider political, 
economic, and security transformation processes are analysed and it is in 
this context that Mozambique’s triple transition is examined.   
 
2) Meso-level analysis focuses on the peace agreement and the processes of 
SSR and their coherence and sequencing with other peacebuilding 
policies, such as DDR and transitional justice initiatives. 
 
3)  Finally, it is at the micro-level where coherence and sequencing are 
looked at through the lens of a comprehensive framework including the 
reform of defence, police, justice and other strategic security institutions  
(in some instances subsumed under a national security strategy).  This 
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requires an exploration of how reforms unfolded in each of these areas, 
with particular attention to how they interrelate, and mutually support or 
undermine each other in implementation.  In this case study the 
intelligence and other security agencies have been excluded from analysis.  
The latter were judged to be beyond the scope of this study, both in order 
make it more manageable, but also because of the difficulties of gathering 
information and gaining access to the relevant actors. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Levels of analysis 
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1.6 The relevance of a case study on Mozambique  
The experience of Mozambique, despite pre-dating the SSR concept and 
agenda, is relevant because it facilitates an analysis of security reforms 
carried out over a long-term period, in this case, from 1992 to 2009.  Although 
at the time of Mozambique’s peace negotiations and subsequent 
peacebuilding phase, the concept of ‘security sector reform’ had not yet been 
developed, security reforms were implemented which could be considered a 
precursor to SSR.  In addition, the concept of SSR formulated in the late 
1990s continued to evolve simultaneously with the implementation of 
Mozambican security reforms.  Thus, it is pertinent to establish whether the 
strategic direction of the Mozambican reforms was adapted (or not) to the 
holistic conception of SSR over the past seventeen years.   
 
This thesis targets two significant historical periods, namely a post-
independence era (in this case accompanied as well by an emerging civil war), 
and a post-civil war period, facilitating a nuanced understanding of patterns of 
continuity and rupture in this African state-building process.  The focus on 
these distinct periods provides the opportunity to compare security and justice 
reforms carried out by a regime in control in the post-liberation war context, 
with those following a civil war period where governmental authority was under 
challenge. 
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Furthermore, this case study facilitates an enquiry about not only lessons 
learnt during conflict resolution and subsequent peacebuilding stages, but also 
about medium to longer-term conflict prevention.  In addition, research on the 
post-civil war peacebuilding phase permits analysis of security-related 
decisions made during the peace process in terms of their impacts in the 
short, medium and long-term. This is particularly useful to comprehend the 
impact of the interaction of international, regional and national factors on 
security and justice reforms, as well as to understand the dynamics of 
powerful local players’ adaptation to external and domestic pressures.  
 
It is also the case that if a strict timeline to analyse SSR - as an integrated and 
comprehensive strategy to address security reforms - is set at the time when 
the concept first materialised in donor development discourse (the UK in the 
late 1990s), then many other relevant historical examples would be rendered 
worthless.  These include cases such as El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, 
Haiti and South Africa (actually the first reported example of holistic SSR even 
before the term had been coined), which formed the basis of many current 
SSR lessons learnt.  Such an option does not seem reasonable for at least 
two reasons.  First, the actual security and development needs of these 
countries warranted a SSR approach even if the SSR concept had not yet 
been labelled as such; and the security development interface was not an 
entirely new feature in donors’ aid agendas.  Indeed, even during colonial 
times these two strategies had merged around the major geopolitical 
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objectives of the main actors in the international system (Duffield 2005: 148, 
Cooper 2006: 318).  Second, the SSR concept has been an evolving concern 
and, despite improvements in policy implementation during the past decade, 
its application within an integrated and comprehensive peacebuilding strategy 
has barely taken root in practice, bar perhaps the example of Sierra Leone.  In 
light of this, it is worth reiterating the importance of studying earlier as well as 
more current situations given the growing number of cases where the same 
shortcomings are re-occurring.  
  
In addition, a case study on Mozambique is important given the shortage of 
studies of SSR on Lusophone countries.  This group of states, beyond their 
shared language, have in common a history of liberation war against the 
colonial power, as well as certain similarities in their institutional frameworks 
and culture.  However, this is not to say that they are unique, but rather that 
their specificity must be compared to more general and transversal sets of 
principles, conditions, and challenges that are common to state-building and to 
SSR in African countries. 
 
1.7 Importance of research  
Against the backdrop of a flawed, but nevertheless increasingly relevant, 
policy and practice of SSR in the international agenda, it is essential to 
ascertain why it still matters to research SSR.   
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First and foremost, SSR programmes have the potential to improve or 
contribute to the deterioration of the quality of security that people are (or not) 
provided by countries that are candidates for reform.  They also impact the 
politics and organisation of the security system of those states in such a 
manner that they may alter (positively or negatively) a given balance of power 
in politics and society, triggering latent conflicts.  One such example took place 
in the context of Croatia’s war of independence from Yugoslavia, and in the 
context of US and German support for transforming an ex-Soviet force into a 
Western military force.  The Croatian army was re-trained and equipped in 
1994-95 by a private U.S defence contractor, in the midst of a UN declared 
arms embargo.  Instead of acting as a professional, accountable and human 
rights observing force, they launched military offensives against UN protected 
areas and their civilian ethnic Serb inhabitants in 1995, in retaliation for earlier 
military aggressions committed by the Serb forces (Woodward 2003: 289-
290).  
 
Secondly, the progressive significance of SSR in the international cooperation 
agenda is matched by growing resources, ultimately provided by worldwide 
taxpayers, who, at best, possess minimal information about these 
programmes, their results and the effects produced in host reform states.  In 
addition, it is relevant to understand the rationale and driving forces behind a 
policy agenda that prescribes holistic programmes and suggests simultaneous 
implementation of justice and security reforms in countries with debilitated 
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state structures and financial constraints.  This gains additional importance 
against the background that Western countries prescribing those recipes do 
not carry out these activities in tandem in their own states.  For example, 
defence reviews, assessment and adaptation of security budgets, 
strengthening or loosening security oversight legislation and judiciary reviews 
are not necessarily sequenced processes in Western countries, or form part of 
programmes called SSR.  This duality of criteria weakens the legitimacy of the 
SSR agenda, and this hypocritical stance also contributes to the resistance 
that this agenda faces in several non-Western countries. 
 
However, given that SSR has become a standard programme in the context of 
peace operations, and since it is linked to strategic interests - be they to 
maintain peace and stability, or to create security efficiency for protection of 
economic assets - African countries are also engaging in it from the position of 
providers of security assistance to its peers.  A telling example is South 
Africa’s contribution to the reform of the armed forces, the police, and 
immigration in the DRC (Hendricks and Lucey, 2013), and Angola’s military 
mission in Guinea Bissau in 2012 (Uzoechina 2014: 20).  Hence, it is also 
appropriate to understand how SSR unfolds in practice in a Western/non-
Western security assistance context, to compare it to the politics of 
engagement by African SSR providers.  Nonetheless, such comparative 
exercise does not take place in the context of this thesis. The rising SSR 
support by African countries to its peers constitutes an avenue of research 
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worth pursuing on its own, in order to learn about the principles and practice 
guiding their conduct, and subsequently assess them in light of those 
advanced by Western countries.  As far as can currently be observed, they 
operate similarly to the majority of other SSR state sponsors in so far as they 
provide technical and training support, but with no inclusion of a governance 
perspective.   
 
It is important, however, to redress some balance with regards to the claim 
that SSR is solely a Western agenda.  Whilst SSR may have been initially 
articulated from a Western policy basis, subject to co-optation by geopolitical 
interests and suited to enabling neoliberal economic agendas, its espoused 
values of democratic governance, which in the most remain to be 
implemented, are not alien to the populations of African countries  
(Hendrickson 2004: 8).  This is proven by African civil society's engagement in 
organic democratic change movements of the 1990s and early 2000s, and in 
recent initiatives to resist the return of authoritarianism (for e.g. in Mozambique 
from 2010 onwards, in Burkina Faso in 2014).  Hence, a grassroots critical 
agency is in the making, and even if uncoordinated and merely discursive 
against violence, contributes towards hybrid post-liberal forms of peace 
(Richmond, 2011).  In light of this the wider the availability of information 
deriving from case study informed research, the higher the potential for 
improvement of the SSR field, and more importantly, of the watchdog and 
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supportive roles that CSOs can play in building democratic governance of the 
security sector.    
 
1.8 Contribution to knowledge 
This thesis aims to contribute to expanding knowledge on at least four different 
counts.  First and foremost, this work provides new empirical evidence through 
a case study on Mozambique, helping to overcome the excessively 
prescriptive and normative stances widespread in current SSR literature and 
policy (Brzoska 2003: 49, Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 17, OECD-DAC 2005: 
61).  Whilst the gap between prescription and empirical inputs is being filled 
with a growing body of case study research from different geographies, a case 
study on Mozambique is pertinent.  Numerous data about Anglophone Africa 
are now being complemented by rapidly expanding literature on Francophone 
Africa, yet information is still lacking about Lusophone countries and the 
unfolding of reforms in their security and justice apparatuses. 
 
Secondly, this research supplements the existing literature on transitions and 
on SSR, by focusing on the sequencing and coherence of reform processes, a 
little studied and understood subject (Lilly et al 2002: 9, Forman 2004: 206, 
Lalá 2004: 12, Brzoska 2006: 12, Lalá 2006: 59, Isima 2010: 336).  At the 
macro level, coherence and sequencing in this case study of Mozambique 
comprises examination of how security and justice reforms evolved in light of 
other simultaneously ongoing political and economic transitions.  This analysis 
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confirmed that the precedence and prevalence of economic liberalisation over 
peacebuilding and democratisation, significantly moulded the short, medium 
and long-term outcomes of reforms, resulting in weak post-conflict state 
institutions, including those of the security and justice sectors.  
 
At the meso level, coherence and sequencing are analysed with regards to 
institutional changes in the defence, police and justice, with evidence showing 
that Mozambique’s 1992 peace agreement provided significant entry-points for 
security reforms.  However, the peace agreement’ provisions were highly 
contested during negotiations and implementation, precluding the enactment 
of a comprehensive framework for security transformation.  This also resulted 
in unintended short and medium-term security outcomes, which led to miss 
opportunities for immediate police and justice reforms.  Yet, opportunities for 
security and justice reform developed in the medium term as well, mainly 
through a public sector reform that started in 1999.  However, this process 
was insufficient and inadequate, insofar as addressing the specificities of the 
security and justice sectors, leading to poor levels of ownership and failing to 
meet institutional performance needs.  
 
Another subsumed contribution to knowledge deriving from the thesis 
engagement with issues of sequencing and coherence of SSR is that of 
helping to fill a relevant policy gap (Brzoska 2003: 41-4, Ball 2006: 329).  This 
is done utilising praxis to augment specific knowledge about how the security 
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sector works on the ground, and unearthing the concrete lessons and 
recommendations that can be derived from that experience.  The research 
findings show that involvement of all security actors (including potential 
detractors) in the preparatory phase of reforms is essential to ensuring the 
legitimacy of the process, but also to identifying the spoilers and building 
strategies to address their needs.  In addition, they highlight how the 
minimalism of the security provisions and their deficient implementation has 
led to security vacuums that induced conflicting parties to engage in survival 
tactics, which tended to reproduce mistrust and violence in the short, medium 
and long-term. Whilst specific reforms may be introduced in the various 
institutions that compose the security and justice system, an overall framework 
is usually missing, and could be introduced through processes starting with 
national security assessments.  Nonetheless, obstacles to such 
comprehensive processes tend to appear in the form of political mistrust 
between the government and opposition, and between the various 
stakeholders of the justice and security sector, a situation oftentimes 
compounded by the absence of societal pressure for security governance 
reforms. 
  
A finding from the juxtaposition of the macro, meso and micro analysis carried 
out in this thesis, is that coherence and sequencing of SSR interventions is 
highly dependent on the interface between international, national and local 
political and economic dynamics.  Yet, even if the context is relatively benign, 
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if external partners are unprepared to pursue a coherent strategy, 
opportunities for progress will be missed.   
 
Fourthly, the thesis systematises, through the literature review, the critique 
about the security sector reform agenda.  The contributions and limitations of 
IR in providing a useful theoretical framework for the debate on SSR are 
highlighted, moving on to an analysis in light of the liberal peace critique. 
 
B - Research Methodology 
1.9 Methodology 
This study adopted a flexible qualitative research design to produce 
knowledge based on the analysis of fieldwork data, and drawing on the 
author’s experience.  The latter derives mainly from having worked as a civil 
servant at the Ministry of Defence in Mozambique (1997-2002), in a period of 
extensive transformation of the security institutions in the country. In addition, 
the author has investigated, over a number of years, the subject of post-
conflict reconstruction as a researcher and lecturer at the Higher Institute of 
International Relations in Maputo.   
 
Primary data collection methods including semi-structured interviews, 
documentary analysis and the analysis of archival data were employed during 
the fieldwork.  These were complemented by secondary data collection, which 
drew on the limited existing research on security matters in Mozambique, and 
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on the growing number of publications focusing on the political economy of the 
country, as well as on its socio-political characteristics.  
 
The choice of a qualitative research methodology derived from the nature of 
the research question, in this case the study of institutional security reforms 
with a focus on coherence and sequencing in post-conflict Mozambique (1992-
2009). Numerical data, whenever available, were used to measure specific 
components of SSR, such as security expenditures, military spending, and 
polling data regarding the public perception of the army, police and/or 
judiciary.  However, putting statistics at the centre of this type of research has 
limitations.  In the case of Mozambique, these included scarcity of data over 
long historical periods, and especially concerning the immediate post-conflict 
phase, as well as the lack of systematisation and low levels of reliability.  In 
addition, shortcomings usually derive from the time intervals in which surveys 
are conducted. Institutions may have been reformed and improved their 
performance, yet results do not fully reflect this outcome, because there is a 
natural time lag before improvements impact on public consciousness. Hence, 
a qualitative analysis based on field interviews enabled an updated and 
nuanced local perspective. 
 
1.9.1 Research Strategy 
Case study research was chosen for its several benefits, namely:  1) attention 
to empirical specifics and to research participants; 2) a detailed examination of 
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issues; 3) a fuller understanding of the socio-political and historical context of 
the study; 4) and the derivation of lessons (Vaus 2001: 231, 235, Yin 2003: 13, 
41, Silverman 2005: 127, Flyvbjerg 2007: 392, Creswell 2003: 181).   
 
However, the adoption of Mozambique as a single case presented research 
limits around the possibility of deriving generalisations and lessons applicable 
elsewhere.  Whilst the use of multiple case studies was considered, issues 
associated with the scope of the research, fieldwork time and budget 
constraints ultimately ruled out this option. To overcome this limitation, 
examples drawn from other countries have been provided on the different 
issues examined, building generalisation through analytic and theoretical 
approaches as opposed to statistical benchmarks. The Mozambique case 
study also has intrinsic value for documenting features that have not yet been 
exposed academically, such as the dynamics of intersections in security 
reforms in the defence, police and justice fields, from an integrated 
perspective of security sector reform.  This explanatory case study moves 
beyond the description of SSR in Mozambique, to draw associations with other 
economic and political reforms occurring within the wider liberal peace project. 
 
The systematic implementation of the case study design ensured research 
reliability through construct validity (Robson 2002: 168, Yin 2003: 33). This 
was achieved by triangulating data from documentary analysis and from 
interviews, and by having, as much as possible, interviewees revise the 
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transcripts of interviews.  Internal validity was built up through the 
consideration of rival explanations to the research questions and by pattern 
matching during data analysis.  A draft theoretical framework on SSR 
prepared prior to the fieldwork, as well as the comparisons drawn with other 
documented cases served to enhance external validity. Finally, reliability 
(Janesick 1994: 217, Yin 2003: 34, Silverman 2005: 127) was built through a 
case study protocol, keeping a fieldwork research diary and a case study 
database. 
 
In the past the researcher held some insider knowledge given her work for the 
Ministry of Defence of Mozambique.  This instance of ‘participant observation’ 
at a given point in time entailed risks, insofar as biased views based on this 
experience could potentially influence research results.  Aware of the danger 
of falling into a situation of ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’, i.e., ‘the selection of only 
those data that fit the research hypothesis’ (Kimmel 1988: 39), the researcher 
used self-reflexivity, discussed the data analysis results with her supervisor 
and exposed her findings to academic audiences to obtain feedback.   
 
1.9.2 Fieldwork  
This PhD thesis comprises research carried out in a multi-year framework and 
data collected during three different fieldwork trips.  The first field trip to 
Maputo occurred from 1 to 30 May 2005 and was undertaken for academic 
purposes, although it was carried out outside the scope of this PhD 
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programme.  However, the information gathered had not yet been 
systematised or utilised elsewhere, and the interview data were relevant for 
the current PhD thesis. 
 
Two other fieldtrips took place from 4 June to 30 September 2008 and from 6 
February to 11 May 2009.  The multiple visits made it possible to follow up on 
developments in the different security arenas, and meant that some of the 
participants were interviewed more than once.  It also allowed the researcher 
the opportunity for deeper reflection, as well as a dynamic basis for 
interpreting and evaluating change.  The second fieldtrip in 2008 entailed work 
in three provinces, two in the North (Cabo Delgado and Nampula - provincial 
capitals Pemba and Nampula) and one in the Centre (Sofala, provincial capital 
Beira), as well as interviews in the capital Maputo, mainly with people related 
to the defence establishment.  The third trip in 2009 was devoted to work in 
the Southern province (Gaza, provincial capital Xai-Xai) and to the completion 
of interviews in Maputo, largely with representatives from the police and justice 
institutions.  These provinces were chosen in order to obtain a representative 
sample from the South, Centre and North of the country, given Mozambique’s 
regional imbalances and different cultures that might have shaped distinct 
security responses. 
 
Over 55% of the time spent in the field was dedicated to scheduling and 
conducting interviews.  Due to the scattered location of documentary and 
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archival data, their collection accounted for approximately 25% of the research 
time.  Another 10% was dedicated to secondary data collection and logistical 
preparation for fieldwork in the provinces, whilst the actual travel time 
consumed the remaining 10% of the calendar.  
 
Overall, the three fieldtrips produced a total of one hundred and fifty-two (152) 
interviews, of which 33 were carried out in 2005.  These were complemented 
by the collection of a variety of legislation, newspaper clippings, reports, and 
publications.  
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Fig. 2 Map of Mozambique fieldwork in 2008 and 2009 
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1.9.3 Data Collection  
As explained above, concerns with reliability of the data led to the use of a 
wide range of methods for collecting data from differing sources, in order to 
enable triangulation and the corroboration of information.  The 
complementary methods used were semi-structured interviews, document 
analysis, archival records and direct observation.   
 
1.9.4 Semi-structured Interviews  
Interviews were the main source of data because they afford a deeper 
understanding of the reasoning, intentions, and driving factors behind 
specific behaviours and decisions on the part of actors in any given 
process.  Semi-structured interviews in particular enabled participants to 
provide their account of events whilst, at the same time, allowing the 
researcher to introduce relevant issues and keep the interview focused.  
Annex A presents a master sample5 of the research questions designed to 
ensure completeness without compromising comparability.  
 
The initial purposive sampling strategy (Bernard 1995: 95, Creswell 2003: 
185, Silverman 2005: 129) later gave way to snowballing sampling (Babbie 
1992: 292, May 2001: 132).  The primary interviewees had suggestions 
about other important actors and, whenever logistics permitted, the 
                                                
5 The interview questions were customised for each category of interviewees and within these categories 
between the different fields and their specific posts.  They were also tailored according to whether 
participants were based at a central, provincial, district or administrative post.  The tailored lists usually 
contained a maximum of 6-8 interview questions. 
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researcher interviewed as many suggested people as possible.  The total 
of one hundred and fifty-two (152) interviewees can be divided into four 
general categories:  
 
a) Decision-makers, policy-makers, civil servants and operational staff of 
political, economic and security institutions. These comprised mainly 
members of the national council for defence and security; defence ministry 
and armed forces; interior ministry and police; justice ministry, courts and 
public prosecution office.  Additional contributions came from the foreign 
ministry, the ministry of public administration, the ministry of planning and 
development, the ministry of finance and the operational centre for natural 
disaster management.  These actors were divided between those based in 
the capital, Maputo, representing a majority of sixty (60) interviewees, and 
those based in the provinces, numbering thirty-six (36) participants.  The 
latter were distributed between four (4) different provincial capitals (Pemba- 
Cabo Delgado, Nampula- Nampula, Beira- Sofala and Xai-Xai- Gaza), 
seven (7) districts (Mueda, Mecubúri, Angoche, Maringué, Chokwé, 
Chibuto, Macia), five (5) administrative posts (N’Gapa, Namina, 
Namaponda, Subué and Malehice) and two (2) localities (Nonje and 
N’Saua). 
 
b) Diversified actors including both Frelimo and Renamo parliamentarians, civil 
society groups such as NGO like the League of Human Rights, JustaPaz, 
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and the Associação Moçambicana para o Desenvolvimento e Democracia 
amongst others, as well as academics from institutions such as the 
University Eduardo Mondlane and the Higher Institute of International 
Relations.  These actors were mostly based in Maputo, but there were also 
some in the provincial capitals, amounting to a total of thirty-one (31) 
interviewees.  
 
c) Two types of focus groups participated, one made up of local community 
members and another of specific social and professional groups.  They 
amounted to a total of nine (9) focus groups comprising about 136 
participants.  Those with the participation of local community members 
(including the common citizen -peasants, traders, etc- teachers, health 
practitioners, local security and justice providers) were carried out in the 
following administrative posts and localities, totalling six (6) focus groups:  
i. Nonge and N’Gapa in the province of Cabo Delgado (about 20 
people each) 
ii. Namina and Namaponda in the province of Nampula (about 15 
people each)  
iii. N’Saua in the province of Sofala (about 10 people) 
iv. Malehice in the province of Gaza (about 40 people). 
 
The advantage of these focus groups was that they allowed flowing 
conversations, with some initial core questions posed to the group, which 
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enabled the interviewees to talk about the issues they wanted.  The 
downside was that sometimes there were lengthy interventions from certain 
participants, diminishing the opportunity for others to express their opinions.  
Occasionally the same few people spoke, so the researcher had to 
cautiously encourage other participants to voice their opinions.  
Furthermore, confidentiality was not applicable in this open community 
setting, and this may have inhibited certain people from disagreeing with 
those in influential positions.  However, the discussions were generally 
positive as the participants communicated actively. This type of meeting 
also allowed the researcher to probe for answers about issues regarding 
conflict resolution, justice and security as a follow up from other less 
sensitive issues, whenever they remained unaddressed by participants.  
 
The remaining three (3) focus groups were composed of: 
 
i. a group of liberation war ex-combatants in the village of Maringué 
(5 participants) 
ii. officers working (mostly lecturers) at the Military Academy in 
Nampula (7 participants) 
iii. Navy officers at the naval headquarters in Maputo (4 participants). 
 
These collective interviews differed from those described above in that the 
groups were smaller and discussions focused around issues peculiar to 
their affiliation.  Also, they allowed deeper and detailed discussions about 
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the issues at stake and the views expressed by the members of these 
smaller groups were more similar. 
 
d) Representatives of the main international bilateral donors and multilateral 
agencies supporting reforms in the defence, police and justice sectors in 
Mozambique from countries such as the USA, the UK, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Germany and institutions such as the UNDP.  From the bilateral 
cooperation milieu, staff from the embassies/high commissions, 
development cooperation agencies, military attaches, police representatives 
in technical cooperation missions and development foundations were 
interviewed.  During the 2008 and 2009 fieldtrips the European Union 
Commission, a major supporter of justice reforms, and at the time also in 
the process of beginning support to the police, did not grant an interview. 
The same happened with Denmark - the main donor in the Justice domain - 
and the World Bank.  The German embassy and development cooperation 
agency, despite their support for the MInt community policing initiative, did 
not see themselves as supporting reforms in the Police, nor in SSR.  A total 
of sixteen (16) interviews were conducted.  
 
 
Documentary Analysis, Archival Records and Complementary Sources 
 
Documentary analysis was based on a review of communiqués, policy 
documents, legislation, non-classified organisational reports and documents, 
parliamentary session transcripts, newspaper and magazine articles, and 
official speeches.  Some of these documents were obtained from open 
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sources such as the publications of official laws, the national newspapers, the 
national archive and the Internet.  Others, such as non-classified 
organisational documents, like those containing institutional structures and 
organograms of the defence, police and justice establishments, as well as a 
wide array of legislation on these areas, were made available by the 
respective ministries.   
 
Parliamentary session transcripts, including those related to debates on 
security and justice matters, were obtained from the archives in the Parliament 
library. The President’s Office had no organised archive of speeches by the 
current and former Presidents, and these were directly sourced from the 
Internet page of the Government of Mozambique, and from blogs such as 
http://macua.blogs.com. 
 
A substantial number of relevant newspaper and magazine articles (old and 
new) was collected from the national news agency, Agência de Informação de 
Moçambique (AIM), and from national newspaper and magazine archives 
such as those of Notícias, Domingo, Savana, Zambeze and Tempo.  Notícias 
and Tempo in particular were good sources for post-independence legislation 
that was not readily available at most libraries.  This was complemented by a 
set of security-focused newspaper clippings for the months of July and August 
2008 that were provided to the researcher by the Secretariat of the National 
Council for Defence and Security.  Additionally, videotapes of public interviews 
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were obtained from the TV station records of the Televisão de Moçambique 
(TVM).  News was also collected from international and regional media 
providers such as the BBC and the Defence Web, mainly through their 
websites.  The researcher drew extensively on the highly respected website 
mozambiquehistory.net for media articles related to the history of 
Mozambique. 
 
Surveys that verified grass-roots opinions about state issues and the 
legitimacy of the security forces including, amongst others, the level of police 
and justice service delivery were also useful (Inquérito Nacional de Opinião 
Pública, 2001, Afrobarometer, 2005, 2008).  Indexes such as the UNDP 
Human Security Index, the Global Peace Index, and the Legatum Prosperity 
Index were helpful because they provided comparative data on development, 
governance, corruption, and peace and security in an evolving timeline, 
highlighting both progress and setbacks.  
 
Data gathering was highly time consuming because of the dispersion of 
information and, whilst a considerable amount of legislation existed, it was not 
possible to obtain all of it from one place.  Furthermore, not all of the desired 
data were collected.  This was the case with most national ministry 
documents, namely: policy statements, organisational development reports, 
institutional memoranda, internal meeting reports and statistical records.  
These documents were not made available as most state representatives and 
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officials from some embassies withheld permission.  In some cases the 
researcher was told that staff shortages prevented the work needed to unearth 
unclassified ministerial or government documents, or to select those pieces 
from within documents that did not contain confidential information.  Many 
institutions simply did not have organised statistical data. The Attorney 
General’s office, for example, had only recently established the relevant 
department.  Hence, over the years, significant gaps persisted with regards to 
statistics on justice, defence and security. 
 
The accuracy and reliability of the data emerging from documentary analysis 
and archival records was of particular concern.  Data analysis requires close 
scrutiny of the historical conditions, contextual considerations and target 
audience for which the documents were initially produced.  The policy 
documents, in particular, were indicative of the general governance approach 
that existed in Mozambique at a given point in time.  Moreover, historical 
documents referring to past practice have cultural underpinnings that are not 
always immediately obvious.  There is also the difficulty of fully understanding 
the inherent preconceptions of the writer(s) of these documents, especially in 
those cases where the researcher was not present at the time of the reported 
events.  However, through accumulated research and knowledge of the 
historical background of the country and of the security establishment the 
researcher was able to address these concerns. 
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Another concern was that a significant proportion of policy documents and 
legislation in Mozambique tended to be drafted from an ideal perspective that 
had little to do with reality.  On the one hand, in many cases, legislation is still 
part of the colonial legacy.  On the other hand, more recent legislative 
frameworks tend to reflect the influence (and legislative traditions) of one 
particular, or of various donors providing assistance in a specific area.  This 
usually results in two tendencies.  Sometimes action differs from that 
legislated due to the outdated nature of the provisions which still closely follow 
much of the original colonial legislation (Trindade 2003: 97, 2.3.1-25/02/09), 
as, for instance, in the case of criminal law.  Another difference stems from an 
extremely formalistic attempt to legislate everything from afresh, but without 
any corresponding implementation of the laws (Pinheiro 1999: 1).  Indeed, in 
Mozambique, the challenge of legal reform is very substantial, with long 
waiting lists of legislation to be examined and approved by the executive and 
the legislature. 
 
Direct Observation 
 
Direct observation took place in an informal manner, by registering events, 
details and behaviours that accompanied the process of data collection.  Other 
relevant data consisted of contextual observations derived from the 
researcher’s knowledge of the working conditions of certain security forces, 
such as the military stationed at the naval base in Pemba, the police facilities 
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in the districts and administrative posts, as well as visits to the prison centres 
of Rex and Ndlavela.   
 
1.10 Ethical considerations 
1.10.1 Informed Consent, Confidentiality and Anonymity 
Ethical issues deserved special attention in this project, with the researcher 
taking the utmost care to protect the interests of those involved in the research 
process.  All interviews were voluntary to prevent coercion and deception of 
any kind. An informed consent form (see Annex B) was distributed prior to the 
interviews, which contained information about the purpose of the research, its 
use, dissemination, and confidentiality measures.  In addition, prior to 
beginning interviews, the researcher orally reiterated the information contained 
in the informed consent form.  Approximately half of the total interviewees 
accepted the use of a tape-recorder, although the majority of these were 
based in the capital Maputo, in contrast with the provinces, where most people 
felt uncomfortable with the use of such a device.  
 
Whilst the use of informed consent was sufficient for the urban-based and 
literate group of interviewees, additional care was taken in the process of 
obtaining consent from the illiterate and grass-roots respondents.  This was 
done by orally explaining the information contained in the formal written 
consent letter to the community gatekeepers and asking them to convey the 
message to the group of interviewees.  In addition, prior to commencing 
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interviews, the researcher addressed the interviewees and explained the 
process again, providing them with an opportunity to ask for clarifications.  
 
The process, however, was not ideal.  The researcher addressed interviewees 
in Portuguese and although simple language was used, some of them did not 
fully understand or speak the country’s official language, which meant that 
translators had to be present in most collective interviews.  Since relying on 
translators carries the risk that the nature of the research is not fully conveyed 
to the respondents, care was taken to select the best possible translators in 
each location.  People spoke openly in most cases, including about the 
government, often expressing resentment about the lack of healthcare and 
poor education and infrastructure, even in the presence of state 
representatives.  
 
Interview-based research relies heavily on the trust created between 
interviewer and interviewee.  Ways of generating trust comprised the 
assurance of confidentiality and anonymity to the interviewees, as well as 
feedback in the form of transcripts to those based in urban locations. In 
relation to individual interviews, codifying of interviewees’ identity ensured 
confidentiality; however, in certain cases, full anonymity was difficult to 
guarantee.  That was because the Mozambican security setting is small and 
unusual views are likely to be indirectly identified by those familiar with the 
environment, even in the absence of interviewees’ names.  Given this 
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limitation, the researcher let interviewees know at the beginning of the 
interview that they had the option to discontinue involvement at any given 
point during the conversation.  Participation in the interview was encouraged 
by outlining the benefits of the study whilst taking care to not overstate them.  
It is important to bear in mind that, whilst this project did not require covert 
research, the subject was of a sensitive nature in Mozambique where security 
issues are still treated as taboo at certain levels.  The public does not receive 
much information about security reforms and, although democratisation is 
underway, limitations exist concerning effective accountability and 
transparency of security institutions.  Consequently, issues related to power 
dynamics and job safety within the justice and security establishment were 
dealt with sensitively, particularly during the process of gaining informed 
consent. 
 
1.10.2 Access and Gate Keeper Involvement  
Gaining access to interviewees was assisted by the fact that the researcher is 
a Mozambican national and possessed a recommendation letter from the 
University of Bradford and had been affiliated with the Higher Institute of 
International Relations of Mozambique.  Access to Defence Ministry and 
Armed Forces officials was relatively easy given the researcher’s former 
affiliation with the Ministry of Defence.  This was not the case with the Justice 
institutions or the Ministry of Interior and Police forces, where significant 
personnel changes, including in crucial leadership positions, had taken place.  
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These changes occurred not only between the time that the researcher 
worked in the security institutions’ milieu, but also between the first and 
second fieldtrips, meaning that the contacts established during the first trip 
were of limited utility during the second.  
 
The researcher relied on former colleagues to facilitate meetings with senior 
personnel in cases where introductory letters proved insufficient to secure 
such interviews.  In the provinces data gathering was initially expected to take 
place either through association with national research institutions assembling 
information in the field or via local NGOs.  The first option was ideal in terms of 
ensuring the degree of independence between the researcher and state 
authorities, but it proved impossible to identify such institutions coinciding with 
the time of the researcher’s schedule.  As a result, preparation of the trip to the 
provinces took considerable time because of the need to contact provincial 
and district state institutions, impacting negatively on the research timetable.  
 
C - Thesis Structure  
1.11 Chapter summary   
This thesis is organised into eight chapters.  The introduction is divided intro 
three sections.  The first exposes the genesis, rationale and relevance of this 
thesis’ research, through an assessment of the existing analysis and 
discussion of the paradoxes and disjuncture between the SSR concept, policy 
and its implementation.  The research question is framed, and the thesis’ 
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contributions to knowledge, and the pertinence of a case study on 
Mozambique are also presented.  The second section comprises the research 
design and includes justification of the qualitative methodology adopted, the 
methods utilised and the ethical dimensions considered. Section three 
provides the structure of the thesis, through a short description of chapters.  
 
The literature review carried out in chapter two starts with a brief overview of 
SSR in the context of different IR paradigms, underscoring its contributions 
and shortcomings and justifying the choice of a theoretical framework based 
on the liberal peacebuilding critique for examining SSR.  The proceeding 
analysis focuses on the emergence of SSR and the contested role of politics in 
it and the impact of the international political economy of aid in SSR practice.  
Finally, a case is made for complementing the adopted theoretical framework 
of the liberal peacebuilding critique with the concepts of critical juncture, path 
dependence and institutional bricolage for the specific case study analysis on 
Mozambique. 
 
Chapter three commences the case study of coherence and sequencing of 
security reforms in Mozambique by setting the assessment of the country’s 
post-civil war security and justice institutions (1992-2009) within a historical 
state-building framework.  This chapter explains Mozambique’s different 
trajectory to that of the majority of African countries where the immediate post-
independence period was characterised by neo-patrimonial rule.  Ruling 
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through rentierism and ethnicisation of politics and leading to a subjection of 
the security sector to manipulation for private gains and protection of particular 
elites did not occur in independent Mozambique.  Nonetheless, an analysis of 
the political economy that characterised this historical period shows that this 
was insufficient to save the country from civil war.  The implementation of 
Frelimo’s socialist exclusionary ruling options and modernist nation-building 
aspirations, whilst simultaneously countering regional security destabilisation 
in a confrontational international environment, ultimately hindered its state-
building project.  The violent responses unleashed, resembling the colonial 
order that it had intended to dismantle, exacerbated societal, political and 
economic grievances paving the way to civil war, and to strengthening 
Renamo’s insurgency. 
 
A historical overview of the origins, structure and institutional culture of the 
justice and security institutions during the post-independence era (1975-1992) 
is provided in chapter four.  The chapter draws on policy and institutional 
weaknesses that derived from the governing options adopted by the ruling 
Frelimo party, and analyses its responses to shortcomings. It is shown that a 
paradoxical and sequential coexistence of critical juncture and path 
dependence at the macro and state-building level fostered incoherence in 
institutional building policies for the justice and security system at the meso 
level.  In addition, the chapter offers a baseline against which to test the 
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apparent rupture between the security and justice institutional apparatus and 
practice of the post-independence and of the post-civil war periods. 
 
Chapter five focuses on the origins, driving forces and sequencing of 
Mozambique’s triple transition, namely from a central planning model to a 
market economy, from one-party to multiparty politics, and from war to peace.  
It argues that the primacy of economic liberalisation over peacebuilding and 
democratisation significantly moulded the short, medium and long-term 
outcomes of the transition.  This specific sequencing of processes combined 
with elements of path dependence (e.g. resurgence of Frelimo’s past 
behaviour) shaped a particular type of political bricolage that resulted in weak 
post-conflict state institutions, including those of the security and justice 
sectors.  In addition to this, old and new patterns of exclusion - mainly but not 
exclusively fostered by economic liberalisation - have been reinforced through 
the emergence of neo-patrimonial logics in the ruling of the country.  
Mozambique is presently vulnerable to outbreak of new forms of armed 
violence, an outcome of Frelimo’s poor learning from Africa’s patterns towards 
violent conflict. 
 
Chapter six focuses on the transition from war to peace by examining 
Mozambique’s General Peace Agreement (GPA) and the implementation of its 
security provisions in the immediate aftermath of war.  It analyses how 
bargaining extended into the period of implementation, and how regime 
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security dynamics that unfolded in this period affected the coherence and 
sequencing of subsequent medium to long-term security and justice reforms in 
the country.  A central argument is that whilst the GPA represented an 
opportunity offering entry-points for security reforms, in practice it resulted in 
missed opportunities for police and justice reforms.  Hence, whilst the GPA 
enabled a negative peace in Mozambique, a more modest view of its political 
success is warranted.  
 
Chapter seven considers the security architecture of the country.  This 
includes analysis of consultation mechanisms such as the National Council of 
Defence and Security and the oversight role of institutions like the Parliament.  
The chapter examines reforms that took place in the defence, police and 
justice institutions between 1992-2009 against the background of renewed 
opportunities offered by public sector reforms, but constrained by the 
underlining construction of a liberal peace.  Reforms in the criminal justice 
system are also appraised given the prominence awarded to them by 
interviewees during fieldwork and their exponential intersectoral nature, which 
facilitated analysis of coherence and sequencing.  The findings confirm how 
resistance to change, quality and change of leadership and cumbersome 
bureaucratic and legal processes affect security and justice reforms.  They 
also illustrate how processes of justice and security reforms can become 
vulnerable to political expediency on the part of the government and donors, at 
times leading to political/ institutional bricolage arrangements. 
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The eighth and last chapter considers research findings against the main and 
subsidiary research questions, provides broad recommendations for the 
upcoming reforms in Mozambique and for SSR in general, and identifies 
relevant topics for further research.  The main conclusion is that despite 
incremental institutional reforms and improvement the overall security and 
justice reform process in Mozambique has been flawed by the absence of a 
comprehensive framework, warranting an evaluation of the need of a national 
security strategy.  The lack of such framework has had a negative impact on 
policy coherence and the sequencing of security reform implementation, 
hampering the efficient delivery of security and justice to citizens.  Yet, such 
process is only valuable insofar as it is based on genuine and inclusive 
ownership by Mozambicans, something that is likely to face impediments.  The 
persistent political mistrust between Frelimo and Renamo since the GPA, the 
GoM’s apparent lack of interest in developing a NSS, and lack of societal 
pressure in this direction embodies the limits of Mozambique’s justice and 
security reform processes. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 Literature Review 
 
 
‘Knowledge is like a garden;  
if it is not cultivated, it cannot be harvested’  
Swahili Proverb 
 
 
 
This chapter analyses SSR in the context of the critique of liberal 
peacebuilding and uses International Relations (IR) paradigms to present a 
theoretical framework that can advance the insights provided by the prevailing 
problem-solving oriented research in the field.  The resultant analysis from the 
application of IR theory - from positivist to post-positivist perspectives, 
including feminism - to SSR has two advantages.  The first is that it explains 
the incoherent implementation of SSR and the power structures underlying it 
(Cox 1981: 126-155), through demonstrating how the transformative potential 
of SSR has been subjected to hijacking by co-option of powerful donors to suit 
self-centred geopolitical concerns. The second is that it underlines how the 
external nature of SSR implies lack of legitimacy to achieve sustainable 
political change in implementing countries, so as to anchor the development of 
a more inclusive (including gender-wise), accountable and efficient security 
and justice system. 
 
However, the traditional paradigms of IR - realism and liberalism - offer a 
somewhat narrow contribution in view of the limited flexibility to overcome their 
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particular entrenched tenets. The liberal peace6 critique has developed in 
reaction to these limitations, and therefore this thesis uses its lenses to further 
the analysis on SSR, by critically examining its constitutive nature in the 
existing liberal order. 
  
The conceptual-contextual divide that characterises SSR indicates that this 
field shares common ground with the liberal critique of peacebuilding, and with 
a body of sceptical literature on a variety of other policies within the security-
development nexus (Egnell and Haldén 2009: 48).  This commonality is 
unsurprising given that, as is similar in emergent areas of knowledge and 
international policy initiatives, most SSR literature has been highly normative, 
subordinating reality to a desire to reform the world (Carr quoted in Griffiths 
1999: 7).  This prescriptive stance, despite being infused with the notion of 
‘doing good’, has proven to be prejudicial because it relies on principles that 
are not (all) shared or awarded the same value by the actors implementing 
SSR. In addition, normative initiatives tend to be vulnerable to co-option by 
powerful actors that dominate the setting of international agendas (Pugh 2000: 
6) and by domestic agents that define ‘national interest’.  
                                                
6 The ‘Liberal Peace’ reflects an ideology that aims at the establishment of sustainable peace, with 
democratisation and economic capitalism as the pillars of stability that resolve and/or prevent armed 
violence.  Development is the end-result of the liberal peace, which is advanced through a western-
centered global governance system that implements a kind of internationalism based on institutionalism 
and state-building as tantamount to peacebuilding.  The peacebuilding enterprise in the framework of the 
international liberal peace encompasses a series of ‘packages’ to be delivered, such as humanitarian 
aid, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, security sector reform, elections, human rights, 
transitional justice, rule of law, free trade and market economies (Richmond 2006, MacGinty and 
Richmond, 2007, Heathershaw, 2008). 
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The liberal peacebuilding critique focuses in particular on the contradictions 
and shortcomings of the current liberal peace model contribution to building 
post-war societies with the rights, freedoms, plurality and equality claimed by 
liberalism (Cooper et al 2011: 13).  Whilst the liberal peace critique has roots 
in IR studies that questioned the nature of power and the way it shaped global 
structures (Cox 1981, 1987, Boulding, 1989), it also draws on contributions 
from peace and conflict studies, and adopts an interdisciplinary approach.  
Therefore, a systematic understanding of the shortcomings of liberal 
peacebuilding is offered, and the theoretical and power assumptions guiding 
such interventions are questioned. This framework is useful for Mozambique’s 
case study because it supports the unpacking of the neoliberal and 
modernisation canons that underpinned the country’s triple transition from war 
to peace, from a one-party state to a multi-party state, and from a centralised 
economy to a market economy.  
 
Despite these strengths the liberal peace critique encompasses an 
exclusionary stance with regard to institutionalism.7 This is because 
institutionalism in its IR interpretation remains embedded in the analysis of the 
establishment, management and outcomes of organisations and regimes at 
the level of the international system and how these play out in light of state 
interests (Long 2002: 40-41, Duffield 2006: 642).  Therefore, it does not confer 
                                                
7 Institutionalism emerged from a variety of social science traditions. As rooted in liberal IR theory, it is 
grounded in the understanding that institutions and the norms accompanying them offer regularity and 
constancy, building predictability and confidence through the sharing of valuable information (Snyder 
1999: 103-104). The theory further holds that institutions ought to be based on legitimacy instead of 
coercion, reducing transaction costs and helping to promote coordination and cooperation rather than 
conflict, by regulating distributional gains (Lynn-Jones 1999: 56, Duffield 2006: 643-645). 
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adequate attention to the agency of individual actors in the shaping of 
institutional structures.  IR Institutionalism also misses the interactions that 
take place within the realm of the state when creating or reforming institutions.  
Yet, elements of a dynamic approach to institutionalism are required to 
understand sequencing of institutional security reforms at the meso and micro 
levels in the case of Mozambique.  As such, and within the spirit of an 
interdisciplinary approach, additional concepts were identified to guide 
analysis of the case study.  These concepts are critical juncture and path-
dependence, derived from historical institutionalism, and institutional bricolage, 
borrowed from sociological institutionalism. 
 
This framework combining the critique of liberal peacebuilding with critical 
juncture, path-dependence and institutional bricolage provides for a nuanced 
investigation of security reforms in Mozambique.  On the one hand, the 
framework enables the examination of historical circumstances and of the 
interaction of actors at both the national and international levels, mediated by 
power dynamics shaped by the global political economy.  On the other hand, it 
facilitates analysis of the reactions of actors on the ground to a mostly 
internationally driven agenda such as SSR, and their capacity to shape 
outcomes at the local level.  This is crucial because the results of the 
interactions between international, national and sub national actors deeply 
affect the coherence and sequencing of institutional security reforms that are 
at the core of this research. 
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The review of literature begins with a brief overview of SSR as it is presented 
in different IR paradigms, before engaging in analysis based on the liberal 
peace critique.  Finally, the analytical framework drawn upon the concepts of 
critical juncture, path dependence and institutional bricolage is discussed with 
regard to its suitability to the case study on Mozambique. 
 
2.1 SSR in the context of IR theory - A brief overview 
The older paradigm of IR - realism - influenced by an objectivist worldview 
views SSR as a foreign-policy instrument utilised by strong states to either 
foster pro-status quo positions (Dalby 1997: 11) or to promote change in 
countries undergoing transitions.  For example, engagement in SSR 
represents a way of displaying power through the build-up or maintenance of a 
prominent position as a player in global peacekeeping.  Such endeavour is 
undertaken in the strong states’ own national interests as a means to keep 
instability at bay, and to legitimise a self-serving global configuration of power 
(Cox 1981: 127).  In the multi-polar post-Cold War context SSR support 
follows intervention in countries involved in security and ethnic-related turmoil.  
In such environments, the security dilemma is transposable to the reality of 
civil war (Posen, 1993), where internal state anarchy developed as a result of 
the loss of central authority.  Hence, a major goal of support to SSR is to re-
establish the monopoly of the use of force by the state, a logic that underpins 
the prevailing implementation of SSR through programmes centred on the 
provision of military training and equipment.   
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However, the conceptual origin of SSR can be placed within an IR liberal 
theory, more concretely underpinned by a pluralist approach.  From this 
approach stem three main assumptions underlying SSR.  The first 
underscores the relevance of other actors beyond the state, relinquishing the 
realist construct of a unitary state that rationally maximizes strategies for 
gathering power and political-military security in an anarchic environment 
(Krause and Williams 1997: 40-41, Lynn-Jones 1999: 54).  In SSR this is 
materialised by acknowledging the existence of a tripartite state, including 
executive, legislative, and judicial components, while also recognising the role 
of non-state actors such as civil society, traditional authorities, and even 
private security companies.   
 
The second assumption refers to a normative concern with the improvement of 
conditions of peace, including boosting global security and development 
(Keohane and Nye, 1977), for which ‘good’ states are required.  Hence, the 
monopoly of the use of force by the state is maintained as a central and 
desirable outcome, explaining why many SSR programmes accommodate the 
train and equip approach with other institutional reform components.   
 
The third assumption is the notion that interdependence leads to cooperation 
and that progress is achievable if solutions to conflicts are obtained through 
institutions, especially those multilateral in character (Keohane and Nye, 1977, 
Keohane, 1987).  SSR as an instrument used in conflict resolution and 
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peacebuilding by multilateral organisations (and certain bilateral donors) 
incorporates a legacy of these assumptions.  
 
Nonetheless, the underpinnings of the SSR concept in liberal theory do not 
translate into practice, and liberal theorists noted that implementation has 
been influenced by a neo-realist ideology, carried out in partial continuity with 
past practices.  A central role continues to be accorded to the state in 
programming, with limited consideration awarded to the participation of non-
state actors (Baker and Scheye, 2007, Abrahamsen and Williams 2008).  
Furthermore, the fundamental importance given to oversight in the SSR 
discourse does not cohere with the current prevalence of technical military and 
defence assistance (Ball and Hendrickson 2006: 3).  Hence, given the 
notorious dissonance between donors’ SSR rhetoric and implementation, 
liberal analysts call for finding alternatives to improve liberal peacebuilding 
(Paris, 2004, 2010). 
  
Constructivism8 questions the possibility of improvement of liberal 
peacebuilding policies such as SSR because of their exclusionary nature, and 
contributes to the analysis in two ways.  Firstly, it focuses on how 
securitisation9 of threats from the developing world in the form of 
                                                
8 Constructivist theory postulates that ideas are important and arise through social interaction, which, in 
turn, shape actors’ identities, interests, and behaviours (Snyder 1999: 104, Buzan and Hansen 2009: 
191). 
9 Securitisation consists of raising matters beyond the usual importance awarded to them, to a level of ‘... 
politics beyond the established rules of the game, and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics 
or as above politics’ (Buzan et al 1998: 23). In other words the issue at stake is turned into a magnified, 
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underdevelopment and conflict gave rise to post-Cold War interventionist 
discourses and containment policies such as SSR (Doty 1996: 129, Duffied 
2001: 26, Busumtwi-Sam 2002: 260, Abrahamsen 2004: 679-683, Cooper 
2006: 317, Duffield 2007: 123).  Hence, constructivists argue that the 
exaggeration of this threat from the developing world led to an overstatement 
of the benefits of programmes such as SSR unduly placing them at the centre 
of Western development cooperation.10  This results in high expectations 
being created around SSR, in the conviction that it will promote conflict 
prevention and lead to improved governance, when in fact SSR is proving to 
be another tool of donor’ crisis management, or ‘liddism’ (Rogers, 2000). 
 
A second contribution of constructivist analysis is that emerging from the 
perspective of hybrid political orders (HPO) (Boege et al, 2008, Kraushaar and 
Lambach, 2009, Brown et al, 2010).11  HPO literature analyses primarily 
peacebuilding and state-building within the project of expansionism of the 
international liberal order, looking at the impact of formal and informal 
interactions on the reconfiguration of political orders that originate a hybrid 
peace (Mac Ginty, 2010).  In the view of certain authors this interaction 
                                                                                                                                       
existential threat, which needs to be dealt with using exceptional measures and justified allocation of 
resources (Buzan et al 1998: 23-24).  
10 Constructivism and realism share partial criticism with regards to the overstatement of the threat 
emanated from armed conflict in developing countries. Recent realist analyses posit that whilst 
manpower and financial commitment to missions addressing the threat had been assumed to serve the 
national interest of intervening countries, this position overestimated the benefits to said states from 
restored peace and stability in troubled countries (Walton 2009: 718). Therefore, there was a need for 
‘pragmatic multilateralism, removed from both the self-righteous fantasies of neo-conservatism and the 
utopian dreams of progressive humanitarian interventionists’ (Stewart 2008: 147). Realists have used 
such arguments to defend current neo-conservative isolationist approaches. 
 
11 A range of theorists, some of which have been described as critical theorists, have discussed this 
concept; but the notion fits well within constructivism, since it emphasises interactions between external 
and domestic realms, taking into account local agency beyond state-centric approaches. 
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between the local and the global can be characterised as ‘friction’ because 
unexpected developments and unintended consequences emerge from these 
policy transfer attempts (Millar, Lijn and Verkoren 2013: 139). Hence, from an 
HPO perspective the viability of SSR and its implementation outcomes need to 
thoroughly examine local actors and their formal and informal power 
interactions with national and international elites. Such analyses imply that the 
measurement of success of SSR considers fluidity, instead of focusing mainly 
on rational theory based planning and management. 
 
 
A critical theory appraisal of SSR reveals the existence of contradictory 
explanatory perspectives. One the one hand there is a strand which argues 
that an ostensible gap between policy claims - framed in the ambitious rhetoric 
of coherent security and development approaches - and the implementation 
on the ground persists (Chandler 2009: 29, Tschirgi et al 2010: 4, Reid 2011: 
102). A disjuncture between the conceptual approach and implementation of 
SSR also demonstrates that, in practice, SSR interventions fall short of the 
policy discourse.  They are oftentimes a-strategic and incoherent in 
themselves, and not only in relation to simultaneously implemented 
peacebuilding policies.  In addition, the tendency to address SSR as a 
technical matter can be understood as a by-product of the fact that Western 
development cooperation agencies support SSR in the absence of wider 
foreign-policy strategies (Chandler, 2009).  
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On the other hand another strand asserts that security transformation is 
unlikely to emerge from existing efforts12 because SSR derives from the wider 
project of expansion of the liberal peace order, which is in turn underpinned by 
neoliberalism (Richmond 2006: 291-314, MacGinty and Richmond 2007: 491, 
Richmond 2008: 21-39).  The fact that SSR is imbued by a neoliberal ideology 
(Chuter 2006: 20) favours the reinforcement of hegemony of powerful 
international actors in this field.  Hence, whilst reform might possibly be 
achieved through SSR (Ball et al, 2003, Pugh 2006: 29), this is doubtful or in 
permanent danger of reversal (Hills 2010: 179, 189, Luckham and Hutchful 
2010: 29). 
 
Little post-structuralist analysis of SSR is available in the published 
literature. However, in continuum with critical theory, this perspective views 
SSR as reinforcing rather than addressing the pitfalls of a governance system 
characterised by global inequality.  Post-structuralism further establishes that 
SSR and similar techniques are instrumental to the strategic purpose of 
development as an apparatus for protecting western values and modus 
vivendi (Duffield 2007: 2).  In this sense SSR was designed and deployed as 
one amongst an arsenal of neoliberal techniques of governmentality devised 
to advance the strategic and bureaucratic priorities of Western security and 
development sectors.  SSR represents, therefore, an attempt to homogenise 
(via the production of donor consensus) the reasons, ways and means of 
                                                
12 There is a dearth of examples of security transformation, with the possible exception of South Africa 
following the end of Apartheid, but there the process was nationally driven and not called SSR (Cawthra, 
2003, 2014, Williams, 2005). 
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reforming the security sectors of recipient countries in the name of good 
governance (Krause 2011: 33).  In the process of implementation SSR 
disseminates the discourse and transfers policy priorities of powerful 
international donors to the elites of developing countries (Colleta and Muggah 
2009: 429).  This reveals the nature of SSR as a soft security tool intended to 
reduce the potential resistance to change on the ground (Krause 2011: 33).  
SSR lacks, therefore, any organic characteristic that might allow it to transform 
or to achieve meaningful political change directed at a more inclusive, 
accountable and effective security system that would benefit the people of 
developing countries.  
 
Feminist research13 contribution to SSR is central from the point of inclusivity, 
which SSR discourse proclaims as a central goal.  The analysis deriving from 
feminist perspectives emerges from a broad range of IR approaches, ranging 
from liberal to post-positivist.  At its lowest common denominator feminist 
research shares the criticism that SSR emerged as a gender insensitive policy 
(Valasek, 2008, Hudson, 2008, Salahub and Nerland 2010: 263).  Beyond this, 
liberal feminists, on the one hand, favoured the adoption of pragmatic 
approaches towards gender mainstreaming in SSR policy-making, training and 
                                                
13 For a long period of time IR analysis has ignored the socially constructed roles of women in society, 
and the power interactions that underpin them.  Recently, a series of SSR related topics including the 
absence of women in decision-making, the impact of militarism on gender in war and peace times, as 
well as the use of rape and gender-based violence as a strategy of war have been researched (Enloe, 
1989, Kelly, 2000, Pankhurst, 2003, 2010, Cockburn, 2004, 2010).  Additional topics comprise 
prostitution and sex tourism in conflict and post-conflict settings, as well as its relation to the wider 
political economies of peacekeeping, and the post-war backlash over women’s security, including links 
between domestic violence and high levels of militarisation during peacebuilding (Meintjes et al, 2001, 
Tickner, 2004, Giles and Hyndman, 2004, Enloe, 2007, Pankhurst, 2007, Jennings, 2010).  
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programming (Bastick and Valasek, 2008).  On the other hand, feminists from 
a critical theory tradition maintained that an add-on approach was insufficient 
and inadequate, resulting only in a superficial incorporation of gender into SSR 
(Clarke 2008: 58-59, Salahub and Nerland 2010: 264).  According to this view, 
SSR did not question the masculinised assumptions of security and power 
subjacent to operations in the security system (Clarke 2008: 58-59).  SSR did 
not attend to the differentiated meaning of security for women and other 
vulnerable groups, and it failed to make a positive impact on these groups by 
altering existing hierarchies (Salahub and Nerland 2010: 268-269).  The 
deeper explanation for these limitations of SSR is found in its implicit 
exclusionary tenets, which were noticeably present in the security systems of 
the states exporting SSR models, and which invariably affected its application 
in implementing countries  (Hudson 2008: 30, Salahub and Nerland 2010: 
276).  Hence, feminist contributions reinforce the notion that in order to 
produce positive change SSR needs to address power relations, beyond the 
donor/implementing country viewpoint, to incorporate the requirement to 
shape power in favour of the end-beneficiaries of the programmes that belong 
to marginalised groups in society. 
 
2.1.1 IR Theory and SSR – Summary and Conclusion 
While the various IR perspectives presented above and summarised in Fig. 3 
below differ in their interpretation of SSR, certain arguments are common 
across two or more theoretical approaches.  For example, feminist theory 
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crosscuts all other approaches and several liberal analyses find an echo within 
certain works of critical theory.  This is because the roots of the latter are 
linked to criticism of the former.   
 
 
Fig.3 Summary of SSR in light of IR perspectives 
 
The synopsis of SSR analysis in light of IR theory has reinforced the assertion 
that SSR is not a neutral agenda, but rather has its roots in the neoliberal 
ideology that pervades the expansion of the liberal peace order.  SSR is not 
intrinsically evil, but its transformative potential has been hijacked through co-
option by powerful donor countries to suit self-centred geopolitical concerns.  
These include the expansion of global capitalism and the protection of the 
modus vivendi of Western countries by keeping insecurity threats at bay.  SSR 
is therefore a technique of governmentality designed to suit this purpose, 
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explaining the disjuncture between the stated good intentions of the SSR 
discourse and its implementation.  In its disguise as a soft power tool, SSR 
attempts to prevent and/or control the resistance to change resultant from the 
social engineering involved in the reconfiguration of the provision of security in 
implementing countries.  Moreover, the external nature of SSR implies that it 
lacks legitimacy to achieve sustainable political change in implementing 
countries, so as to anchor the development of a more inclusive (including 
gender-wise), accountable and efficient security and justice system. 
 
The result of this assessment could be in itself compelling enough to conclude 
that SSR is a lost cause.  However, such a sceptical stance is not embraced in 
this thesis. The analytical contributions of mainstream IR perspectives suffer 
from a bias that ensues from focus on the agency of donors and of the global 
governance system, whilst failing to consider the role of actors on the ground 
in shaping SSR practices.14  This lacuna existed in the wider field of 
peacebuilding, but has been filled by contributions from liberal peacebuilding 
scholarship in the last two decades (Pugh 2000: 6, Taylor, 2007, 2010, Reid 
2011: 99).  Concepts such as ‘hybrid political orders’ (Boege et al, 2008, 
Kraushaar and Lambach, 2009, Brown et al, 2010), ‘post-liberal peace’ 
(Richmond, 2011), and ‘friction’ (Tsing, 2005, Millar, 2013) have gained 
momentum in liberal peacebuilding critique.  However, only recently have they 
                                                
14 The shortage of analysis about the agency of SSR actors from ‘implementing’ countries is indicative of 
the extent to which IR has been ‘colonised’ by a liberal intellectual hegemony in the last few decades. 
Indeed, the argument by post-colonial theorists that security studies and development theories are 
Western-centric (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 1, Munck and O’Hearn 1999: 1-26) is also appropriate to IR 
and to the field of SSR.  
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resonated in published critique of SSR (Podder, 2013, Gordon, 2014, 
Schroader and Chappuis, 2014).  Thus, this thesis aims to contribute to the 
existing SSR critique through a case study of security and justice reforms in 
Mozambique.  Given the value of the liberal peacebuilding critique for the 
framing of analysis of power exchanges between the ‘local’ and the 
‘international’, a discussion on SSR in view of the liberal peacebuilding critique 
follows. 
 
2.2 SSR and the Security-Development nexus in the context of the liberal 
peacebuilding critique 
 
The development community found in the security-development nexus 
discourse a new direction to drive its activity in the immediate post Cold War 
era, and used it to anchor the foundation of the liberal peace paradigm that 
would drive the field of peacebuilding. The embracing of the security-
development nexus represented a breakthrough given the longstanding 
rejection by development practitioners of the importance of security 
challenges, and the antagonist attitude between the security and the 
development fields (Willet 2005: 575, Ball 2005: 86, Krause and Jütersonke 
2005: 455).15 This change in the discourse of the development community 
                                                
15 Several interrelated debates occurred as a precursor to this change.  The first revolved around the 
need for a continuum between provision of humanitarian aid and longer-term development support, at a 
time when humanitarian relief prevailed (Duffield 2001, 2010, Junne and Verkoren, 2005, Pupavac, 
2006). The second focused on the nature of complex political emergencies (Duffield, 1994, 2007, Cliffe 
and Luckham, 1999, Goodhand and Hulme, 1999, Wheeler, 2000, Kaldor, 2007) and lead to the agenda 
on the Responsibility to Protect (UNGA, 24/10/2005, A/RES/60/1, UNSG 12/02/2009, A/63/677). The 
third asserted the centrality of human security (UNDP, 1994) and led to realisation that the cohabitation 
between conflict, insecurity and poverty impeded its achievement (Willet, 2004).  Backed by the 
prominent study ‘Voices of the Poor’ (WB, 1999) a security first approach emerged on the premise that in 
order to engage in meaningful aid assistance, the security situation on the field required prioritisation in 
the form of stabilisation. 
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assumed moving towards conflict-sensitive assistance, and from 
disengagement with the state towards commitment to state-building (Smith 
2001: 6, Cooper and Pugh 2002: 5).  These principles became the bedrock of 
peacebuilding through statebuilding, and were advanced under the logic that 
shoring-up stabilisation, introducing human rights and regular elections would 
lead to democratic institutions and economic-growth based development 
(Paris, 2004). The package oftentimes applied regardless of the context, 
region, history and culture failed to address the root causes of conflict leading 
to a relapse into war or the emergence of extremely violent politics and crime 
(Cramer, 2006, Darby, 2006, Dodge, 2006, Call, 2007).  It was usually 
concerned with a fast exit strategy for interveners (Paris, 2002, Fearon and 
Laitin, 2004, Rees, 2006, Rubin, 2006) and failed to transform power relations 
and pave the way towards more equitable societies in implementing countries, 
as promised by the emancipatory goals of the liberal peace (Richmond, 2009).  
 
The poor results of this liberal peace-based peacebuilding agenda spurred 
contestation over the hegemonic development policies framed in the 
assumption of the security-development nexus as a mutually reinforcing bi-
directional movement (Duffield 2001, 2005, 2007, 2010, Cooper, 2006, 
Waddell, 2006).16 Criticism focused on the widespread acceptance of the 
                                                                                                                                       
 
16 To conceptually address the considered poor understanding of the constitutive nature of the nexus, it 
was proposed that the nexus be understood as a network of connections between separate ideas, 
processes or objects, which implied an infinite number of possible linkages and relations. This implied 
different potential configurations of linkages between security and development, and not all were 
mutually reinforcing (Stern and Öjendal, 2010: 11).  
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security-development nexus as unproblematic, consensual, and progressive, 
despite being of a complex and unclear nature and plagued by incoherence 
and confusion (Tschirgi, 2005, 2006, Tschirgi et al 2010, Cramer, 2006, 
Chandler, 2009, Stern and Öjendal, 2010).  Regardless of the contestation, 
SSR was framed within the mainstream discourse.  Despite increasing 
prominence in the development agendas of more multilateral and bilateral 
actors - similarly to other peacebuilding policies - SSR results in ‘arresting 
insecurity’ in conflict-ridden countries have remained, at best, questionable 
(Scheye and Peake, 2005).  
 
2.2.1 SSR and the Withering Away of Politics 
 
In retracing the origins of the SSR agenda, the literature recognises that its 
roots were based in different policy debates and research strands that 
emerged with the end of the Cold War (Brzoska, 2003, Ball, 2010).  Besides 
the security-development nexus debate, SSR emerged under the influence of 
studies on civil-military relations and democratic transitions (Hutchful and 
Bathily, 1997, Stepan, 1988, Alagappa, 2002, Cawthra and Luckham, 2003), 
and amidst debates that attempted to move beyond a purist perspective of 
military expenditure reduction in the context of neoliberal economic policies 
(Ball, 1988, DfID, 2000, Hendrickson and Ball, 2002).  Regrettably, the central 
political analysis and the underlying political-economy examination that both 
types of reflections brought to the emerging field of SSR were downplayed in 
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the policy development process, which anchored itself in the traditional tenets 
of the security-development nexus.   
 
The emergence of SSR as a pillar of development policy meant that it carried 
along some of the legacy of this field, such as that development intervention 
ought to be perceived as apolitical, abiding by the imperative of impartiality 
and neutrality (Anderson, 1999: 146; Duffield 2001: 88; Junne and Verkoren 
2005: 5).  This engendered the (much denounced) technocratic approaches 
adopted in the overall implementation of SSR (Williams 2000: 2; Ball 2006: 
328; Peake et al 2006: 252; Egnell and Haldén 2009: 47-48), which emerged 
also as a function of the need to distinguish SSR from more controversial 
regime prompting security agendas that characterised the Cold War period 
(Ball 2010: 29). This largely explains why the predominant policy and practice 
on SSR has for a long time only engaged superficially with the political 
dimensions affecting security reforms, despite research reiterating that SSR is 
intrinsically linked to politics (Hills, 2000, 2010, Cawthra and Luckham, 2003, 
Luckham and Hutchful, 2010, Schnabel and Born, 2011).  The liberal 
peacebuilding critique suggests that this SSR posture has been in sync with 
similar fields of practice since technocracy, driven by the goals of neutrality 
and efficiency, has been a trend in peacebuilding and conflict approaches 
(Mac Ginty, 2012). 
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The rise of the apolitical stance brought about by the developmentalisation of 
SSR resulted in practical deficits in the implementation of this agenda. The 
first was an insufficient understanding of the historical and state formation 
record of the countries undergoing reform and a lack of sensitivity concerning 
political and cultural factors (Egnell and Haldén 2009: 27-50, Hills 2010: 179, 
Albrecht et al, 2010).  This has been compounded by a certain amount of 
political correctness on the part of donors - and sometimes retrenchment - in 
the delivery of aid in this field, given that this support concerns core areas of 
state sovereignty (Lalá, 2001).  Intimately linked to state delivery in security 
and justice areas is the degree of legitimacy harnessed by these institutions, 
or the lack thereof because the African state, in its Westephalian conception, 
tends to either be weak, be a progress in the making, or predatory to its own 
people (Zartman, 1995, Reno, 1998, Miliken and Krause, 2002, Fukuyama, 
2005).  This state conception - trying to accommodate different levels of 
stateness - rather than one that considers the different locus of power in a 
society has prevailed in a first generation of SSR programmes (Sedra, 2010).  
The implications were that programmes were shaped in a top-down 
configuration that centred on formal state institutions and the government as 
interlocutors (Hutchful 2003: 35-41, Human Security Centre, 2005), lacking 
participation of civil society and of ordinary citizens in the formulation of 
security policy, and disregarding marginalised voices (Caparini, 2002, 2004, 
2010, Fluri and Hadžic 2004: 171-234, Farr, 2004).  The literature has been 
very critical of SSR policy and programming overlooking the role of non-state 
  75 
security and justice agents, as well as that of private security and military 
companies, despite their crucial role simultaneously as drivers of insecurity 
and as providers of security and justice (Sharf 2004: 61, Mancini, 2005, 
Abrahamsen and Williams, 2006, Isima, 2007, Baker and Scheye, 2009).  The 
dearth of knowledge about non-state actors has been bridged by growing 
literature which has probed into the mutually reinforcing as well as 
exclusionary state interactions with traditional chiefs, militias, warlords, 
paramilitaries, vigilante groups, local defence forces, private military and 
security companies (PMSCs), business communities and transnational rebel 
groups (Faundez, 2003, Golub, 2003, Francis, 2005, 2012, Avant, 2005, 2009,  
Kyed, 2006, Baker and Scheye, 2007, Abrahamsen and Williams, 2008, Jones 
and Munoz, 2010, Alden et al, 2011). 
 
This trend has led the SSR agenda to gradually recognise non-state actors, in 
particular in the context of community policing work and of justice delivery 
(Albrecht et al, 2011, Francis, 2012), and with the development of specific 
policy frameworks on areas such as PMSCs and business and SSR.17   
 
The criticism of SSR as an exclusionary agenda has also prompted the 
incorporation of participatory approaches - already common in other 
                                                
17 An International Code of Conduct for Private Security service providers (ICoC) has been devised, and 
the area of business and SSR has been focusing on private-public partnerships to promote security, 
development and protection of human rights, including through abiding to the Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights.  Whilst there has been analytical and normative progress in these areas 
SSR programming and implementation is yet to reflect these advances.  http://icoca.ch/, 
http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/ http://www.securityhumanrightshub.org/ 
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development policies - and the rising importance of the local ownership 
principle, beyond the elites and the bureaucracies implementing institutional 
security reforms (Ebnöther and Fluri, 2005, Scheye and Peake 2005: 234, 
Nathan, 2007).  For instance, cross-governmental and societal consultation 
are becoming a common practice in SSR programmes as attested by the 
examples of the defence and security reviews carried out by countries such as 
South Africa, Uganda, Burundi and Sierra Leone (Africa, 2011, Hendrickson 
2007, 2014, Jackson and Albrecht, 2010).  Yet, the degree to which the inputs 
provided by the different actors is centrally considered in the ultimate security 
decision-making remains questionable, and constitutes a valid research topic, 
although one beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
The second major deficit emerging from the prevailing apolitical stance of SSR 
relates to a deficient level of political analysis concerning the levels of 
commitment of the ruling elites in implementing SSR, and therefore negatively 
affecting donors’ political risk management.  Published research argues that 
the willingness of the implementing countries is oftentimes taken for granted 
(Cooper and Pugh 2002: 11-12, Sedra, 2010), when there are usually both 
plausible and vested reasons for them to resist SSR.  Amongst these reasons 
is the perception by ruling elites that SSR is an avenue for external meddling 
in internal state affairs, which usually implies efforts to emasculate the security 
forces and to cut security expenditures (Hendrickson 2004: 7).  The discussion 
on security expenditures has shifted from defence budget cuts towards 
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alignment of budgeting priorities and longer-term planning cycles (Omitoogun 
and Hutchful, 2006).   Despite this change in the discourse which now anchors 
security expenditure reviews (ISSAT, 2012, WB, 2012, WB, 2013), 
implementation has yet to show progress beyond models of conditionality, 
since this pre-empts serious engagement towards sustainability.  This trend 
has led to downplaying of legitimate security needs of the implementing 
countries, which are left unprepared to deal with incoming threats and upon 
crisis, recurrently engage in security off-budget expenditure.  In the bigger 
picture, even when there is agreement on the need for SSR, the values, 
principles, priorities and methodologies are not always consensual, leading to 
a disjuncture between donor SSR policies and the demand-driven needs of 
developing countries (Ball and Hendrickson, 2006, Ball, 2010).  
 
Reasons for a non-committal attitude from the ruling elite of the implementing 
country also tend to relate to carrying out reforms that allow them control in 
terms of the pace of change.  Genuine SSR implementation disrupts the status 
quo, entailing not only far-ranging institutional consequences, but also internal 
political upheavals with power distribution consequences (Luckham and Kirk 
2012: 11).   
 
From an institutional perspective, implementing countries face the challenge of 
managing power quests that appear in the guise of inter-institutional rivalry, 
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and which further the lack of coordination of the institutions and actors 
involved in security and justice delivery (Peake et al 2006: 251).  
 
From an internal politics viewpoint the test concerns, on the one hand, the 
maintenance of power through competitive elections and people’s perceptions 
of the SSR programme, in terms of outcomes related to safety and public 
security, as well as justice service delivery.  On the other hand, more acute 
challenges arise through the pursuance of undemocratic and manipulative 
strategies pertaining to regime survival, such as those of politicisation, 
ethnicisation and instrumentalisation of security forces (Bryden et al 2008: 
327).  Examples of nefarious regime security dynamics include Mauritania, 
Nigeria, Guinea, Niger, Togo and Liberia.  These countries have all witnessed 
coups d’état and the deliberate manipulation of ethnic, regional, or political 
interests by presidents and their inner circles, in order to take and maintain 
control of the state’s security apparatus.  The failure of SSR to consider these 
political aspects has been worsened by lack of analysis of the implementing 
country’s polity, including its democratisation process, and the internal power 
dynamics of the major political party actors, which significantly determine the 
choice of leadership and its governing strategies.   
 
The lack of informed assessment of political aspects often leads to situations 
where following engagement in SSR programmes, and upon facing difficulties 
in progressing in areas of democratic governance (Hänggi and Scherrer 2008: 
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18, Brzoska 2009: 7, Bryden and Olonisakin 2010: 9), donors revert to more 
traditional areas of assistance such as those of train and equip (Sedra, 2010). 
 
The flaws to factor-in the history of state formation, the role of non-state 
actors, the nature of the commitment of ruling elites to the SSR agenda, the 
formal and informal power configurations, the political dynamics in transition 
periods, and the internal dynamics of crucial political parties of the 
implementing countries, have been central to the disruption of SSR 
programmes, and the poor consideration they devote to local ownership and 
sustainability during implementation.  This failure to grasp complex internal 
political dynamics and to carry out iterative adaptation according to major 
contextual changes in the making clearly demonstrates the limits of the 
mainstream SSR approach adopted in the last decade.  However, SSR has 
not remained static, and therefore it is relevant to review what has been 
learned and what the limitations have been in the process. 
 
The (un)learning curve 
 
Cumulative learning processes have occurred in the field of SSR insofar as 
policy and programming is concerned.  For instance, conflict-sensitive 
approaches have been adopted (Andersen, 2011) and concerns for monitoring 
and evaluation are now awarded greater programming priority (Popovic, 2008, 
Rynn and Hiscock, 2009). Yet, whilst evidence points to the need for flexible 
programming that allows for regular adaptation to changing conditions (Ball, 
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2014), this is not predominant in practice and it remains difficult to identify 
successful examples of comprehensive SSR (Schnabel and Born, 2011).  An 
assessment of the implementation of SSR carried out by the OECD-DAC 
recognised that learning was slow to translate into organisational behaviour 
change, and into practice, with donors’ lack of coherent SSR strategies 
hindering progress (OECD-DAC 2007: 13-14).  This explains the burgeoning 
of knowledge development to support security and justice implementation in 
terms of country case studies, but also of specific thematic areas such as that 
of customary justice in the last decade (for e.g. Harper, 2011, Keane and 
Downes, 2012). 
 
Liberal peacebuilding critics also acknowledge the incorporation of earlier 
critique and improvements in development aid frameworks and peacebuilding 
deriving from the growing accumulation of policy-based evidence (Chandler, 
2009, Paris and Sisk, 2009, Cramer and Goodhand, 2011).  This has been 
reflected, for instance, in the 2011 World Development Report (WDR) (WB, 
2011) and with the emergence of the New Deal.18  Nonetheless, despite UN 
calls for delivery of peacebuilding in accordance with the conditions and needs 
of implementing countries (UNSG, 11/06/2009), it is observable that this has 
                                                
18 The 2011 WDR uses the concept of citizen security moving away from state-centric security, and 
recognises that building institutions is a long-term process, which does not necessarily conform to 
Western models. It stresses lessons learned in terms of conflict prevention and resolution (WB, 2011). 
The New Deal is a framework designed to aid countries to move from fragility to sustainable 
development. It was signed in 2011 in Busan at a meeting on aid effectiveness between the G7 and 
donor countries.  There is emphasis on the implementing country’s own ownership of reforms, as well as 
a commitment by donors to be accountable as well.  Legitimate politics, security and justice are three 
main components of the framework alongside economic foundations and revenue and services 
(http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/). 
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not taken root (Andersen, 2011).  A compelling explanation is offered for this 
lack of translation of learning into practice through the argument that 
significant contradiction and competing goals prevail amongst distinct aid 
policies (Chandler, 2009).  The tensions surrounding structural adjustment 
policies (SAP) and subsequent poverty reduction strategies (PRSP), and post-
war reconstruction plans are illustrative, with the first prevailing over the latter 
given that it served the purpose of expanding global capitalism (Barayani 
2008: 23).  In the SSR camp a notorious example is the clashing of direction of 
SSR and Counter-Terrorism (CT) assistance, demonstrating the pressure 
between enhancing democratic governance, whilst providing needed train and 
equip assistance.19 Yet, what appear to be common when distinct policies are 
at odds is that those that prevail tend to mirror donors’ own interests, such as 
the provision of more traditional security assistance programmes which tend to 
favour militarised responses (Sedra, 2010, Sherman, 2010, Schnabel and 
Born, 2011).  This appears to be a cyclical matter and suggests the 
resurgence of old practices criticised in the early days of SSR.  At the time the 
criticism concerned the fact that if ‘train and equip’ prevailed in SSR 
programmes, then these would resemble mere re-labelling of pre-existing 
international security cooperation programmes (Chalmers, 2000, Chanaa, 
2002, Ball 2004: 2, Wulf 2004: 23).  Currently, the blurring of boundaries 
                                                
19 OECD-DAC policies prescribe that security assistance measures to improve developing countries’ 
capacity to prevent terrorism should be in accordance with democratic rule of law, and in observance of 
the principles of accountability and respect for human rights (OECD-DAC 2003: 16, OECD-DAC 2004: 
28). This has not been observed in practice and CT assistance in the context of the ‘War on Terror’ 
hinders the implementation of SSR governance components (Wulf 2004: 24, Willet 2005: 569,586, 
Keenan 2006: 271, Ball and Hendrickson 2006: 19-23), as demonstrated by the example of Somalia 
(Menkhaus 2009: 231, Bah 2009: 506, Bryden and Brickhill 2010: 260). 
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between these two agendas questions who the beneficiaries of SSR are, as 
well as the legitimacy of this global policy given that it ends up being politically 
compromised.  
 
Liberal peace critics engaged in a debate showcasing two different viewpoints 
about these tensions.  On the one hand are those who interpreted the 
contradictions as being a by-product of the lack of a political project driving 
foreign policy, resulting in short-term interventions which are a function of an 
evasion of responsibility and accountability by the main donors (Pupavac 
2006: 265, Chandler 2008: 427, 2009).  Along these lines SSR programmes 
have been accused of adopting short timelines rather than long-term 
strategies (Hutchful and Fayemi 2005: 80), and they have lacked follow up 
upon the exit of peace support operations (Schnabel and Ehrhart 2005: 9).  
 
On the other hand are those arguing that the rationale lies beyond an a-
strategic stance; it is rather connected to the higher hierarchy interest of 
Western donors in maintaining a global hegemony of their system of values, 
protect their security, and advance global capitalism (Cramer, 2006, Reid-
Henry, 2011, Pugh et al, 2011, Duffield, 2001, 2010).  Alongside this direction 
of research SSR analysis has been dedicated, for instance, to questioning the 
apparent neutrality of the agenda (Chuter, 2004 unpublished), to unpacking it 
as an ideological construct of the liberal peace (Jackson, 2010) and to 
examining the nature of SSR as a soft power tool (Krause 2011: 20-39). 
  83 
These lenses have been particularly useful in unveiling the deeper level of 
constraints facing SSR given the agency of global players in setting and 
implementing the agenda, and in explaining why tokenism prevails in SSR 
programming, preventing meaningful engagement with issues of ownership 
and sustainability. 
 
The difficulties surrounding the processes of learning and the real possibilities 
of improving the SSR agenda and its implementation have been exposed by 
the above arguments.  In the main, improvement seems to be compromised 
whenever higher order security and economic interests of powerful actors are 
at play, showing that SSR is subordinated to their hegemonic quests. 
Nonetheless, this rationale is valid from a donor centred analytical point of 
view; a political economy of aid perspective, focusing on the interactions 
between donors and the implementing countries provides a more complex 
picture, further unpacking the delusion of the apolitical nature of SSR.  
 
2.2.2 SSR and the International Political Economy of Aid 
 
The perception of hegemony of liberal peacebuilding leads to a powerful 
image of an organised intervention, when in fact the outcome reveals serious 
contestations from those that are subjected to it (Selby, 2013).  The 
standardised packages applied - of which SSR is part - are met with 
backlashes that stem from the level and depth of social engineering involved 
in the expansion of the liberal model, and from the degree of divergence with 
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the values and organising frameworks of the society at stake (Cooper and 
Pugh, 2002, Egnell and Haldén, 2009, Hills, 2010). Certain liberal 
peacebuilding critics argue that in most cases, hegemony is far from 
encompassing since Western policy prescriptions and expectations are not 
fully incorporated into the polity and modus operandi of implementing 
countries.  This is because they interface with local perceptions and 
interpretations of the practice of peacebuilding and impact on it (Taylor, 2007, 
Tadjbakhsh, 2011).  
 
Reactions from implementing countries come not only from the elites, but also 
from everyday manifestations of social life although resistance may manifest 
itself in more subtle ways, including within non-state and customary level 
dynamics (Baker,2009, Schmeidl and Karokhail, 2009; Richmond, 2009, 
2011).   
 
However, when elite interests clash with liberal peacebuilding prescriptions 
different outcomes emerge more visibly in the form of resistance, adaptation 
and even obstruction (MacGinty, 2010, Luckham and Kirk, 2012). The strength 
of these reactions is also connected to the effectiveness of the structure of 
incentives provided by liberal peacebuilding (peace, stability, foreign 
investment, capital accumulation through privatisation, democratic institutions, 
etc), and whether the promised peace dividend materialises in a 
predominantly inclusive or exclusionary manner.  Neo-patrimonial dynamics 
tend to gain prominence in contexts where power redistribution is at play, with 
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high levels of competitiveness included in the equation.  Dynamics of co-
option of powerful elites by donors, as well as of prominent societal groups by 
national elites come into play shaping outcomes in fluid and unpredictable 
manners (MacGinty, 2008). The reactions are juxtaposed to the expansion of 
liberal values and modes of governance more widely, and not confined to 
post-conflict situations as shown by the example of Zimbabwe.  In this case 
resistance was extreme, and SSR was publicly vilified by the ruling elite as 
being an external regime change tool, and therefore ‘intrumentalised’ and 
‘politicised’ during the 2008 electoral campaign, and continuously during the 
tenure of the Government of National Unity (NewsDay, 14/08/2013).      
 
The outcome of these interfaces has generated a scholarly line of work around 
the notion of ‘hybridity’, which has been useful to explain liberal peacebuilding 
not as a fully imposed and implemented model, but rather as a negotiated and 
mediated reality, reflecting local agency at play (Richmond, 2014).  The utility 
of this model further resides in capturing the fluidity of social interactions and 
mutual accommodation allowing for more flexible approaches at the level of 
programming.  In SSR for example, adopting these lenses as iterative context 
and conflict analysis would be useful, as it would potentially allow for more 
flexible programming.  It would support moving from institutional and sector to 
thematic and issue approaches, but also incorporating a diversity of actors and 
planning for conscious actions upon evolving interactions.  Nonetheless, 
certain authors guard against the temptation of using the hybridisation 
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analytical framework as a tool to develop new prescription and societal 
management formulae and intervention, thus up scaling social engineering 
and control attempts.  In this sense the danger is that even if external 
intervention is calibrated to operate in more subtle and negotiated ways, 
unexpected outcomes will still persist (Millar, 2014).  For SSR the 
unpredictability further highlights the level of risk faced by actors involved in 
the enterprise, whether this concerns donors, implementing countries’ elites, 
CSOs or communities, insofar as the level of possible violent responses.  This 
is why it is important that any such process be owned and led by nationals in 
an inclusive and synergetic process that will sustain itself due to the actors’ 
genuine interests.  Nevertheless, one of the shortcomings of the hybrid 
political orders approach is that it describes the outcomes with an implicit 
assumption of ‘interactive empowerment’, with little said about the ethical and 
equitative merits of the solutions found, and about their potential emancipation 
blockages.  Ultimately, however, HPO encapsulates a more fine-tuned 
approach to capture the nuanced interactions and outcomes, leading to a 
more pragmatic assessment of what can be achieved through SSR.  
 
2.2.3 SSR and Liberal Peacebuilding Critique - Progress and Limits 
 
The liberal peacebuilding critique engaged above was useful to shed light on 
the consequences of the emergence and development of the SSR agenda 
within the security-development nexus mainstream in the post-Cold War 
period.  It succeeded in demonstrating how the roots of the SSR discourse 
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within the development field led to a superficial engagement with political 
factors and implications that surround and derive from security and justice 
reforms.  It further enabled understanding about how the withering away of 
politics and political factors resulted in the neglect of the central components 
of ownership and sustainability in implementation.  
 
The analysis of SSR that emerged from engagement with the liberal 
peacebuilding scholarship has added value by providing an explanation about 
the difficulties to learn from SSR experience, given the subsuming of this 
agenda to other competing policies, to the strategic security and development 
interests of powerful international actors, and to the unpredictability of the 
results of interactions between international, national and local actors during 
implementation.  In addition it has debunked the myth of the hegemony of the 
liberal peacebuilding model, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of 
negotiated realities where local agency plays a significant role in shaping 
outcomes.  The use of this analytical approach has been useful to attain a 
more realistic assessment of what can be achieved through SSR, to highlight 
the need to plan for conscious actions upon evolving interactions, and to 
accommodate more flexible and iterative approaches to programming.  
 
Importantly, the liberal peacebuilding critique shed light on the reasons behind 
discrepancies between discourse, policy and implementation of SSR, and the 
similar disjuncture between the levels of political commitment, strategic 
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conceptualisation, programming and implementation.  It demonstrated the 
need to interrogate the quest for coherence and sequencing as a standard 
formula, given the level of unpredictability characteristic of SSR and its 
sensitivity to multiple factors, pressure and tensions.  However, the analysis of 
SSR against the background of the liberal peacebuilding critique lends itself to 
a degree of relativism that may suggest powerlessness, and therefore the 
adoption of a hands-off approach. This is dangerous because it fails to 
recognise that not adopting a position implies taking a stance that implicitly 
reinforces the status quo in favour of the powerful groups in society. In 
addition, such stance fails to engage with the need to understand the organic 
and interactive makings of institutions, and the openings where positive 
change can occur and become sustainable.  For that reason this thesis 
complements the preceding analysis drawing on a concept similar to that of 
hybridisation, namely institutional bricolage.  
 
2.3 Complementing the liberal peace critique: critical juncture, path 
dependence and institutional bricolage as analytical tools 
 
Institutional bricolage, drawn from sociological institutionalism, is used in 
conjunction with the concepts of path dependence and critical junctures, 
deriving from historical institutionalism, to complement the theoretical 
framework of this thesis, based on the above examination of SSR in light of 
the liberal peacebuilding critique. Under the wider field of New Institutionalism 
(March and Olsen 1984, 1989), historical institutionalism and sociological 
institutionalism were the chosen combined approaches given their suitability to 
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address the central goal of understanding patterns of sequencing in 
Mozambique’s case study of security reforms.  
 
2.3.1 Historical Institutionalism, Path Dependence and Critical Junctures  
 
Prominent scholars have underscored the importance of sequencing as an 
explanatory factor by stating that ‘When things happen within a sequence it 
affects how they happen’ (Tilly 1984: 14).  Hence, it is relevant to further 
explore how the timing and order (Pierson 2004: 54, Campbell 2004: 41) in 
which security reforms took place partially shaped their outcomes.  
Sequencing has been widely studied by rational choice scholars.  Game 
theorists, in particular, have built theoretical arguments about the 
consequential nature of the temporal order of choices (Pierson 2004: 59).  
However, their explanations apply to limited and abstract kinds of sequences, 
occurring in restricted scenarios, where utility maximising rational individuals 
choose within ‘rules of the game that provide equilibrium “solutions” to 
collective action dilemmas’ (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 706).  This theory is 
comparable to neo-realist IR theory and has influenced thinking on 
peacebuilding, including that from other IR schools, by reinforcing the 
perception that it is possible to extract formulas that can be generalised.  
 
These approaches are inadequate for studying the sequencing of security 
reforms in post-war Mozambique as the linearity assumed does not conform to 
the complexity of the context and the multiplicity of actors and institutional 
interactions, which are not limited to one clear set of  ‘rules of the game’.  
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Moreover, the differing and competing values and interests of internal and 
external actors and institutions shape their decisions and subsequently impact 
the dynamics enabling and constraining security reforms.  Similarly, in 
Mozambique, as in most post-war environments, institution building cannot be 
dissociated from liberalisation because the former needed to take a particular 
shape to become the optimal vehicle for implementation of the latter.  Indeed 
liberalisation was the main goal and institution building a mere instrument, as 
illustrated later in chapter V. 
 
In view of the limitations of rational theories, historical institutionalism was 
selected as a more suitable analytical approach to study sequencing.  
Historical institutionalism focuses on the historical development of institutions 
looking at how their formal and informal attributes affect the outcomes 
produced.  It postulates that the logic of path dependence prevails, i.e., that 
later occurrences are determined by earlier events and decisions, following a 
similar sequencing pattern.  Yet, it also recognises that this path is not 
inevitable and that critical junctures may occur, implying that crisis may prompt 
rapid change and a different course of action to that predicted.  The following 
explanation helps to clarify why the theory is relevant to the study of 
Mozambique’s security reforms: 
Historical institutionalists… probe uneasy balances of power and 
resources, and see institutions as the developing products of struggle 
among unequal actors…  typically at meso or macrolevel analysis that 
examines multiple institutions in interaction, operating in, and influenced 
by broader contexts.  They pay close attention to ways in which multiple 
institutional realms and processes intersect with one another, often 
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creating unintended openings for actors who trigger changes… Analyses 
tend to highlight and explore causes operating at the interorganisational 
or interinstitutional level (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 706-707).  
 
The above definition shows that historical institutionalism reinforces the 
importance of actors’ interaction and of power relations, offering as well a new 
contribution by establishing the relevance of inter-institutional dimensions and 
of the sequencing element.  Historical institutionalism is the best option for 
analysis in the context of Mozambique because it examines sequencing from 
a diachronic point of view, paying attention to a longer time span (Pierson and 
Skocpol 2002: 698).  This historical view is necessary in order to gain a 
suitable understanding of Mozambique’s security reform processes over a 
period of seventeen years.  It also utilises a relational view of timing, i.e., it 
highlights the occurrence of one specific event relative to another (Pierson 
2004: 55), enabling the analysis of the interconnections of major security 
reform choices and (in)actions.  
 
Within the analytical dimension of timing the concepts of path dependence - 
pointing at self-reinforcing dynamics - and of critical junctures - underscoring 
the possibility of change - support the sequencing analysis.  Together with the 
emphasis that historical institutionalism places on processes that structure and 
reshape states, politics and public policymaking (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 
693-695), these concepts are useful to examine, for example, Mozambique’s 
General Peace Agreement as a critical juncture that conditioned the 
subsequent path of security reforms.  Critical junctures are important because 
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they challenge the pattern set by path-dependence, and emphasize the 
potential for change (Pierson 2004: 69).  In the case of Mozambique this is 
illustrated by the fact that although police reforms were poorly factored in the 
GPA, they subsequently became a priority.   
 
Despite recognising the importance of critical junctures the reinforcing nature 
of path dependence outcomes in longer-term contextual and historical analysis 
prevails in historical institutionalism.  It is commonly highlighted that 
‘institutions have shown considerable robustness even when facing radical 
social, economic, technical and cultural change’ (March and Olsen 2006: 11). 
 
This resistance to change seems to manifest itself especially when relevant 
security stakeholders understand change as being predominantly imported 
from/induced or imposed by external sources.  Realising this, global actors 
promoting SSR began encouraging the local ownership of these processes.  
Nevertheless, even when national state security actors take SSR on as their 
own strategic project, and engage in formal political and legal decisions to 
enact new policies and their respective implementation, they still have to 
confront embedded institutional cultures.  As in cases of reform in other fields 
of public policy and institutional change security reformers are constrained by 
the pervasiveness of informal customs, traditions and codes of conduct (North 
1990: 6).  These render most reform efforts into ad-hoc activities based on 
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technocratic procedures that are usually found wanting in terms of wider 
stakeholder legitimacy (March ad Olsen 1989: 69, Stryker 1994: 859).  
 
Hence, analysis of longer-term continuities (before and after the critical 
junctures), first and foremost draw attention to processes of incremental 
change (North, 1990, Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 21, Pierson and Skocpol 
2002: 703, March and Olsen 2006: 12, Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 1-37).  In 
Mozambique, an attentive look allows to understand that justice reforms, for 
example, had been taking place in the context of the democratisation 
framework, and even over a longer timeframe beginning, at least, with 
independence in 1975.  These perspectives are central to the study of SSR 
because, as argued by one prominent scholar, ‘continuities are more 
significant than change per se, and reform as improvement or mitigation is a 
more realistic goal than the social engineering required to achieve SSR goals 
and objectives’ (Hills 2010: 189). 
 
The attention to time-frame, the multiple actor focus, and the process-oriented 
examination allowed by historical institutionalism are critical given that most 
studies of SSR take place within a restricted time framework, often marked by 
a peace agreement and its subsequent implementation by state actors.  This 
short-tem approach results in three particular consequences.  Firstly, the 
longer-term drive and the interaction between the state and other relevant 
security stakeholders that shape the process of security sector reform are 
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obscured.  Secondly, such analyses tend to ignore the fact that the actors who 
participate in the institutional arrangement/policy design are not necessarily 
the same who implement it, nor are they those who engage in later policy 
struggles (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 22).  Thirdly, studies become skewed 
because they either tend to identify a major change in the short-term and 
conduct analysis uniquely around this event, or they arrive at predominantly 
sceptical conclusions failing to see the makings of a more gradual pattern of 
change.  
 
Attention to incrementalism within a process-oriented analysis of SSR 
reinforces the viewpoint that it is vital to understand the characteristics of the 
process of change at stake.  For example, institutional breakdown is not the 
sole cause for modifications, as change may also be driven by the need to 
improve performance.  Despite the need for institutional adaptation to the 
demands of a shifting environment, change might not occur if crucial actors 
perceive that the potential gains are outweighed by their costs (Powell and 
Dimmaggio 1991: 4).  Similarly, change in the context of security reforms may 
imply negotiations and trade-offs, as well as the constant threat of regression 
or reversal (Hills 2010: 179, 189, Luckham and Hutchful 2010: 29).  Finally, 
institutional inertia (Matthews, 1986) can also play a role in slowing 
implementation.  These different dynamics are not unfamiliar to the case of 
security reforms in Mozambique.  Indeed they are incorporated in a 
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controversial process of change, with inter and intra-institutional conflict, multi-
level power struggles, resistance to change and unintended consequences.  
 
2.3.2 Sociological Institutionalism and Institutional Bricolage 
  
Sociological institutionalism complements historical institutionalism in the 
theoretical framework guiding this case study of Mozambique’s security 
reforms.  Sociological institutionalism contributes by paying specific attention 
to actors’ agency in the outcomes resulting from change processes.  In this 
way, it counterbalances the weight of the structural institutional analysis 
provided by historical institutionalism, favouring a less deterministic analysis.  
 
Sociological institutionalism concentrates on the formation of institutions and 
the role that actors play, looking at their identity, and at how cultural and 
historical aspects shape their preferences, rendering their decisions a product 
of social construction.  The main conceptual tool for this work is institutional 
bricolage.  Bricolage is a concept that characterises human beings’ capacity to 
adapt and innovate, drawing on the resources at hand (Levi-Strauss 1967: 
17).  This concept was initially introduced into institutional analysis as referring 
to the endogenous capacity of an organisation to blend its existing 
components in innovative ways to produce new outcomes (Douglas 1987: 66).  
It has subsequently been used by several disciplines and tailored to analyse 
multiple contexts (Campbell, 2004, di Domenico, Haugh and Tracey, 2010), 
but the definition used here is that developed by Cleaver (2000, 2001, 2002) 
when studying water resource management.   
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According to Cleaver, institutional bricolage represents an ad-hoc, partial, 
social and historically embedded process rather than a clear-cut managerial 
activity where individuals pursue maximising solutions (Cleaver 2000: 379).  It 
involves a blend of the formal and informal, the traditional and the modern, into 
a complex process of construction shaped by individuals acting within the 
limits of circumstances (Cleaver 2002: 15).  These individuals or institutional 
actors have multiple and complex social and cultural identities that produce 
contending motivations for the use of resources at hand, a fact which 
influences their decision-making in the face of changing circumstances 
(Cleaver 2002: 15).  These actors engage in bricolage, i.e. using old 
institutional values, existing philosophies and instruments, and combining 
them with new elements that they adapt (Cleaver 2002: 16,17), transforming 
change into more organic, legitimate and effective innovations.   
 
This concept is useful for the study of SSR in Mozambique as it contextualises 
prevailing practices alongside new developments, and provides pointers for 
analysing piece-meal approaches and improvisation in security reform.  The 
notion draws attention to the agency of multiple interacting external and 
internal institutional actors, allowing the author to investigate a wide range of 
situations where institutional arrangements are decided and produced 
(Cleaver 2002: 19).  It also presents an analytical advantage because it 
underscores local actors’ methods of withstanding pressured change, such as 
through ‘political bricolage’, including dynamics of negotiation and coping 
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strategies through cooperation, resistance, and accommodation.  This is 
remarkably useful for scrutinising the resilience of Mozambique’s security 
sector institutions and stakeholders when faced with reforms that were mainly 
induced under the neo-liberal triple transition.  
 
Institutional bricolage contributes in two ways to this research.  On the one 
hand, it is used to characterise the end-result of the institutional security 
reform processes.  On the other hand, it is understood as a deliberate method 
utilised both by agents carrying out institutional security reforms and by the 
beneficiaries of those processes.  Using the concept to underscore the end-
result of security reforms is justified because, despite the intentional nature of 
external and internal actors involved in the processes of institutional decision-
making, policy-making, programme design and implementation, outcomes 
almost never resemble the original goals.  The process is affected by 
contingent factors, by other stakeholders’ attitudes, and occasionally even by 
accidental developments (Goodin 1996: 25).  As spelt out above, SSR, with its 
conceptual variety pointing towards different reform rationales and entry-
points, is susceptible to bricolage, leading to outcomes that were not 
envisaged at the outset.  Given the malleability of the SSR agenda, elites with 
the political and economic leverage to engage in these programmes tailor 
them according to their interests and preferences in light of the context they 
face.  Yet, beyond this intentionality, the SSR process is usually conflict-
ridden.  This happens because, even when the aim is clear and shared by all 
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intervening actors, the views about how to reach the goals typically collide, 
spoilers hinder the process, and both the political nature and technical 
components of the process carry a number of unforeseen risks. 
 
The use of the concept of bricolage as a method is particularly useful for 
understanding how influential actors utilise existing arrangements, blending 
them with novel elements and directions to obtain new institutional 
configurations through the reform process.  This is helpful for explaining more 
gradual change since institutional building is rarely ‘design de novo’, but is 
rather a process through which social engineers work with materials inherited 
and shaped by the past (Goodin 1996: 30).  They recombine them with new 
inputs and craft, via an innovative process of bricolage, contemporary 
institutions that differ from, but also resemble, previous ones (Douglas 1987: 
66-68, Campbell 2004: 70).  The application of this concept to SSR is valuable 
because it reinforces the potential to elucidate the implementation of policy 
and institutional security reforms in the short-to-longer term continuum.  More 
importantly, in the case of Mozambique, it fosters a nuanced insight into the 
use of bricolage by national political decision-makers and top security 
personnel as a method to manage and control the pace and depth of change.  
A certain degree of continuity with existing models and practices dating from 
the liberation war has helped Mozambican elites avoid the perception that 
post-civil war institutional reform represented a complete rupture with the past, 
thus nurturing staff engagement whilst minimising the effect of spoilers.  
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Two aspects of bricolage are of interest to this analysis: substantive bricolage 
and symbolic bricolage.  The first comprises the recombination of pre-existing 
institutional principles and practices to address problems according to the idea 
of instrumentality (Campbell 2004: 69).  The second focuses on the notion of 
appropriateness, which is important insofar as the solutions that actors devise 
must be acceptable and legitimate within the broad social environment.  
Hence, for new institutions to survive, they must combine existing cultural 
symbols consistent with the dominant normative and cognitive principles, and 
make use of corresponding symbolic language and rhetorical devices 
(Campbell 2004: 70).  Mozambique’s case study, drawing on the voluminous 
data gathered identifies the new and historical elements that have been 
combined through bricolage.  An example concerns arrangements of security 
and justice provision at the community level in the post-civil war (Chapter VII), 
which in certain cases operate in ways that resemble mechanisms of social 
and political control during the post-independence period (Chapter IV). 
 
Finally, another benefit of the use of the concept of institutional bricolage is its 
contribution to analysing relations of power.  It is of utmost importance to 
recognise the differences in the power held by different actors because the 
institutions and SSR processes generated through bricolage are not 
necessarily the result of disinterested efforts.  In fact, they may actually end-up 
reinforcing and perpetuating patterns of exclusion (Cleaver 2002: 20).  This 
has a bearing on what actors are allowed to contribute, to decide, and to 
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benefit from SSR programme outputs and outcomes.  Those who feel 
excluded from direct participation may well find indirect and unconventional 
ways of impacting, and even re-shaping the outcomes of SSR, whether or not 
that thwarts the reform process.  The use of institutional bricolage in 
Mozambique’s case study permitted an examination of the role that non-state 
actors such as traditional leaders, community policing groups and 
communities themselves play in the provision of everyday security, and how 
that can be connected/disconnected from nationally designed institutional 
reforms.  Ultimately, it offered a reality check on the configuration of power 
relations.  These can be far from straightforward in areas where the state has 
little implantation, and where state agents have to conform to the (oftentimes 
undemocratic) traditional values of the community at stake and its leader, at 
the risk of retaliation. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed the contributions of IR theory in explaining SSR.  
Through this analysis the supposed neutrality of SSR was unveiled and its 
vulnerability to hegemonic quests of powerful actors exposed.  Subsequently, 
SSR policy development, implementation and learning processes were 
examined in the context of the liberal peacebuilding critique, which underlined 
the limitations of the transformative power of this agenda given its roots in the 
liberal peace paradigm.  The apolitical stance of SSR was questioned in view 
of the power relations’ intricacies that cut to the core of this agenda and the 
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shortcomings that derive from this posture were analysed.  The complexity of 
the interactions between donors and implementing countries was examined 
demonstrating that the liberal peace order suffers from fundamental 
contestations that prevent it from acquiring a full hegemonic status.  These 
contestations and the dynamics of accommodation and resistance were 
shown to be at the centre of the difficulties to learn given their entailing of 
unexpected interactions and outcomes.  As such, the importance of strategy, 
and the ways to understand coherence and sequencing require innovative 
approaches beyond the traditional institutional structuralism.  This, therefore, 
warrants that the SSR analysis in light of the critique of liberal peacebuilding 
be complemented by a theoretical framework based on a combination of 
historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism.  This is done 
drawing respectively on the concepts of critical juncture, path dependence and 
institutional bricolage to analyse the coherence and sequencing of security 
reforms in the defence, police and justice sectors in Mozambique.  The 
combined theoretical framework enables the interplay between deductive and 
inductive analyses, drawing extensively on the voluminous data gathered from 
field research in Mozambique.  Furthermore, it allows for institutional security 
reforms to be examined in the short-to-longer term, creating scope for 
analysing multiple actors’ interaction and inherent power relations.  
Importantly, this theoretical framework focuses attention on the methods 
utilised by domestic actors to withstand externally pressured adjustment, 
including coping strategies through cooperation, resistance, and 
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accommodation, in attempts to manage and control the pace, shape and 
depth of change. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Mozambique’s post-independence political economy and the roots of the 
Civil War 
 
 
‘Can one see the track of a boat on the river?  
After a while all traces are wiped out’  
Bambara Proverb 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the case study about coherence and sequencing of 
security reforms in Mozambique and its place in the wider transitional and 
peacebuilding processes.  It also sets the assessesment of Mozambique’s 
post-civil war security and justice institutions (1992-2009) - the central concern 
of this research - within a historical state-building framework, by looking at the 
political economy that prevailed in the post-independence period and which 
contributed to the outbreak of the civil war. 
 
Mozambique’s post-independence period has been the subject of significant 
exploration and many contending views about the causes of the civil war. 
Whilst this chapter does not intend to replicate those discussions, it is 
important to underscore that they focused mostly on explaining the origins of 
the war as based either on external motives, i.e., the regional destabilisation 
war launched by neighbour countries against Mozambique’s, or on internal 
factors such as the political options adopted by Frelimo’s ruling elite.20 This 
                                                
20 For instance, the sizeable literature on the nature and dynamics of the civil war has come to 
contradictory conclusions regarding the origins of the conflict with some writers emphasising external 
factors (Munslow, 1983, Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983, Fauvet, 1984, Saul, 1985, Johnson and Martin, 
1986, Hanlon, 1986, Cawthra, 1986, Minter, 1989, Vines, 1991, O’Laughlin, 1992, Saul 1993, Minter, 
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chapter reinforces the literature that overcame monocausal explanations21 by 
presenting an analytical perspective that juxtaposes internal, regional and 
international elements, as well as the political and economic trajectory of the 
independent country as inseparable factors at the root of the civil war.  
 
Africa’s history is populated by states where the immediate post-independence 
period was characterised by ruling through rentierism and ethnicisation of 
politics leading to a subjection of the security sector to manipulation for private 
gains and protection of particular elites.  Mozambique followed a different 
trajectory, where the ruling elite’s reactive stance to regional developments 
and policy choices created fundamental grievances that fostered instability. 
Elements of ethnicity and elite corruption played a minor part in the conflict, 
and the country truly represented an exception to the neo-patrimonial 
paradigm that swept the post-independence continent.  This generated high 
hope for the country, but it did not prevent the occurrence and the 
consequences of the civil war.  Towards its end the ethical economic stance of 
Frelimo’s ruling in the immediate post-independence period was unfortunately 
lost.  Economic and political liberalisation was introduced and the exploitation 
of natural resources through skewed governance and ‘democratisation of 
corruption’ accompanied the process (4.1.3.5-18/05/05).  In the long run 
Mozambique’s elites have not learned from the history of most other African 
                                                                                                                                       
1994) and others pointing to domestic features (Hoile, 1989, 1994, Cline, 1989, Cahen, 1987, Clarence-
Smith, 1989, Geffray, 1990, Wilson, 1992, Bowen, 2000, Cabrita, 2000, Lubkemann, 2005, Dinerman, 
2006).  
21 Contributions to overcoming monocausal approaches included, for example, Henriksen, 1978, Vail and 
White, 1981, Hanlon, 1984, Egerö, 1987, Young, 1990, Coelho, 1992, Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1994. 
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states, where the ‘politics of the belly’ (Bayart, 1993) and systems of 
patronage have led to grievances and armed conflict.  The country is currently 
on the path of fierce politics, with reinforcement of old, and the breeding of 
new grievances likely to produce violent conflict, albeit of a different nature 
from that of the civil war.  These developments are analysed in chapter V, 
which focuses on the sequencing of the country’s triple transition at the macro-
level.  
 
This chapter considers the political history and political economy of the country 
in the aftermath of independence in 1975, which represented a unique type of 
rupture with the former colonial regime.  The main exception to FRELIMO’s 
stated break with the colonial system was the adoption of Portuguese as the 
official national language, given that it represented a core unifying factor of 
Mozambique’s nation and state-building project within a diversified ethno-
linguistic population.   
 
3.2 Frelimo’s state-building project and post-independence armed 
conflict  
 
3.2.1 Transitioning into a Fragile Independence 
After more than a decade of a liberation war against the fascist Portuguese 
colonial regime, Mozambique declared its independence on 25 June 1975.  A 
period of nine months of transitional government rule preceded independence, 
in accordance with the provisions set by the Lusaka Accords signed on 7 
September 1974 by the Portuguese state and FRELIMO.   
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This period was marked by tension and uncertainty, with secrecy surrounding 
the negotiations and the contents of the Lusaka Accords.  There were security 
challenges as well, posed by those that opposed either independence or the 
terms on which independence was enacted.  Hence, an additional cease-fire 
agreement set out measures to cope with some of the expected challenges.   
 
Although the agreement specified a timeline for the gradual withdrawal of the 
Portuguese armed forces, it also stipulated that both military forces needed to 
collaborate in interventions to re-establish internal order during transition 
(Cease-Fire Agreement, 1974, Arts 4, 6).  This provision conferred the joint 
military commission with the operational means to resolve extreme cases of 
insurrection, as both parties agreed to jointly detect and neutralise reactionary 
and subversive actions.  All militias (including those of private groups) and 
other similar organisations, as well as the members of the Portuguese military 
Special Forces, including the Comandos, were to disarm immediately (Cease-
Fire Agreement 1974, Arts 9,13,14).  Particular attention was to be paid to 
potential disruptive activity by the former affiliates of the Portuguese 
repressive political police called Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estado 
(PIDE, later PIDE-DGS) (Cease-Fire Agreement, 1974, Art 10). 
 
However, in practice, the fulfilment of these goals fell short of the desired 
outcome. Armed uprisings and acts of sabotage were regularly carried out by 
former PIDE elements, extremist Portuguese settlers and by previous 
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members of military units (Jardim, 1976, Newitt 1995: 539-540, Veloso 2006: 
105).  In addition, propaganda was widely used by these groups to spread the 
belief that FRELIMO would be unforgiving towards white populations in 
general, and not merely towards colonial state officials (Pitcher 2002: 39-40).   
 
FRELIMO worsened the situation with strong anti-colonial and anti-capitalist 
speeches, accompanied by the arrests of sabotage suspects, and of 
landowners and civil servants accused of wrongdoing by common citizens 
(Pitcher 2002: 39-40, 4.5.1.5-17/05/05).  Such arrests were based on often-
unsubstantiated accusations, given the lack of investigative capacity during 
the rule of the joint transitional government (Veloso 2006: 100).  
 
The signed agreements also foresaw the need to defend Mozambique’s 
integrity against external aggression, and measures to stop Portuguese and 
Mozambican nationals from becoming involved in military collaboration with 
the Governments of South Africa and Rhodesia were agreed to be necessary 
(Cease-Fire Agreement 1974, Arts 6,11).  Nonetheless, similar to the case of 
curbing internal armed uprisings, implementation proved difficult. 
 
3.2.2 Ethnicity and Corruption: Begging to Differ from the Rest 
 
The previous section showed that the background against which FRELIMO 
implemented its nation and state-building project was one marked by a 
generalised feeling of insecurity concerning the future of the independent 
country.  This fragility was shadowed by the contested process around the 
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emergence of FRELIMO, which at the beginning encompassed a series of 
different groups with a plurality of political and ideological views. Internal 
dissent to mainstream socialist views was resolved through violent party 
purging leading to the consolidation of one of the factions at the head of the 
Front.22  An example of such process is the controversy surrounding the 
disappearance of former leaders such as Uria Simango, Joana Simeão, and 
Lazaro Nkavandame, who are thought to have been killed extrajudicially.  Part 
of the accusation against them relied on what was perceived as their liberal 
and capitalist orientation, with this schism bringing great damage to the party.  
Questions around ethnicity complicated matters, with widespread perception 
that southerners, mainly from the Shangane ethnic group, controlled Frelimo. 
This perception developed from a prevailing historical presence of southerners 
in Frelimo’s top leadership and was reinforced by the fact that the nationalist 
group leaders named above and killed belonged to ethnic groups from other 
regions.  Frelimo has addressed the issue by maintaining over time a 
balanced regional representation in the party, especially regarding state and 
government appointments.  Whilst this has been crucial in the management of 
national politics and internal party power balance it does not always work in 
favour of efficiency. 
 
                                                
22 FRELIMO’s Central Committee Report to the Third Congress provides insight about the internal 
contradictions between the groups in FRELIMO.  Several authors have also addressed the issue (e.g. 
Munslow, 1983, Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983, de Bragança and Depelchin 1986: 29-52, Ncomo, 2003, 
Cabaço 2010: 282-84, Igreja, 2010: 781-799, Vieira, 2010). 
 
 
  109 
After independence, the dominant group transformed into a single party 
(Frelimo) and became the incumbent ruler of the country (Constitution of the 
People’s Republic of Mozambique, 1975, Art 3), adopting socialism and the 
creation of an egalitarian society as the driving ideology behind its nation and 
state-building project. 
 
This ideological choice driving the build-up of an egalitarian society created a 
highly disciplined, politically committed and responsible leadership united 
around the goal of achieving socialism (Newitt 1995: 544, 546).  Standing-out 
against the tendency of the era, Frelimo’s elite rejected the individual 
enrichment and corruption that were widespread in many newly independent 
African countries (Hanlon 1991: 15, Newitt 1995: 545, MacQueen 1997: 236-
237, Saul 2011: 93). The following quote extracted from the inauguration 
speech of the Transitional Government is illustrative: 
“Material, moral and ideological corruption, bribery, seeking comforts, 
string pulling, nepotism, that is favours based on friendship, and 
especially giving preferential employment to relatives, friends or 
people’s from one’s region, all this is characteristics of the system we 
are destroying.  Tribalism, regionalism, racism and unprincipled 
alliances are serious onslaughts on our political line and divide the 
masses.  Because Power belongs to the People those who exercise it 
are servants of the People.” (Transitional Government Inauguration 
Speech 1975: 7) 
 
Compared with West Africa where cronyism was rampant, in Mozambique the 
quoted orientation was generally followed, and campaigns against corruption, 
especially targeting public officials and security forces were strong throughout 
president Samora’s rule and not just at independence. This non-corrupt and 
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highly moralised stance boosted Frelimo’s post-independence legitimacy and 
the aim of constructing a Webberian state, able to deliver welfare and security 
to the Mozambican people, based on the principles of equality and freedom 
from oppressive colonial structures.  Yet, the combined effects of the 
centralised economic policies adopted and of the war led to inflation, and with 
it the spread of societal corruption in the guise of illicit trade and black market 
practices (The Times 21/12/81, Makwala 1983: 46) which were sternly 
combated by the state’s judicial apparatus as analysed in Chapter IV.  In 
general however, the modesty and austerity abided by the ruling elite and the 
economic model adopted postponed capital accumulation.  
 
In hindsight, it can be observed that this stance resulted in two paradoxical 
tendencies.  The first was the growth of corruption in the emergency food 
distribution services, and in the armed forces, accused of theft of livestock 
from the populations towards the end of the war (Herald 5/2/92). Adding to the 
loss of operational capacity, the credibility of the FPLM-FAM was also tainted 
by suspicions of widespread corruption by high-ranking military, which eroded 
the forces’ logistical capacity (Saul 1991: 108, Notícias 25/01/92, Human 
Rights Watch 1992: 57, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996: 27), and who 
became stakeholders in the continuity of the war.  The second was that parts 
of the ruling elite became actively engaged in the resolution of the conflict, as 
they were eager for the country to become part of a lucrative global economy 
as further analysed in Chapter V. 
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3.2.3 Ideology and the Quest for National Identity 
 
Frelimo’s post-independence goal of creating an efficient administrative 
bureaucracy anchored in explicit development and security strategies included 
a strong ideological and identity element.  Measures intended to boost the 
sense of belonging to a Mozambican nationality were launched.  These 
comprised the ideals to eradicate divisions on the basis of ethnicity, race, 
religion, class and sex, and to attain women’s emancipation and the provision 
of universal education and healthcare (Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
Mozambique, 1975, Arts 16,17, 26, 31).  Indeed, Frelimo achieved significant 
progress in the latter two areas until the early eighties (Hanlon 1991: 16, 
Newitt 1995: 549, Minter 1998: 28).  Furthermore, the FPLM-FAM - prior to the 
incidence of corruption in the latter years of the war - also became a symbol of 
national unity, given the countrywide recruitment, the active fostering of a 
national culture, and the bonds forged between people from different ethnic 
groups at its service (Transitional Government Speech 1975: 5, 16, Malache 
et al 2005: 174). 
 
Yet, in contrast, and despite the rhetoric of inclusion, the nation-building 
endeavour led, in practice, to the ostracism of many groups including the 
traditional authorities, small-scale traders and ‘well-off’ peasants due to the 
perceived ideological alignment of these groups with colonialism and 
capitalism which generated exclusion and exploitation (Geffray 1990: 50, 
Hanlon 1991: 12, 16, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 180, 220, Newitt 1995: 
548).  
  112 
In addition, the modernisation project entailed the implementation of measures 
that resulted in the prohibition of indigenous cultural and religious practices 
considered superstitious and backwards, such as polygamy, initiation rites and 
rain dance ceremonies (Hanlon 1991: 13, 25, Pitcher 2002: 73, Cabaço 2010: 
285). There was also hostility towards religious congregations.23  All this was 
based on priority being given to the pursuit of scientific progress that ended up 
impairing the legitimate bonds formed between FRELIMO and part of 
Mozambique’s society (e.g. people living in liberated zones and those with 
nationalist aspirations living in cities) during the liberation struggle 
(Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 33). 24  It is no coincidence that in learning 
from its own mistakes, after the end of the civil war the state (still under 
Frelimo’s rule) endeavoured to mend relationships with the religious 
congregations, and allowed the creation and proliferation of identity and ethnic 
based associations.   
 
All in all, at the political level, the choice of a single-party model meant there 
was no way to accommodate dissenting voices in a legal and peaceful 
                                                
23 For example, at his inauguration as President of the People’s Republic of Mozambique, Samora 
Machel stated that: ‘It is in order to respect the freedom of conscious that the state can not be confused 
or be linked to any religion…Mass mobilisation is a right and duty exclusively conquered by Frelimo 
through a difficult struggle against colonialism and imperialism.  The close association of religious 
institutions to the machinery of domination and aggression of our people, certainly does not grant them 
the right to currently claim something they have always fought against’ (Machel, 1975b). Author’s own 
translation.  
 
24 A renowned Mozambican scholar argued that the relationship between FRELIMO and the rural 
populations in the liberated zones of the northern province of Cabo Delgado was based on a 
combination of mobilisation and repression.  In addition, the alliance between them was sustained by 
immediate mutual objectives such as the population's need for military protection and FRELIMO's need 
to feed its guerrillas, much more than by any common ideological thinking (Adam, 1993). 
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framework of opposition, which led to an exclusionary pattern in an eminently 
multicultural and plural society.   
 
3.2.4 Flawed Economic Policies 
 
Notwithstanding Frelimo’s unity behind the single party model, its economic 
policies became a strong point of contention within the leadership (Negrão, 
2001, Africa Confidential 06/10/78).  One line of argument, supported by 
President Machel, was based around providing pragmatic responses based on 
socialist inspiration but contextualised in the reality of the country (Afrique Asie 
17/05/76).  This favoured the support for the traditional agricultural activity of 
the peasants and a fair integration of these practices into the wider national 
production system, even if concrete policy instruments to implement such a 
vision were lacking (Negrão, 2001).  In contrast, others argued for a more 
purist and theoretical interpretation of socialist economic models and 
promoted concrete policies such as the mechanisation of large state farms 
(Newitt 1995: 543, Negrão, 2001, Africa Confidential 06/10/78).   
 
Between 1975 and 1977 a debate ensued regarding the direction to follow and 
during that phase pragmatism seemed to prevail over ideology concerning 
economic matters (Financial Times 03/11/75, African Development 1976: 
1236-37, Pitcher 2002: 38).  For example, the initial take over of land and 
private property by the state and the appointment of state representatives to 
manage production units was prompted by the massive flight of around 
200,000 Portuguese settlers and qualified Mozambicans who left the country 
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between 1974 and 1975, presenting significant security and economic 
challenges for the new state-building enterprise (Pitcher 2002: 38, Financial 
Times 03/11/75, African Development 1976, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 
37). 
 
However, the political outcome of Frelimo’s third congress in 1977 
consolidated support for an economy based on central planning.  Frelimo 
declared itself a Marxist-Leninist Vanguard party (Frelimo, 1978) and adopted 
an Indicative Prospective Plan (PPI) that aimed to end underdevelopment 
within a decade (Castel-Branco 1995: 598).  The state centralised investment 
and controlled the market at the same time that it institutionalised the 
previously ad-hoc policies of aldeias comunais (communal villages)25 and 
large state farms, accompanied by the intention to train the work force 
(Francisco 2003: 157). 
 
The state-farms were intended to replace the big agricultural enterprises 
previously run by Portuguese settlers and other foreign concessions.  
Frelimo’s added goal was to mechanise agriculture but this proved 
unsustainable in practice since it required intensive financial investment and a 
skilled labour force (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 65, Alden 2001: 7, 
Pitcher 2002: 53).  Furthermore, small-scale farmers deliberately disrupted this 
                                                
25 The communal villages were a form of concentration of rural population in delimited territory in order to 
organise production and economic life.   
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project, which they perceived to be against their interests (Abrahamsson and 
Nilsson 1994: 215).  
 
The communal villages were aimed at setting up a viable administrative 
structure with adequate territorial coverage. It was thought they would also 
allow for better service delivery and party control, as well as improved 
organisation of people for collective and cooperative-oriented production 
(Pitcher 2002: 86).  However, except for those areas where they had been put 
into practice in the context of the liberated zones, implementation advanced 
slowly.26  In addition, support for cooperative-oriented production suffered from 
lack of investment given its absorption by the state-run farms (Castel-Branco 
1995: 599).   
 
At the same time, dissatisfaction prevailed because the communal villages 
model was not aligned with the needs of family-based agriculture and 
commerce.  Frelimo’s measures to subsidise the distribution of seeds and 
farming instruments failed to meet the requirements and the credit system did 
not work.  The commercial network that customarily absorbed surplus 
production had collapsed with the flight of the Portuguese and Indians and had 
                                                
26 The 4th session of Frelimo’s Central Committee (CC) that took place between 7-16 August 1978 
analysed matters of discipline, political deviation, corruption and violation of the ideology of the party. 
The then Minister of Agriculture, Joaquim Ribeiro de Carvalho was expelled from the CC under 
disciplinary action because he espoused an ’erroneous‘ notion of development, which ’obstructed‘ the 
advance of socialism.  Apparently he had been admonished several times, but maintained his conviction, 
refusing to implement the priorities defined by the party organs of direction in relation to the Communal 
Villages.  After the third session of the Popular Assembly (12-13 August 1978) he was relieved of the 
position of Minister of Agriculture (Tempo 27/08/78, 25 de Setembro 09-10/1978). 
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not been replaced (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 46, 219).  To make 
matters worse, the organisation of rural areas resembled colonial policies of 
aldeamentos (‘villagisation’)(Coelho, 1993, Newitt 1995: 549).27  The end 
result of this flawed rural development strategy was a decline in agricultural 
production and the creation of food dependency in a formerly self-sufficient 
countryside.  
 
When these policy failings were officially recognised at Frelimo’s fourth 
congress 26th-30th April 1983, the decision to address them was implemented 
with severe limitations: civil servants and the managers of the state-led 
enterprises stalled the process; a drought occurred and the war of 
destabilisation advanced (Hanlon 1991: 26, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 
233).  By then, discontent had also grown in rural areas and Mozambique’s 
National Resistance (RENAMO) gained ground by profiting from this 
vulnerability. 
 
3.2.5 Inherited Economic Vulnerabilities 
 
Further to the points made above, Mozambique inherited a colonial capitalist 
economy, highly dependent on subsidies from the central government and on 
regional and global networks of trade and commerce, through which foreign 
                                                
27 The policy of villagisation was implemented by the colonial regime in order to prevent and/or curb 
FRELIMO’s support by local populations.  Implementation started in 1966 and attempted to build political 
support amongst the populations for the colonial regime, through the delivery of socio-economic services 
such as health, schooling, technical support for agriculture and the establishment of commercial 
networks.  However, amongst other problems, the administrative structures faced difficulties in the 
implementation, and the conditions promised were not always in place, oftentimes leading the 
populations to abandon altogether these delimited areas (Henriksen, 1978, Isaacman and Isaacman, 
1983, Coelho, 1993). 
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currency was injected into the economy.  Initially Frelimo and the Apartheid 
regime took a pragmatic stance by maintaining neutrality to safeguard 
economic relations (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 77).  However, 
subsequently, and in response to Frelimo’s hardening of its anti-racist and 
anti-capitalist political discourse, increased support for Zimbabwe’s war of 
independence, and the rise of the Southern Africa Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC), South Africa (RSA) opted for an economic blockade.  It 
decreased quotas of foreign workers in the gold mines, which together with the 
fall in gold prices, dramatically cut Mozambique’s foreign income 
(Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 77).28  In addition, the price decrease of 
Mozambique's primary commodities in international markets, together with 
successive natural calamities and Renamo’s destruction of economic targets, 
converged to strangle the newly independent country's agricultural production 
and overall economy (Hanlon 1991: 20-23, Alden 2001: 7).   
 
The lack of access to foreign currency dramatically reduced the nation's ability 
to import food for internal consumption, which until 1981, had been met by 
state farm production.  The resulting food scarcity fostered an increase in 
crime, economic speculation and black market activity in urban areas (Africa 
                                                
28 In April 1978, i.e. before the creation of the SADCC in 1980, the RSA denounced the payment to 
Mozambique in gold according to fixed prices, which was carried out as a percentage of workers’ salary.  
From then onwards, Mozambique could only receive in gold if it accepted international market rates, 
representing a huge economic setback.  The beginning of Renamo’s war led to a tougher stance on the 
part of neighbouring countries towards the RSA which, together with their increased support for the 
African National Congress (ANC) and their enforcement of economic sanctions imposed by the 
international community, led the RSA to expel mine workers from countries such as Zambia, 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe following independence.  
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Now 1983: 43-46).  This, in turn, led Frelimo to introduce more restrictive 
security legislation, and to transform the security and justice institutions into 
punitive and repressive establishments, as discussed in Chapter IV.  The 
outcome was a severe disruption of the nation and state-building project, 
intensified by the advent of a post-independence armed conflict that lasted 
sixteen years, and which ended only in 1992.  
 
Frelimo came to power facing enormous challenges from the confluence of 
difficult national, regional and international conditions.  To believe that an 
entirely different result could have stemmed solely from their governmental 
performance would be academic naiveté.  Nonetheless, it is reasonable to 
assert that its immediate problem-solving responses, coupled with its strong 
ideological orientation, failed to mitigate the problems it faced, whereas more 
strategic political consideration might have delivered better results.  Whilst 
these important fault lines represent Frelimo’s responsibility in the 
development of the post-independence armed conflict, its outbreak was 
undeniably affected by the regional and international context surrounding 
Mozambique.  
 
3.2.6 In the Epicentre of International and Regional Dynamics: RENAMO’s 
Creation and Survival 
 
At independence and during subsequent years, Mozambique’s main donors 
and advisers came from socialist countries like China, Russia and Cuba.  This 
contributed to the disruption of Frelimo’s state-building project and turned 
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Mozambique into a pawn in the East-West ideological confrontation, despite 
its affiliation with the Non-Aligned Movement.  Frelimo did not officially 
embrace a Marxist-Leninist ideology until 1977, but by then, a silent regional 
war of destabilisation and the roots of RENAMO’s insurgency had been sown, 
with the goal of curbing the expansion of communism in Southern Africa.  
 
The regional dynamics were focused around the opposition of the Front Line 
States (FLS) - Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola, as well 
as Zimbabwe and Namibia, after independence - to the dominance of the 
white and racist rule of Rhodesia and South Africa.29 
 
Within this context, the newly independent Mozambique, against its own 
national economic interests, implemented mandatory UN SC sanctions against 
Rhodesia, and provided support for Zimbabwe’s struggle for independence.  
This was contrary to the predominantly pragmatic responses to domestic 
problems, and to the logic of maximisation of interests in relation to economic 
transactions with the RSA.  In this case, Frelimo acted according to its 
espoused principles of internationalism and solidarity, guided by values of 
appropriateness.  Thus, the country adopted varying guidelines in its decision-
making processes, choosing courses of action according to different criteria in 
                                                
29 The FLS (1976) pre-dated the SADCC (1980) and whilst the former was eminently a political 
organisation of defence and security in light of the RSA threat, the latter was more directed at building 
economic independence from South Africa’s economic domination, although it never lost sight of its Anti-
Apartheid perspective, and of support for the liberation movements.  
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distinct situations, in an attempt to balance domestic interests with 
international legitimacy. 
 
In retaliation - and as confirmed by the head of the Rhodesian intelligence 
services of the time - the regime of Ian Smith, began Mozambique’s 
destabilisation by recruiting and training a ‘pseudo-terrorist’ unit comprised of 
a variety of Mozambican dissidents (Flower 1987: 262, 301).  This group 
included members of the former Portuguese counter-insurgency forces and of 
the colonial secret police, FRELIMO army deserters and escaped prisoners, 
Rhodesian spies, and individuals that had run away from Frelimo’s re-
education camps (To the Point, 03/06/77, Finnegan 1992: 31, Human Rights 
Watch 1992: 20, Minter 1998: 42, Flower, 2004).   
 
At its start, in 1976, the group that subsequently became RENAMO mainly 
destabilised and counteracted activities of the Zimbabwean liberation fighters 
based in Mozambique.  Upon Zimbabwe’s independence, RENAMO would 
likely have surrendered had it not been for the extensive logistical and 
financial support received from RSA’s ‘Total Strategy’ against the perceived 
‘Communist Total Onslaught’ (Jaster, 1986, Minter, 1994, Stiff, 1999).  Despite 
the RSA’s external aggression against another sovereign state, the West did 
not openly object, allowing the conflict to escalate. 
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Nevertheless, following the refusal of the Soviet-led Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (COMECON) to accept Mozambique as a full member in 
1981,30 Mozambique realised that a strategy of rapprochement with the West 
was indispensable, as the country had become increasingly reliant on 
emergency food aid.  Whilst Mozambique enjoyed support from Western 
partners such as the Nordic European countries and even the UK following 
independence, appeasement with the US became essential.  
 
This rapprochement created the conditions for a formal political agreement 
between Mozambique and the RSA in 1984, namely the N’komati agreement, 
which was supposed to have ended the civil war.  However, internal RSA 
disputes led to its continuing support for RENAMO (Newitt 1995: 568, Minter 
1998: 58, Alden 2001: 9).   
 
With the end of the Cold War and the fall of Apartheid, the causes of the 
conflict as widely perceived at the time, i.e. international confrontation and 
especially regional destabilisation, should have been resolved and obstacles 
to peace removed.  However, the war showed no signs of abating in 
Mozambique and RENAMO gained control of considerable parts of the 
countryside, despite committing atrocities and using violent, forced 
conscription in its expansion (Hanlon, 1984, Gersony, 1988, Geffray, 1990, 
                                                
30 COMECON accepted Mozambique only as an observer given its weak economy, including a low gross 
national product and reduced export potential.  However, in practice political factors appear to have 
motivated this decision.  Mozambique was most likely not perceived as ‘enough’ Marxist by the Soviet 
Union.  It had adhered to the non-aligned movement, had refused a Russian naval base following 
independence, and did not take sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict (Jinadu 1984: 16-47).   
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Morgan, 1990, Vines 1991, 1996, Wilson, 1992, Finnegan, 1992, Nilsson, 
1993a,b, Minter, 1994, Hall and Young 1997: 169-170).  This clearly indicated 
that it had succeeded in building a support base amongst a relevant share of 
the population, by capitalising on the vulnerabilities created by the flaws of 
Frelimo’s internal rule.  
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
Mozambique’s immediate post-independence period was filled with 
expectations of implementation of a modernising state-building project 
anchored in the construction of an inclusive and fair society, united by the goal 
of forging a common national identity.  Led by an ethically oriented ruling 
FRELIMO, energised in the revolutionary quest against corruption, and 
legitimised through the achievement of independence via liberation war, the 
country nevertheless succumbed to its political economy make-up. 
 
This chapter demonstrated that a number of core explanatory factors beyond 
ethnicisation of politics and corruption interacted to produce the outcome of 
the civil war in Mozambique.  The absence of rentierism and neo-patrimonial 
politics that was at the root cause of armed conflict elsewhere in Africa was 
not enough to withstand a regional destabilisation strategy with links to 
international dynamics of the proxy wars of the Cold War.  Furthermore, in the 
internal domain a series of policy choices exacerbated the already fragile 
transition to independence.  First was Frelimo’s fascination with applying in 
Mozambique globally prominent theories of economic growth and models of 
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modernisation, in a bid for overall social engineering that would create a 
‘progressive’ Mozambican society.  This central pillar of Frelimo’s state-
building project was in line with the mainstream development narrative of the 
time, anchored in the primacy of scientific knowledge and technology as the 
panacea for ‘underdevelopment’, and therefore cutting across the East-West 
ideological divide.  Second was the initial improvisation by Frelimo and its 
adoption of problem-solving reactive approaches, accompanied by certain 
policy and decision-making immaturity during the troubled independence 
transition.  Third was the prevailing myopic reading of the Mozambican 
society, downplaying the importance of rural economic dynamics and social 
stratification, as well as the central role of traditional authorities.  Fourth was 
the consolidation of initially reactive measures into fully-fledged policies of 
Marxist-Leninist orientation (at least theoretically) after the third party 
congress.  Fifth was the nationalist revolutionary fervour imprinted in the 
social, political and economic directives that resulted in unrestrained 
implementation behaviour.  The exclusionary stances resulting from this 
combination of factors were successfully exploited by the RENAMO 
insurgents, which aptly transposed and perpetuated the asymmetric armed 
conflict interactions between the regional and global variables into the 
domestic realm.  The negative introduction of the ethnic card into politics, and 
the enmeshing of the country in global trends and networks of corruption was 
something to arrive with the end of the armed conflict and the unleashing of 
the triple transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Revisiting the Past: Historical Roots of Mozambique’s Security 
Challenges 
 
 
‘Fragile is the present without the past 
mediocre is the future without the present 
sad is humankind without memory’ 
José Craveirinha  
 
       (author’s own translation from original 
Portuguese  version) 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter continues the case study of coherence and sequencing of 
security reforms in Mozambique through the historical state-building 
framework first adopted in Chapter III. This is done through an examination of 
the origins, structure and institutional culture developed by the Security and 
Justice apparatus during the post-independence phase that followed the 
liberation war (1975-1992).   
 
Questioning the implicit assumption within much of the war-to-peace transition 
literature that post-conflict environments represent blank slates warranting 
high levels of social engineering, this chapter provides a baseline to test the 
institutional ruptures and continuities in the post-independence and the post-
civil war periods in Mozambique.  In this way it sets out a foundation for 
comparing how the legacy inherited by Mozambique’s Security and Justice 
institutions in each of the transitions shaped or not the make-up of the 
successor institutions.  
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In the post-independence period less attention has been paid to the workings 
of the Security and Justice institutions in the ‘liberated zones’31 of 
Mozambique’s Liberation Front (FRELIMO),32 when compared to research 
carried out on political and economic topics and civil war issues.33  This is due 
to at least three factors:  1) incomplete historical and primary archival records; 
2) difficulties in gaining access to institutional documentation pertaining to the 
period in question34 as well as in obtaining comprehensive and reliable 
interviews from crucial players; and 3) limited numbers of secondary 
sources,35 in particular of published accounts of those involved.  Such data are 
beginning to emerge (e.g. Veloso, 2006, Moiane, 2009, Pachinuapa, 2009, 
Vieira, 2010) although they form more of a patchwork, rather than a coherent 
storyline, in contrast to the predominantly oral narrative surrounding 
                                                
31 The functioning of the liberated zones lacks systematic analysis, although insights have been provided 
by certain publications.  See e.g. Mondlane, 1969, Machel, 1975a, Adam, 1993, Vieira, 2010. 
 
32 FRELIMO was created in 1962 as a front bringing different independence movements together, 
namely the Mozambique African National Union (MANU), the National Democratic Union of Mozambique 
(UDENAMO) and the African Union of an Independent Mozambique (UNAMI).  The front emerged under 
the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane as president and Uria Simango as vice-president. 
 
33 Research on security and justice in post-independence Mozambique suffers from a dearth of scholarly 
attention.  However, a few contributions do exist, which deserve mention:  
a) on justice: Isaacman and Isaacman, 1982, Cruz, 1986, Sachs and Welch, 1990, Gundersen, 1992. 
Scattered insights can also be gained from certain chapters in de Sousa Santos and Trindade, 2003;  
b) on wider security: Igreja, 2010 and Machava, 2011 offer compelling analyses of Frelimo's use of 
violence as a means to consolidate power;  
c) on the armed forces: Honwana, 1995, Macaringue,1997 and 2002, Malache et al, 2005. 
 
34 The first attempt at the reorganisation of Mozambique’s public administration documentation and 
archives took place as part of the 2001 Public Sector Reform and began after the 2006 approval of a 
‘Records and State Archives Management Strategy’.  In addition, a National System of State Archives 
was approved in 2007, revising its earlier format from 1992, but its reorganisation is still on-going. 
 
35 In this case ‘limited’ refers not only to the dearth of data, but also to the fact that the media was 
controlled by the state.  Laws and official speeches were vastly reproduced in the newspaper Notícias 
and in the magazine Tempo, as a way of keeping the public informed.  Hence, on a positive note, the 
media outlets constituted a good repository of the official documents of that time.  However, the control 
exerted by the state restricted any analytical or critical posture in the editorial line of those articles, 
especially if they were thought to challenge Frelimo. 
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FRELIMO’s foundation and rule during and following the war of 
independence.36  The perpetuation of this oral narrative aimed at protecting 
the legitimacy of the regime in the absence of systematic historical analysis 
warrants further research.  This could help balance the typical tendency of 
political actors such as Frelimo who, despite espousing democratic ideals, 
continually reproduce and reinforce a mentality of secrecy (Honwana’s 
Preface in Vieira, 2010, Coelho 2011: 8-9).37  Nonetheless, given the 
information gaps, this chapter does not provide a comprehensive 
historiography of the Security and Justice institutions in the post-independence 
period.  Instead, based on the distinct sources consulted, it sheds light on the 
factors of coherence and sequencing in the development of the Security and 
Justice institutions, within the context of Frelimo’s overall post-liberation state-
                                                
36 de Bragança and Depelchin offer a powerful critique of uncritical examinations of the historical 
development of Frelimo, from being a liberation front with nationalist goals into a socialist, and 
subsequently Marxist-Leninist party.  They also raise awareness of the danger of confounding the history 
of Frelimo with the history of Mozambique (de Bragança and Depelchin, 1986). 
 
37 This mind-set appears to have developed from a combination of factors. 1) The first relates to the 
liberation movements’ enduring perception of being under siege, developed during colonial times.  In the 
case of Frelimo, this perception was maintained in the post-independence period given the Cold War's 
contribution to the start and continuation of the Mozambican civil war. 2) The second concerns the lack 
of transparency that characterises the management of Frelimo’s internal party business, such as 
processes dealing with internal dissent. Examples are the controversial killings of former party leaders 
such as Uria Simango and Joana Simeão, which are thought to have been extrajudicial. 3) The third, 
which probably developed as a consequence of the first and second, is a longstanding internal party 
ideological guideline postulating that all criticism and self-criticism must take place within the party, which 
must address and solve problems, promoting change from the inside.  Criticising the party in venues 
external to the party was unwelcome because it provided information to outsiders, who could manipulate 
information against the regime.  Professional journalists and scholars ought to obey these orientations as 
stated in the report of the first National Seminar on Information, 1978.  This old pattern of thinking has 
not disappeared and in fact seems to have strengthened with the return to power of the more 
conservative wing of Frelimo since 2005.  However, in contrast to the party discourse by senior 
representatives, it appears that space for criticism within the structures by regular Frelimo members has 
diminished, or that discordant opinions are no longer considered.  This prompted influential party 
members to break with the tradition of internal criticism as prescribed by the party and publicly criticise 
the way the country and party business have been managed in recent years.  In turn, this led to public 
campaigns of character assassination carried out by unidentified authors, and fierce debates emerged in 
the media between the supporters and the opponents of the current regime, whether belonging or not to 
the party. 
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building project.  The concept of critical junctures and path dependence as 
defined in the literature review guide this scrutiny with the aim of unveiling the 
ruptures and continuities that have impacted the institutions of Security and 
Justice. 
 
4.2 The state security and justice system between 1975-1992  
 
The revolution that followed Mozambique’s war of independence dismantled 
existing colonial structures and created new ones, epitomising the rupture of 
the state apparatus, including the institutions of Security and Justice.  
Independence represented a critical juncture, bringing about opportunity to set 
up effective and legitimate Security and Justice institutions.  However, whilst 
Frelimo aimed to develop a new and modern Mozambican state, the external 
and internal threats it faced led it to emulate some of the measures adopted by 
the colonial regime. 
 
At the same time, counterrevolutionary activity created security and military 
operational demands, leading FRELIMO to draw on the experience of 
governing the ‘liberated zones’ to provide immediate security and justice 
responses (Mondlane 1976: 182-186, J.Veloso-08/04/09, 4.5.1-27/02/09, 
personal comm. S.Vieira-11/09/08).  This required the development of 
integrated security solutions by way of liaisons between the people and the 
security forces - through institutional bricolage - partially explaining the 
creation of securitised structures at various levels of society, to support the 
work of the uniformed security forces in the post-independence period.  
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At first, all security forces derived from FRELIMO guerrilla groups, most of 
whom had not received any training prior to joining the regular armed forces or 
Police (J. Veloso-08/04/09).  Nonetheless, given the impending threats, 
Frelimo could not afford to allow a security vacuum to develop whilst these 
forces were being trained.  In addition, the Security and Justice institutions 
were seen as vital to both the movement's political survival and the legitimacy 
of the revolution.  In keeping with their experience in the liberated zones, these 
institutions remained actively controlled by Frelimo.  This meant that in the 
face of new realities, FRELIMO still resorted to its past experience instilling a 
degree of continuity between the old practices of the liberation struggle and 
the new post-independence decisions, in line with path dependence theory. 
 
In this interaction between critical juncture and path dependence, threat 
determined priority; hence the subordination of policy-making and 
implementation to pragmatism and institutional bricolage became prominent 
as a coping measure.  This constrained coherence and sequencing in the 
Security and Justice system institution building, with long-term institutional 
development being downgraded in the face of the primacy of power politics. 
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Fig. 4 Post-independence patterns in the justice and security system 
 
4.2.1 Defence 
The Legacy of the Colonial War and the Lusaka Accords 
 
The Defence forces of the newly independent Mozambique embodied their 
time and context.  The armed wing of FRELIMO, the Forças Populares de 
Libertação de Moçambique (FPLM), which fought the guerrilla war against the 
Portuguese colonial army, formed the core of the post-independence armed 
forces (FPLM-FAM).  In conformity with FRELIMO’s governing stance, the 
creation of the FPLM-FAM represented rupture with colonial structures and 
policies, and therefore members of former colonial forces (including 
Mozambican citizens) were not incorporated into the newly created army.   
 
The Lusaka Accords between the Portuguese state and FRELIMO created a 
joint military commission to oversee the maintenance of a cease-fire during 
transition (Lusaka Accord, 1974, nr 8), but did not include post-independence 
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provisions for the security forces.  This demonstrated that the negotiations 
preceding the agreement concerned a transfer of power rather than the terms 
of independence (de Bragança, 1986, Sachs and Welch 1990: 1), signalling 
that, instead of a negotiated settlement, Frelimo obtained de facto 
unconditional authority from the Portuguese state. 
 
The dispositions of section V of the Cease Fire Agreement were the 
precursors to the complete rupture surrounding institution building of the 
independent country’s armed forces.  They determined that those 
Mozambicans serving in the Portuguese armed forces, whether in 
Mozambique or abroad, should be demobilised by the Portuguese state and 
reintegrated into Mozambican society by FRELIMO.  This was typically 
representative of a critical juncture, where the rupture materialised in the 
exclusion of the Mozambicans who had been members of the Portuguese 
colonial army, representing a lost opportunity to build competence within the 
new armed forces.  
 
It must be recalled that the climate of suspicion was acute and that Frelimo 
legitimately feared that those who had worked for the colonial system could 
not transform overnight and become loyal to the new revolutionary regime.38  
                                                
38  In part, the flaw was that they considered all civil servants, including all security forces, as a threat 
and were not able to differentiate amongst them.  However, Frelimo’s concerns were not unfounded as 
armed uprisings and acts of sabotage against independence were carried out by groups of extremist 
Portuguese settlers, members of former Commando and Special Forces units, in addition to affiliates of 
the former PIDE-DGS (Jardim, 1976, Newitt 1995: 539-540, Veloso 2006: 105).   
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However, this political consideration clouded concern with the declared 
process of egalitarian and inclusive nation building.39   
 
From the point of view of state-building and institutional performance, the 
FPLM-FAM could have benefited in the initial stages from the experience of 
those Mozambicans who had served in the colonial armed forces to train a 
regular army40 (Malache et al 2005: 163-164), and afterwards to effectively 
halt RENAMO’s insurgency.41  The majority of Mozambicans had served in the 
colonial army not out of conviction but due to the compulsory nature of 
Portuguese military service (Cabaço, 2010: 241).  Any resistance on their part 
would have opened them and their families to the threat of retaliatory action by 
the colonial authorities and by the PIDE-DGS.  In addition, military service 
represented a means of subsistence for those in the regular army and also for 
                                                
39 An inclusive policy might possibly have helped to avoid the support of these disaffected groups for 
future counterinsurgent forces.  Whilst Renamo had not yet developed, it was not implausible to foresee 
the emergence of such a group, given the regional context.  Frelimo was aware of emerging internal and 
external threats as proven by the inclusion of provisions to tackle these in the cease-fire agreement that 
accompanied the Lusaka Accords (Frelimo-Portuguese Cease-Fire Agreement, 1974, Arts 6,9,13-14).  In 
fact the same document foresaw the implementation of measures to stop Portuguese and Mozambican 
nationals from becoming involved in military collaboration with the governments of South Africa and 
Rhodesia (Frelimo-Portuguese Cease-Fire Agreement, 1974, Art11). 
 
40 Frelimo military instructors trained in Tanzania, both in guerrilla tactics and in conventional army 
training.  However, the downside was that their actual experience was in guerrilla warfare, which is why, 
after independence, the Mozambican armed forces sent many of its officers to be trained in former 
socialist republics, in order to help transform its mainly guerrilla army into a conventional force.  In this 
context, Mozambican members of the colonial army could have provided useful organisational input 
(1.1.1-01/09/08). 
 
41 The usefulness of the former colonial military was implicitly recognised when the war intensified, since 
President Machel ‘rehabilitated’ the Comandos that had remained in Mozambique in the meeting of the 
Comprometidos (compromised), which took place between 3-7/06/1982.  After this it appears that he 
prompted them to collaborate with a special counterinsurgency unit created to combat Renamo, which 
some analysts likened to the ‘Flechas’, a similar unit created by the Portuguese within the PIDE to deal 
with the Frelimo guerrillas in the course of the war of independence (Igreja 2010: 799). 
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those that were part of the Provincial Organisation of the Voluntary and Civil 
Defence (OPVDC) (Cabaço 2010: 238).  
 
Portugal’s adoption of an ‘Africanisation’ policy for its army in Mozambique 
accelerated when faced with the threat of FRELIMO’s insurgency, resulting in 
Mozambicans accounting for around 60% of the colonial army in 1974 
(Macaringue 2002a: 7, Malache et al 2005: 158, Cabaço 2010: 240).  Few, 
however, were promoted to officer's rank, with the most senior Mozambican 
serving as captain (Macaringue 2002a: 8).  This reflected the practice of 
Mozambicans being used solely to execute orders, and not to set policy or 
strategy.  Yet, instead of reasoning in terms of institutional performance, 
FRELIMO acted from the point of view of appropriateness and concern for 
safeguarding the legitimacy of the FPLM-FAM, which allegedly could have 
been hindered in the eyes of the people, if elements from the colonial forces 
had been integrated.  Also, in addition to maintaining consistency between 
their anti-colonial discourse and practice, Frelimo feared insurrection on the 
part of the former colonial military, as well as disruption to the unity and the 
future build-up of the FPLM-FAM (1.1.1- 01/09/08, J.Veloso-08/04/09). 
 
This decision and the lack of a consistent policy on integration into 
Mozambican society of the African members of the colonial army (Darch and 
Hedges 1999: 146) resulted in unintended security costs (Malache et al 2005: 
163).  Many of these Mozambicans, feeling excluded from the new nation-
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building project, and humiliated by the naming and shaming campaigns that 
occurred post-independence (Coelho 2002: 150, Coelho and Macaringue 
2002: 50, Igreja 2010: 781-799) joined the group of the disaffected assembled 
by Rhodesia to perpetrate acts of sabotage.  
 
The FPLM-FAM 
 
The creation of the FPLM-FAM, i.e. the transformation of FRELIMO’s guerrilla 
units into a regular army, was limited by international bipolarity and regional 
destabilisation (Malache et al 2005: 163).  According to different interviewees, 
this led Frelimo into actions based on reaction rather than initiative and 
prevented the emergence of a well-structured vision, institutional strategy, 
mission, composition and capacity plan for the FPLM-FAM (1.2.1.5-27/05/05, 
1.1.1-01/09/08, 1.2.2-14/09/08, 4.5.1-27/02/09).   
 
However, the aim of building a well-trained and well-equipped professional 
army did exist as proven by the fact that at the same time that Mozambique 
was engaging in operational missions to counter destabilisation, military 
cadres were being sent abroad to study in Eastern bloc countries (4.5.1- 
27/02/09).  In addition, there was also an intention to define an institutional 
strategy but implementation was hampered by the necessity to respond to 
regional and domestic threats (Coelho and Macaringue 2002: 49), implying a 
response guided by the priorities of border defence and maintenance of 
internal order (J.Veloso-08/04/09).   
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From the point of view of organisational structure, the Commander-in-Chief of 
the armed forces was the president of Frelimo (Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of Mozambique, 1975, Art 5) and the Defence institutions 
represented an evolution from the Department of Defence that the liberation 
struggle movement established to coordinate military action during the war.   
 
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Armed Forces General Staff existed as 
a unified institution to administer the FPLM-FAM, and both were subject to 
direct party control, with the Minister and the Chief of General Staff sitting high 
in Frelimo’s hierarchy (Malache et al 2005: 169).  The primary mission of the 
MoD was to implement Frelimo policy to defend the nation and the state. This 
implied the consolidation of independence and of national unity through the 
coordination and organisation of the FPLM, which were established as a force 
of defence and consolidation of the revolution (Decree 1/75 of 27/07, Art 3).  
 
Interviewees confirmed the bond between the armed forces and the party in 
power (4.5.4-09/09/08, 4.1.1-26/02/09, 4.5.1-27/02/09, 1.1.1-01/09/08).  A top 
political decision-maker at the time claimed that the FPLM-FAM were a state 
instrument but that, given that Frelimo was the only party in government, ‘the 
party and the state acted as a single entity’ (4.5.1-27/02/09).  At the same time 
he emphasised that this was not equivalent to saying that all those in FPLM-
FAM were party members as: 
…not everyone that entered the armed forces to serve in the 
destabilisation war were party militants, although in general everybody 
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followed the orientation provided … some people had doubts, and only 
adopted or consolidated party values once inside that institution (4.5.1-
27/02/09).   
 
This explains the chief function of the National Political Commissariat that 
ensured political direction and indoctrination in the FPLM-FAM, thus 
maintaining its allegiance to Frelimo (Honwana 1999: 162, Macaringue 2002: 
148, Malache et al 2005: 162).  Thus, the armed forces were a core element of 
Frelimo’s rule, and they were kept under political control, displaying hybrid 
civilian-military characteristics, as a result of path dependence at work.  This 
set up was in keeping with the war of independence tradition, where the 
military branch and other sectors of FRELIMO were indistinguishable, since all 
were engaged in the political-military task of liberating the country (Macaringue 
2002: 139).  
 
From 1975 until the early 1980s the FPLM-FAM forces transitioned from being 
a guerrilla group to a conventional army.  Yet a paradox existed, since having 
originated from a guerrilla movement, the institution now had to confront 
another emerging insurgency.  The FPLM-FAM conventional army model 
became inadequate to fight a guerrilla war, yet its transformation gained 
momentum through extensive training, the acquisition of equipment and 
advisory services provided by Eastern bloc aid, even if support did not reach 
the levels envisaged by Frelimo (Malache et al 2005: 163).  From there on, it 
rapidly adapted its composition and methods of warfare to fight increasing 
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guerrilla activity, and adopted more ‘forceful’ means of recruitment to 
strengthen its presence in the provinces (Malache et al 2005: 174).   
 
Nonetheless, FPLM-FAM vigour declined as the war intensified with the 
consequent destruction of infrastructure and the lack of new investment in the 
military apparatus, resulting in a significant loss of efficiency (1.2.1.5-27/05/05, 
1.2.2-14/09/08, 1.1.4-12/08/08).  The latter was a consequence of reduced 
support from the Eastern bloc, in response to the perceived betrayal by 
Mozambique due to the signing of the N’komati Agreement with South Africa 
in 1984 and the country’s rapprochement with the West.   
 
Finally, the high prestige and respect gained by the FPLM-FAM during the 
liberation war and early independence slowly waned due to the lack of military 
capacity to protect populations from rebel attacks.  This was aggravated by the 
government soldiers’ indiscipline and harassment of people, which stemmed 
from state failure to meet their basic needs such as the provision of food and 
equipment in the field (Newitt 1995: 574, Malache et al 2005: 175, 1.1.4-
12/08/08).  
 
Thus far, it has been shown that in the post-independence period Frelimo’s 
policies were informed by the past practices of the liberation war, thus 
denoting a degree of path dependence.  Although independence represented 
a critical juncture, and despite the effective rupture in the security arena 
  137 
demanding the creation of Defence institutions from afresh, Frelimo did not 
give strategic priority to longer-term institution building in these areas.  
Instead, its strategic priority was to face immediate internal and external 
threats resulting in the adoption of reactive stances designed for survival.  At 
the same time Frelimo was not driven to maximise institutional performance 
and focused instead on retaining the legitimacy of the regime and its security 
forces.  Hence, appropriateness featured as much as pragmatism in domestic 
and foreign policy decision-making.  Paradoxically, such decisions, like the 
exclusion of former colonial Mozambican military from the new post-colonial 
army, led to unintended consequences that furthered security vulnerabilities, 
namely the creation of a pool of disenfranchised people for its opponents to 
draw upon. 
 
4.2.2 Public Security  
The Legacy of the Colonial System and the Lusaka Accords  
 
During colonial times the system of dual policing resembled that of the 
Portuguese metropolitan areas.  This system included public protection police 
units and judiciary police, etc, working in the main Mozambican cities and 
paramilitary units consisting of local recruits operating in rural areas.  These 
answered to local Portuguese administrators that held, amongst others, 
executive and judicial discretionary powers (Trindade 2003: 100).  The latter 
arrangement, in tandem with the traditional leaders’ conflict resolution 
mechanisms, was applied to the indigenous populations, whilst the former 
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covered the white, the coloured and the assimilados.  In FRELIMO’s view it 
was a system of ostracism that fostered inequality amongst Mozambicans, 
and had to be changed. 
 
The Lusaka agreement foresaw the creation of a Police corps to maintain 
order and security during the transitional government period (The Lusaka 
Accords, nr 11), but the legal provision for this body was only enacted on the 
eve of independence (Decree 54/75 of 17/05).  The resulting Police corps 
comprised a few residual members of the earlier Portuguese public security 
police and former members of FRELIMO guerrilla troops that received six-
months police training in Nachingwea, Tanzania in 1974 (3.1.5-20/09/08).  
FRELIMO’s practical policing experience was limited to that undertaken in the 
liberated zones (4.5.1-27/02/09, J.Veloso-08/04/09, 4.5.4-09/09/08).  
However, high levels of suspicion kept it from integrating the remaining 
Portuguese elements in the new Police force (J.Veloso-08/04/09).  As in the 
case of the FPLM-FAM, this decision reflected the fact that independence was 
an instance of critical juncture, where rupture was preferred over gradual 
reform. 
 
The PPM 
 
Training for the new Police force began (3.1.1.5-23/05/05) in 1976, but the 
Polícia Popular de Mocambique (PPM) was only legally created in 1979 (Law 
5/79 of 26/05).  Similarly to the experience of the armed forces, the civil war 
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disrupted the medium to longer-term efforts of institution building of the Police.  
Its mission to uphold order and public security was shared with the FPLM-
FAM, as during the civil war the PPM barely extended beyond provincial 
capitals, and even there, it was very limited in its operational capacity (3.1.2.5-
18/05/05, 4.5.1-27/02/09).  In turn, the Police were also entrusted with the 
mission of containing internal and external enemies, and therefore they 
contributed to protecting the defence ring around the city of Maputo from 
Renamo military incursions (3.1.1.5-23/05/05).  This was typical of the 
prevailing ‘unified security’ concept based on the idea of merging internal and 
external security measures and forces (Chachiua 2000: 56), depending on the 
nature of the threat.  It was also grounded in the perception that all threats, 
including internal criminality - see below in justice section - were infiltration 
attempts stemming from the war of destabilisation.  
 
The Police, however, failed to enjoy the privileged status of the FPLM-FAM 
because of the war (3.1.2.5-18/05/05, 4.5.4-09/09/08, 4.5.1-27/02/09).  The 
force was also less prominent than the intelligence services - Serviço Nacional 
de Segurança Popular (SNASP) - which, besides collecting and analysing 
information, were authorised to search, investigate, interrogate and detain 
(Decree 21/75 of 11/10, Art. 5).  Furthermore, the SNASP maintained a prison 
(4.5.4-09/09/08, 2.3.1-25/02/09) intended for those accused of counter-
revolutionary activities.  Although this was its main focus of activity, the 
SNASP was also authorised to instruct judicial and criminal processes, 
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holding, in practice, greater powers than the criminal investigation police 
(Decree 25/75 of 18/10).  The SNASP was also more powerful than the 
Attorney General, given that both he and the Police had legally established 
detention periods, whilst the SNASP was exempt from such limits (4.1.1- 
26/02/09).  In this regard, the SNASP resembled the PIDE-DGS, representing 
a line of continuity or path dependence with colonial practice.   
 
The Police, being the ‘poor child’ in the far-reaching security system 
established by FRELIMO, suffered from an enduring inferiority complex 
compounded by politicians' attempts to bring in outsiders to occupy leadership 
positions (3.1.2.5-18/05/05).  This long-lasting trend was illustrated by the 
absence of a police commander between 1979 and 1995, with the force being 
directly managed by the Minister of Interior - a member of Frelimo’s top 
hierarchy - to whom each Police branch was accountable (3.1.5- 20/09/08).  It 
was an additional sign of the strong grip Frelimo maintained over the security 
sector.  Despite the fact that the Police was institutionally weak and deprived 
of the prestige of the FPLM-FAM or the SNASP, the Ministry of Interior (MInt) 
was, nevertheless, a powerful institution.  
 
The ‘Democratic Structures of People’s Power’ 
 
Significantly, the law stated that the primary mission of the MInt was to 
guarantee the working of the ‘democratic structures of people’s power’ at the 
local level, and its coordination and liaison with the national level, in addition to 
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ensuring the transformation of the Police into a real instrument of security and 
defence of the popular masses (Decree 1/75 of 27/07, Art 5).   
 
The emphasis given to 'people’s power' was followed with a series of 
structures of social and political control based on the creation of people’s 
committees extending from the national down to the local level, but under the 
close observation of Frelimo’s National Political Commissariat.  It was no 
coincidence that, at the time, Armando Guebuza, Mozambique’s current 
President, simultaneously held the posts of Frelimo’s National Political 
Commissar and Minister of the Interior.  
 
Guebuza can be credited with bringing dynamism to the democratic structures 
of people’s power (Veloso 2006: 105), centred upon the Grupos 
Dinamizadores (GD) created on the eve of independence.  These consisted of 
Frelimo party cells organised at the neighbourhood level to perform political 
mobilisation and control, as well as judicial, administrative and security alert 
(neighbourhood watch) functions (Meneses et al 2003: 351-354; Brito 2010: 
19).  The latter task, in particular, was carried out by sub-level structures such 
as the chefes dos quarteirões (chief of block) and the chefe das dez casas 
(chief of ten houses).  These observed neighbours’ behaviour and reported to 
the GD any suspicious movements suggesting collaboration with ‘the enemy’, 
or instances of inobservance of Frelimo party rules and rules of social conduct 
(4.1.1-26/02/09).   
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In addition to the former structures, as the war progressed, the Grupos de 
Vigilância Popular (GVP) were created to carry out surveillance against 
sabotage in factories or, more widely, in the communities, adopting informal 
patrolling roles, and acting effectively as armed people’s militias (Tempo 
15/04/79; Notícias 5/5/84). 
 
These ‘democratic structures of people’s power’ became the bedrock of the 
security system guaranteeing public order, and their work represented a 
significant input and source of information for all state security institutions.  
Their cooperation with the Police, for instance, was embodied in the concept 
of ‘Police-People’ liaison that mandated close collaboration between these 
actors (4.5.4-09/09/08).42  This solution denotes institutional bricolage, insofar 
as the gaps in security institutions were consciously bridged by a combination 
of state-led and quasi-institutionalised activity of non-state actors.  In this way, 
besides extending security control over society, Frelimo also boosted its 
legitimacy by creating structures for citizens to allegedly exert people’s power 
in practice. 
 
Whilst these structures became an effective platform for people to intervene in 
society, the result was not necessarily progressive.  In general, the actions of 
the democratic structures of the people’s power produced, at best, 
                                                
42 This principle and the experiences associated with it became a source of inspiration for the 
community-policing efforts that were set up in the post-civil war period (4.5.4-09/09/08) but which have 
also been a target of contestation by populations at large and by those citizens involved in 
implementation. 
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controversial and unintended results. On the one hand, they served as useful 
administrative and security informants; on the other, they contributed to many 
abuses and injustices.  The people serving often manipulated these structures 
for personal profit, witch-hunting, and petty revenge (To the Point 31/10/75).  
They were under the oversight of Frelimo’s Political Commissar, but the 
abundance of the 'structures' in such a large country hindered oversight, even 
with the help of local populations who were encouraged to denounce and 
report misconduct (Notícias 23/05/83). 
 
Furthermore, the veracity of the information that these people’s structures 
produced (some of it anonymous) was difficult to verify, for example, by the 
SNASP or the Police, resulting in the security institutions becoming 
accomplices in the plentiful misdemeanours and unjustified punishments that 
occurred (To the Point 20/07/79).  Public indignation ranged well beyond 
Police complicity with the democratic structures of people’s power, given that 
Police interventions in general were characterised by brutality, owing to its 
paramilitary nature (Seleti 2000: 354-355).  In addition, their performance was 
significantly affected by the low education and the poor training of the cadres, 
coupled with the high level of indoctrination around the need to uphold and 
protect the political and social values of socialism.  This combination earned 
the security institutions a long-lasting negative reputation (Seleti, 2000, Leão, 
2004), with unfortunate implications for its credibility in the post-civil war 
period. 
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This section highlighted that changes in the public security apparatus, as in 
the Defence sector, represented a critical juncture in terms of discontinuity 
with the institutional arrangements of the colonial era.  It also shed light on the 
capacity of Frelimo to engage in institutional bricolage, complementing formal 
state structures with societal means of political control through the 
institutionalisation of the democratic structures of people’s power.  This value-
laden choice was also a pragmatic decision given Frelimo’s creation of an 
incipient paramilitary Police force, which lacked the ability to maintain public 
order and societal control on its own. The outbreak of the civil war reinforced 
the secondary role of the Police relative to the intelligence or the Defence 
sectors, in a similar pattern to that which prevailed during the war of 
independence. 
 
4.2.3 Justice   
The Legacy of the Colonial System  
 
For a long period the colonial system of Justice was based on dualism, with 
separate structures for whites, coloured and assimilados on the one hand, and 
for the majority black population on the other.  The former had access to the 
judicial courts, whereas the latter could only make use of the so-called ‘Private 
Courts of Indigenous People’. In rural areas, Portuguese authorities 
administered justice with the help of traditional local authorities (Trindade 
2003: 99).  
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The prison system replicated this dualism, with the creation of special prisons, 
or special sections within prisons, for indigenous people (Decree-Law 39 997 
of 29/12/54, Arts 1 and 2.3).  This reasoning was infused with a sense of 
‘mission civilisatrice’ and in that spirit the indigenous villages within the penal 
colonies aimed ‘… to obtain a considerable improvement in the degree of 
civilisation of all users, in tandem with recuperation of the condemned’ 
(Ordinance 17 710 of 04/05/1960, Ch IV §II. B) Z.1. and Z.1-A3.).   
 
In the late colonial period, the indigenous status was abolished creating 
juridical equality but in practice discrimination and prejudice persisted 
(Trindade 2003: 99), partly because of oppressive legislation stemming from 
Portugal’s fascist era. Moreover, the time lag between the approval of laws in 
the Portuguese capital and their introduction in colonial legislation caused the 
colonies to apply outdated legislation.  For instance, Decree-Law 26 643 of 
1936 reforming the organisation of prisons was only adapted and transposed 
into law in the colonies through Decree-Law 39 997 of 1954.   
 
These problems were common to all of the colonies’ inhabitants but for most 
of the Mozambican population additional obstacles existed in terms of access 
to justice.  Amongst them was the colonial era legacy of widespread illiteracy 
resulting in a lack of awareness of legal rights and economic resources to 
access legal services.   Moreover, particular provisions and separate prisons 
existed for political crimes (Decree-Law 26 643 of 28/05/36, Arts 7.7 and 7.8) 
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and, if in Portugal it was not possible to obtain a fair trial in a political case, the 
situation was worse in the colonies where the PIDE exerted tight control 
(Sachs and Welch 1990: 2). 
 
Taking into account this legacy of fascist, colonial and elitist systems of Justice 
(Sachs and Welch 1990: 2) and Security, Frelimo decided that an entirely new 
judicial structure was required.  Nonetheless, it was pragmatic enough to 
declare that all legislation prior to the Constitution of 1975, which was not 
against its predispositions, was applicable until its modification or revocation 
(Constitution of the People’s Republic of Mozambique, 1975, Art 71).   
 
Hence, despite the clear intention to completely break with the colonial Justice 
system and the actual organisational restructuring led by Frelimo post-
independence which indicated a state of critical juncture, the seeds of 
continuity and path dependence persisted, taking into account the Herculean 
task of legal overhaul, which remains unfinished (Trindade 2003: 97).  
 
Building a Popular Justice System 
 
The new system was based on the concept of popular justice (Decree 1/75 of 
27/07, Art 13) and was meant to promote fairness, abolish the injustice 
inherent in the colonial apparatus and implement justice that advanced the 
interests of the Mozambicans (Law 12/78 of 02/12, Preamble).  A novel, 
unitary Justice framework was established that merged executive and judicial 
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powers.  The executive managed the system through the Ministry of Justice 
(MJus), which amongst other roles, centrally appointed professional judges.   
 
Besides comprising its own functional directions, structure-wise the MJus led 
the Court Structure and the Attorney General's Office (Decree 1/75 of 27/07).  
The Judiciary Police, subsequently renamed Criminal Investigation Police 
(Decree 25/75 of 18/10), transferred from the MJus to the MInt (Decree 1/75 of 
27/07, Art 15).  The prison and re-education services remained under MJus 
supervision until they were transferred to the MInt (Decree 1/75 of 27/07, Arts 
6.10, 13, Decree 26/75 of 18/10). 
 
Priority was awarded to legislative reform (Decree 1/75 of 27/07, Art 14.3), 
ensuring the simplification of technical legal language and the dissemination of 
the main legislation to make it accessible to the common citizen.  The former 
happened by incorporating long clarifying preambles in the newly adopted 
laws (Sachs and Welch 1990: 12), and the latter by publishing them in the 
mainstream media such as the newspaper Notícias and magazine Tempo, 
and by having them explained in broadcasts by Rádio Moçambique.  In 
addition, legal explanatory campaigns were carried out by law students and 
justice officials in the provinces (Trindade 2003: 106, 2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.4.1-
24/03/09). 
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The willingness to adopt inclusive processes was reflected in the fact that the 
production of new judicial system legislation was based on an extensive, 
nation-wide consultation and debate, incorporating actual input from the 
population.  This process began in 1975 and resulted in the official law only 
being approved in 1978 (Sachs and Welch 1990: 4, WLSA 2000: 38; Trindade 
2003: 109).  An entirely new system, completely distinct from the colonial 
structures, was designed, reinforcing the tendency to critical juncture. 
 
The new judiciary comprised at its base local popular courts (neighbourhood 
popular courts in the urban areas), followed by district-level popular courts, 
provincial popular courts, and the supreme popular court (Law 12/78 of 02/12, 
Art 10.1).  Criteria of fairness were taken into consideration and therefore the 
different court levels applied gradually increasing penalties, functioning also 
with successive stages of appeal.  At the lower level, courts were to be 
exclusively composed of lay judges (Law 12/78 of 02/12, Art 36), and in the 
other echelons professional and elected judges were to work together.  
People’s assemblies selected the non-professional judges from a list of names 
proposed by the party committees in coordination with the mass organisations 
at the corresponding level (Law 12/78 of 02/12, Art 52.4).  This arrangement 
pointed towards a solution of institutional bricolage.  Not in terms of 
improvisation, given that the process of designing the new judicial organisation 
was consultative and comprehensive, but rather concerning the compromise 
found between a quasi-informal and formal institutional arrangement, where 
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different actors effectively contributed towards a plural, more organic and 
legitimate system.  This process can be interpreted as a genuine form of 
people's participation in justice delivery, aside from the caveat requiring 
previous party-related structures, such as the women’s wing, to vet candidates 
eligible by communities to join the local Justice structures (Gundersen 1992: 
260).  This solution, in addition to promoting legitimacy for the regime, also 
addressed a significant institutional lack of specialised staff and material 
resources (Ministério da Justiça, 12/2000: 23). 
 
The underlying philosophy in the delivery of justice was the use of common 
sense, so long as this did not contradict existing law.  It was founded on 
progressive revolutionary principles, side-lining mainstream traditional 
authorities and customary law.  This exclusion in particular, represented 
ideological continuity with earlier FRELIMO liberation war convictions that local 
traditional authorities had collaborated with the colonial powers; hence they 
had to be barred from participating in the new Justice system.  Moreover, the 
formation of courts at the local level, as an interim measure, was in keeping 
with the experience of the liberated zones.  One important difference however, 
was that FPLM members were now barred from serving in the local courts 
(Frelimo 1976: 121).  In practical terms between 1975 and 1978, and until the 
implementation of the new law, judicial responsibilities were mainly carried out 
by the GDs that subsequently became the main detractors of the new Justice 
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system, given that its full operation implied the reduction of their power (2.1.1- 
17/09/08). 
 
Genuine concern for implementation of the judicial reorganisation prevailed in 
accordance with the principle of ‘people’s’ power, with priority being devoted to 
the local level, where the new system gained popular adherence.  However, 
the expansion towards district and provincial levels, as well as the creation of 
the supreme popular court - which was only set up in 1989 - was constrained 
by lack of trained staff to undertake work in the several Justice institutions at 
the various levels (2.1.1.5-17/05/05, 2.4.1-24/03/09) and by the progression of 
the war in the 1980s.  This protracted process of implementation, coupled with 
the absence or the destruction of state structures, ultimately constrained 
progress at the local level, resulting in traditional authorities regaining their 
original conflict resolution roles based on customary law (WLSA 2000: 48).  
 
Fig. 5 Structure of the Ministry of Justice under the unitary conception of power 
  151 
Radicalising Justice  
 
The institutional implementation described above became tainted by the 
growing harshness of the laws adopted and executed as the war progressed.  
However, these draconian measures were not solely a function of war, but had 
a deeper ideological goal, i.e. that of Frelimo’s nation and state-building aim 
grounded on modernisation.  In President Machel’s understanding, the 
Mozambican consciousness had to be transformed in line with the belief that 
‘the tribe ought to die for the nation to emerge’ (Machel 1975a: 34).  In 
addition, the creation of the ‘New Man’ was central to Frelimo’s nationalist 
project, encompassing the rejection not only of colonialist values but also 
those of obscurantist tradition.  Amongst others, this meant rejecting sorcery 
and embedding rationalism in individual and collective thought through 
scientific education, pedagogical and moral campaigns, sharing the 
experience of revolutionary political struggle, and military discipline (Machel 
1975a: 31-35,159-165, Cabaço 2010: 284-289).  President Machel upheld 
these views consistently; however, they reflected a common civilising aspect 
of an oppressive modernist ontology, regardless of the adoption of a capitalist 
or a socialist orientation, or of colonial or independent rule.  Hence, a subtle 
ideological continuity existed between the colonial authorities’ and Frelimo’s 
modernist state-building project. 
 
In 1983, the militarised environment of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary 
warfare led to the peak of radicalisation of the Frelimo regime, highlighting the 
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disparities between its stated objectives at independence, and the measures 
implemented.  For instance, a Presidential decree clarifying the MJus mission 
of defence of the people’s power through ‘repression of violation of legality’ 
reinstated the goal of completing the implementation of the judiciary structures 
(Presidential Decree 69/83 de 29/12, Preamble).  However, in the same year, 
President Machel paradoxically decided, on political and ideological grounds, 
to close the Faculty of Law (until 1990).  This decision was acclaimed by the 
Popular Assembly members, who associated this training institution with 
bureaucratic, rhetorical and elitist colonial law practices, detached from 
Mozambique’s socio-cultural reality (Sachs and Welch 1990: 118-120, 
Notícias 23/03/83).  Yet, given that this was the sole legal training institution, 
its closure produced long-term negative consequences for the staffing and 
institution building of the Justice system of the independent Mozambique 
(Ministério da Justiça 12/2000: 26).  Hence, it is plausible that this might have 
been a tactic to postpone the completion of the judiciary pyramid, which, as 
mentioned previously, would only be finalised with the creation of the Supreme 
Popular Court in 1989.   
 
This suggestion gains credibility if weighed against the fact that the regime 
simultaneously expedited the politicisation of common delinquency and 
economic crimes, as demonstrated by the revision of the law on ‘Crimes 
against the Security of the People and the People’s State’, approved in 1979 
(Law 2/79 of 01/03).  This law was intended to combat increasing internal 
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crime, which was seen by the regime as a counterrevolutionary threat against 
the people, the people’s power and society.  Hence, the amendments 
introduced penalties to punish common social, criminal and economic 
offenses, which had become rife in the climate of economic hardship, and 
instituted the practice of public flogging.  In addition, it provided for capital 
punishment in cases of economic sabotage, including smuggling of goods and 
speculative activities.  Massive acquisition of products harming public 
provision of goods and the illegal traffic of foreign currency were also severely 
punished (Law 5/83 of 31/03).  These legal dispositions were implemented 
and a massive operation of revolutionary ‘purification’, labelled Operação 
Produção (Operation Production), was carried out that same year (1983) 
(Notícias 11/04/83). 
 
Operação Produção was a large-scale campaign intended to address rampant 
social problems, but was also used to remove and punish people whose ideas 
were not in line with those of Frelimo.  It targeted unemployed people in 
general, unemployed single-mothers, criminals, intellectual dissidents and ex-
PIDE agents.  Members of the religious group Jehovah’s Witnesses were also 
subject to systematic persecution because of their ‘conscientious objection’ to 
bearing arms in a military conflict or to serving in the armed forces (Human 
Rights Watch 1992: 23, Público Magazine 25/06/95).  Arbitrary arrests were 
made for minor offences such as not carrying identification papers, a practice 
which led to many disappearances since the security forces did not normally 
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allow people to contact their relatives or colleagues to inform them about the 
detention (Granjo, 2010).  Furthermore, those convicted in the courts for 
crimes of sabotage as well as political and economic offenses were also sent 
to re-education camps.  From 1982 onwards, these trials were held in public 
both to instil transparency in the process and deter further crime (Notícias 
13/08/1982).43   
 
Despite the trials, discretionary powers held by the security forces in this 
operation resulted in many prolonged detentions without trial as well as 
imprisonment under severe conditions.  Forced labour, collective humiliation, 
torture, violent punishment, and extrajudicial killings characterised the 
operation, which marked a grim period in the history of independent 
Mozambique and of Frelimo’s rule.  The prevailing excesses led President 
Machel to adopt in 1985 a political decision which mandated that no one 
should be sent to re-education camps without trial and conviction (2.3.1- 
25/02/09, Notícias 04/01/85).  
 
Thus, the Operação Produção using discretionary powers held by security 
agents in conjunction with the incompleteness of the judiciary pyramid, 
prevented potential judicial processes and decisions that might have curbed - 
to a certain extent - the implementation of extreme measures from the start.  
                                                
43According to the Judge-President of the People’s Provincial Court of Maputo, João Trindade, trials 
stopped being held in the court premises because the audience was limited.  Instead, it became common 
practice to hold them in the neighbourhoods, before hundreds of people, and in the presence of the 
administrative structures and GD members, who were able to testify regarding the behaviour of the 
accused (Notícias 13/08/82). 
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This further supports the idea of intentionality behind the stalling of the 
implementation of the Justice system.  Decision makers considered that the 
security threat perceived also as stemming from internal sources needed to be 
firmly met and that an effective Justice system would slow down and hinder 
such processes.  Yet, it has to be considered that the Justice apparatus was 
part of the system of the time and that people’s judges integrated the ad-hoc 
verification posts that decided whether citizens were sent to re-education 
camps.  At a later stage, trained judges also played a part in the process, 
when an appeal procedure was established (Granjo 2010: 85).   
 
In general, however, it is clear that the Justice staff received political directions 
concerning the need to eradicate strict legalist positions in favour of 
revolutionary legality (Ministério da Justiça 12/2000: 25).  They were to take 
‘material truth’ - understood as following the requirements of the revolution - 
into account, particularly in the case of judicial rulings.  The following quote 
from an editorial of a publication of the MJus illustrates the predominant 
thinking:  
 The independence of the judges consecrated by constitutional principle 
does not mean neutrality in the class struggle, it does not mean being 
apolitical, and even less means the liberty to take decisions that are 
objectively contrary to the revolutionary process (Justiça Popular 1981: 
2). 
 
This indicates that, although judges retained functional independence, they 
were not immune to the revolution and courts therefore implemented laws 
drafted by the party and the executive that often resulted in harsh sentences, 
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although acquittals also took place (Notícias 14/12/83 and 22/10/87).  In 
addition, citizens’ rights to proper legal defence were often violated, despite 
the state’s declared goal of ensuring people’s access to legal defence, in 
particular with respect to criminal offenses (Decree 1/75 of 27/07, Art 4.2).  
The National Service of Consultation and Juridical Assistance (SNCAJ) 
created for this purpose had not yet been put into practice due to the absence 
of both the necessary regulations and material resources.  It was only in 1986 
that its successor was formed and designated the National Institute of Juridical 
Assistance (INAJ).  The act recognised the gap created in terms of people’s 
rights and re-established the role of private advocacy, which had been 
abolished as a business activity after independence (Sachs and Welch 1990: 
12, Trindade 2003: 106, Marques e Pedroso 2003: 35-36). 
 
In this environment of revolution and counterrevolution, Frelimo actively 
promoted the work of the Military Revolutionary Court (MRC).  This 
supposedly interim structure was created in 1979 and remained operational for 
10 years, until the judiciary was ready to perform its duties in the context of the 
Law on ‘Crimes against the Security of the People and the People’s State’ 
(Law 3/79 of 29/03, Art 23).  The MRC judges were appointed by the MoD 
(Law 3/79 of 29/03, Art 4) and were mainly military career officers, who mostly 
lacked any legal training (Trindade 2003: 33).   MRC verdicts were final; their 
capital sentences were executed by firing squads within five days (Tempo 
08/04/79a and 22/04/79, Notícias 22/08/79 and 23/02/83), and their 
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deliberations were carried out behind closed doors, although the decisions 
were made public through communiqués (Law 3/79 of 29/03, Arts, 3, 6, and 
14).  The depositions were not registered in writing and any magnetic 
recording was subjected to MRC approval, although the clerks of the same 
court could prepare an abridged summary of the proceedings (Law 3/79 of 
29/03, Art 15).  These procedures hampered any accountability in political and 
judicial decision-making.  
 
This normalised succession of violent justice and security provisions and 
implementation, which in most cases would only be utilised by rulers as 
measures of exception, was in part due to a deteriorating economy.  In 
particular the proliferation of certain merchants profiteering from the 
circumstances, whilst the general population endured constant food scarcity, 
lead to rising popular resentment and protest. Under these conditions the 
public demanded justice and harsher punishments, not only because they felt 
strongly about the issue, but also because accusing a fellow-person often 
promised them political and societal approval, allowing them to evade scrutiny 
themselves.  In addition, they felt empowered to make such claims given that 
Frelimo’s discourse and action had been that of people’s power, supported by 
hybrid societal-party-security structures where people effectively participated.  
This emerged as an outcome of Frelimo’s initial build-up of populism, leading 
to complex circumstances whereby the party’s use of violence to consolidate 
the revolution was strengthened and taken to extremes, allegedly by popular 
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demand.  In light of that situation, Frelimo’s reasoning was that had it not 
responded in a satisfactory manner, ‘street justice’ would have proliferated, 
creating the perception of the party’s loss of security control accompanied by 
loss of legitimacy (Tempo 08/04/79b).  Ironically, the loss of legitimacy 
occurred all the same due to the radical methods employed.  
 
The foregoing analysis detailed how, despite Frelimo’s intention of rupturing 
with the colonial system, legislation carried on from the colonial era and 
Frelimo’s modernist approach to nation and state-building conformed to path 
dependence.  At the same time, the institutional design of a new judiciary 
utilising high levels of popular participation was an instance of critical juncture.  
The new Justice arrangement displayed characteristics of institutional 
bricolage, combining quasi-informal and formal layers of justice into a plural, 
comprehensive and organic system.  The protracted implementation of Justice 
reform was damaged by the exclusion of the traditional authorities and by the 
growing harshness of legislation and its implementation.  This was further 
exacerbated by the intensification of the war and the rise of economic crime, 
leading to a spiral between Frelimo’s radicalisation of the use of violence and 
popular demand for severe punishment for common infractions.  This 
outcome, characteristic of populist postures adopted by Frelimo in a bid to 
maintain and display the perception of control, resulted in an exponential 
decrease of its legitimacy and of the coherence between its stated objectives 
and performance. 
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Fig.6 Justice and security system in the post-independence 
 
4.3 Linkages between the justice and security systems and their 
implications for coherence and sequencing  
 
Coherence 
 
Against the backdrop described above, it can be discerned that, from a macro-
level analysis of the nation and state-building project, there was little 
coherence between Frelimo’s discourse and the reality on the ground. This 
resulted from unintended consequences of decision-making that led to the 
paradoxical coexistence of independence as a critical juncture and elements 
of path dependence from the colonial era. This lack of coherence was further 
due to contradictions between Frelimo’s normative socialist agenda aiming at 
an egalitarian and progressive society, and its use of exclusionary and violent 
methods of implementation leading to the oppression of a considerable 
proportion of the population.  These circumstances were prompted by a subtle 
pattern of continuity between the Portuguese colonial regime and Frelimo’s 
self-determination rule, due to the commonly espoused goal of creating a 
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modern civilisation in Mozambique.  This form of unintentional ideological path 
dependence evolved in tandem with Frelimo’s acknowledged transfer of 
practices from the liberated zones to the remaining territory following 
independence.  At times, said practices were at odds, such as in the setting up 
of direct participation and consultation; in other cases they reinforced each 
other, such as the use of violence to impose certain models of Justice.  Over 
time, and as Mozambique’s economic and security challenges grew, the 
resemblance between the regimes increased in aspects such as the 
centralisation of decision-making and the adoption of severe security 
measures.  
 
The intended coherence of Mozambique’s state-building project was often 
transposed to the meso-level of the Justice and Security system, as an 
integrated whole through the centralisation of processes in the hands of the 
Executive and via the appointment of high-ranking party members to key 
government positions.  For example, the MJus was responsible for the 
structure and decision-making of most of the Justice system (Ministry, Courts, 
Attorney General, Legal Aid structures) with the exception of the MRC and the 
PIC.  This suggested the existence of strong interconnections between the 
various institutions.  Interviewees provided evidence of weekly or monthly 
work at the neighbourhood administrative level, including hands-on problem-
solving campaigns.  This meant that all Justice institutions were represented in 
these meetings with the populations and worked jointly to resolve practical 
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problems.  In addition, all institutions within the ministry participated in national 
meetings, enhancing the dialogue amongst them (2.1.1-17/09/08, 2.4.1-
24/03/09).  
 
However, whilst the interviewees stated that closer coordination and 
cooperation existed in problem solving at the meso-level, at the macro-level, 
the coherence between the stated goals, the laws approved and their 
implementation was more problematic.  Symptomatic of this was the fact that 
Frelimo’s aim of boosting and protecting people’s power was watered down by 
the use of extreme violence targeting the same people it vowed to empower. 
 
In the same vein, although the links between the Justice and the Security 
structures were intended to develop collaboration, due to the understanding 
that the system could only work if each party fulfilled its role (Notícias 
08/11/82), in practice the justice-security relationship was unbalanced.  
Although justice in theory benefitted from a stronger foundation for institution 
building, in fact, it was rather less developed than the security institutions.  The 
latter had strengthened due to the war and this ultimately led to the disregard 
of the Justice sector in the civil war peace agreement and in the subsequent 
transition.  
 
With regards to interconnections between security institutions, the earlier 
sections mentioned inter-institutional rivalry between the PPM and the FPLM-
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FAM, and between these and the SNASP.  In fact, besides its core 
organisational structure, the SNASP initially had a strong presence within the 
MoD and the MInt, owing to its military and paramilitary counter-intelligence 
bodies within these institutions.  It was also well represented at the level of the 
Immigration Services.  This arrangement deepened inter-institutional 
suspicions (4.5.4-09/09/08) and it was the creation of a Joint Command of the 
Security Forces (JCSF) that eventually resolved the issue (Veloso 2006: 104).  
Subsequently, SNASP was removed from the other security institutions, and 
the MoD and the MInt took ownership of their own counter-intelligence units 
(4.5.4-09/09/08).  In addition, the fact that the country was facing an armed 
conflict served to unify the competing institutions and the direction of a 
cohesive party helped to ease tensions.  The creation of the JCSF was 
important in supporting coherence in security delivery through the coordination 
that it brought to the operational level, by implementing practices such as 
information sharing and joint operations.  Besides the activity of the JCSF 
reinforcing inter-institutional dialogue, this was also consciously promoted 
through engagement in civic and peaceful activities, such as sports events 
between teams representing the various security forces (Notícias 14/06/85). 
 
Sequencing 
 
In terms of sequencing, the main challenge at the macro level of the nation 
and state-building project was that all areas needed to be built simultaneously, 
given the decision to dismantle the colonial state apparatus and to create state 
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institutions from afresh.  However, at the meso-level of institutional 
development this goal proved unattainable, given the dearth of qualified 
human resources.  In addition, the emergence of the post-independence 
armed conflict further stymied the development of sector and institutional 
strategies in general.  In consequence, the ‘learn by doing’ approach 
prevailed, as underscored by several sources across different areas (J. 
Veloso-08/04/09, 2.3.1-25/02/09, 4.5.1-27/02/09, Domingo 29/06/08).  The 
security sector was no exception, and despite receiving priority in resource 
allocation, it remained largely reactive with respect to protecting national 
security in wartime.   
 
At the meso-level of institutional development in the Security and Justice 
system, the sequencing of reforms consistently took a back seat whenever 
wider political goals were at stake, as in the creation of a tripartite structure for 
the prison establishment.  This resulted from three interrelated factors, with the 
first, the need for political control leading to the establishment of prisons under 
the aegis of SNASP, predominating.  There was, secondly, an aversion to 
placing the prisons under the management of the MJus, as had been the case 
during colonial times when many Frelimo members had served political 
sentences.  And lastly was the conviction, rooted in the experience of the 
liberated zones, that open re-education centres with productive activities were 
the best way to rehabilitate criminals and the ‘non-adjusted’.  Therefore, the 
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re-education services were created and placed under the responsibility of the 
MInt (2.3.1- 25/02/09, Summary of World Broadcasts 06/10/81).   
 
This disjointed responsibility produced institutional disjuncture, with the prison 
organisation partitioned between several ministries and operating according to 
distinct criteria.  The SNASP was responsible for political prisons and the MInt 
for pre-trial detention prisons, post-trial jails and for re-education centres. The 
MJus covered central, provincial and district level prisons, penitentiaries, a 
women’s detention centre, and open prison facilities for post-trial detainees.  
There was very little coordination between these institutions on prison matters 
and the standard of prisoner treatment was generally dismal (Notícias 
04/01/85, 2.3.1-25/02/09, To the Point 20/07/79, Rádio Maputo 27/06/89).  
Yet, the re-education centres in particular were object of international and 
national criticism due to human rights abuses and illegal imprisonment.44  A 
symptom of these circumstances was that in the mid-80s around 42,000 
detainees were held in re-education centres in comparison to around 7,000 
serving sentences in the other prisons (2.3.1- 25/02/09).  
 
Sequencing, or lack of attention to it, also negatively impacted the security 
sector as a result of the fact that the Police lagged behind the armed forces 
with regards to institutional development.  However, from the perspective of 
                                                
44 The abuses were primarily denounced by Catholic Reverend Daniel Sithole in a letter addressed to the 
US and other Western governments in 1981 (Sithole, 23/08/81). Subsequently they were mentioned in a 
Human Rights Watch Report from 1992 and further substantiated in the Público Magazine, 25/06/95 and 
in a publication by a Christian missionary (Hammond, 1998).  
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social and political control, sequencing was taken into consideration - even if 
unintentionally - and the gap that arose from the diminished role of the 
traditional authorities and Police weakness was filled (or attempted) by Frelimo 
with the creation of the hybrid society-state-party democratic structures of 
people’s power.  
 
It can also be argued that a particular sequencing awareness was present in 
Frelimo’s concern with formal political control in the process of the creation 
and development of the security forces.  Control was legally concentrated in 
the hands of the President, and in practice few other high-ranking Frelimo 
leaders had any input on security matters.  The Popular Assembly, which did 
not play any legal role, complied strictly with party directions in case of 
disagreement.  Hence, in terms of oversight, any measures taken in this 
single-party governing arrangement, to address abuses by the security forces, 
were manifestly insufficient.  Such measures took place through, for example, 
the Ofensiva da Legalidade (1981) (Legal Offensive), a campaign whereby the 
President called on people to denounce abuses committed by the security 
forces in order to 'purify the ranks of our defence and security forces' 
(President Machel quoted in Tempo 15/11/81).  His pleas were met with 
masses of citizens turning up at political rallies, and their forthcoming attitude 
in denouncing abuses committed by the security forces (Tempo 15/11/81) 
worked as an indicator of people’s support and participation in these initiatives.  
Yet, such popular adherence was surrounded with ambiguity since, given the 
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circumstances of populism, people participated because they felt strongly 
about the issues, but also because they were afraid of being sanctioned if they 
did not. 
 
In general, members of the security forces, and of the SNASP in particular, 
were accused of abuse of authority, of making undue use of the material 
means at their disposal, of unprofessional conduct, etc.  Through public 
sessions and internal disciplinary and control measures they were 
admonished, punished or expelled, according to the seriousness of the 
infraction (Africa 12/1981, Notícias 22/02/82, Tempo 28/02/82).  These public 
rallies served a triple function as morality, accountability and deterrence 
campaigns, given that they were also intended to bridge the gap that arose 
from the incipient internal mechanisms of inspection of the security institutions.  
In addition, people’s support of the Ofensiva da Legalidade conferred 
legitimacy on Frelimo, and provided further authority to the President, thus 
appeasing public outrage caused by the security forces’ wrongdoing.  
Nonetheless, institutionalised mechanisms of external oversight were lacking 
and therefore systematic accountability for the performance and management 
of the security forces was null, fulfilling the objective of centralised control by 
the core of Frelimo’s leadership of that era. 
 
In light of these accounts, a pattern of disregard or of relegation of sequencing 
was evident as it related to institutional development, in contrast to when it 
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concerned political and social, and even institutional control.  This trend was 
prominent whether the decisions were unintentionally prompted by the 
surrounding circumstances - such as in the case of pragmatic decision-making 
leading to the build up of the armed forces to the detriment of the Police during 
the ongoing war - or whether they were motivated by Frelimo’s proactive 
agency, such as in the case of the closure of the Law Faculty or of the launch 
of the Ofensiva da Legalidade. 
 
 
Fig. 7 Illustrations of post-independence critical junctures, path dependence and institutional 
bricolage 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
Frelimo’s development as a liberation movement and the values that it 
espoused when it became a government shaped its post-independence rule, 
but the outcomes of its decision-making were also shaped by contextual 
factors.  Frelimo’s social engineering attempt to create both a modern state 
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and the ‘New Man’, whilst simultaneously countering regional security threats 
and Renamo’s insurgency in a confrontational international environment, 
ultimately hindered its state-building project.  Policy and institutional 
shortcomings, as well as popular resistance, also contributed to preventing 
Frelimo’s socialist ideology from materialising in full. Frelimo addressed these 
contestations with the use of violence, but also with the legitimate creation of 
governing structures inclusive of the people.  Regrettably, the use of violence 
became predominant, resembling the colonial order that Frelimo had intended 
to dismantle, thus exacerbating, instead of appeasing, societal conflict.  
 
It is not surprising that Mozambique’s Justice and Security system is usually 
vilified when its role in the post-independence period is discussed, given the 
poor preparation and the plentiful excesses the security forces committed with 
impunity.  However, it needs to be reiterated that these forces were under 
Frelimo’s political civilian control, which also bore responsibility for the 
misdemeanours committed by the quasi-formal securitised structures of 
people’s power.  The abuses perpetrated were in total contradiction to the 
spirit of freedom, fairness and justice that FRELIMO proclaimed at 
independence, and the increasing rhetoric of repression and punishment was 
matched in practice.  This occurred not only via security forces’ 
transgressions, but also through Frelimo’s excessive zeal in the quest for 
control of security, institutionalising violence with the passing of draconian 
legislation, subsequently implemented by the judiciary.   
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Although discursively and to a large degree in practice, Frelimo distinguished 
itself from colonial thought and performance, the critical juncture represented 
by independence and by institution building from afresh of the Security and 
Justice system was tempered by the subtler ideological path dependence of 
modernism.  Another critical source of continuity was pragmatic decision-
making, often driven by the similarity of the challenges and threats faced by 
the colonial regime and Frelimo, such as in the case of insurgency.  Path 
dependence stemming from colonial rule interacted with another type of 
continuity deriving from Frelimo’s liberation war traditions and governing 
experience.  Nonetheless, whilst the former was often prompted by 
unexpected circumstances and the need to cope with unintended 
consequences, Frelimo deliberately used the latter.  However, the patterns of 
governance applied to limited areas under tight social, economic, political, and 
security control when transferred to a much wider territory with lesser state 
control, resulted in major inadequacies.  
 
The continuities deriving from Frelimo’s experience within the liberated zones 
were ideologically and sequentially prominent in comparison to those 
originating from colonial policies; the simultaneous manifestation of both 
legacies also furthered the disparity between Frelimo’s discourse and practice.  
Importantly, the convergence of these different types of path dependence 
strengthened the tendency towards problem solving based on reactivity and 
pragmatism.  This subordinated strategic and medium to long-term policy-
  170 
making, with coherence and sequencing factors of institution building policies 
being systematically overridden, when competing with tactical political 
considerations. 
 
Further to the above, the paradoxical coexistence of critical juncture and path 
dependence at the macro, state-building level fostered incoherence in 
institution building policies for the Justice and Security system at the meso-
level.  These policies were downgraded in light of the paramount need for 
institutional adaptation to meet the demands of the civil war, which became 
the main driver of institutional change.  In this sense, coping measures were 
put in place through, for example, the creation of the JCSF to harmonise 
operational performance.  Importantly, to address existing institutional gaps in 
the Justice and Security system, Frelimo resorted to institutional bricolage.  
These creatively addressed institutional design by combining formal elements 
with flexible societal-based arrangements.  Such was the case in the security 
establishment, featuring formal security forces alongside democratic structures 
of people’s power, and in the Justice arena, with the formation of a hybrid 
judiciary, with professionally trained magistrates working together with 
untrained judges nominated by the people.  These institutional bricolage 
solutions addressed pragmatic governance concerns, at the same time as 
they conferred functional legitimacy on the institutions created, given the 
participatory nature of their design.  However, this needed to have been 
complemented by performance-based legitimacy, achievable through the 
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degree and quality of the delivery of the goals such institutions were set up to 
achieve.  Yet, the analysis carried out in this chapter underscored that the 
quest for legitimacy within the state-building project was hampered by 
Frelimo’s failed attempt to change social consciousness through the use of 
violence, resulting instead in shattered chances for reconciliation within the 
Mozambican society and the deepening of the civil war. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Sequencing in Mozambique’s Transitions: economic liberalisation, 
peacebuilding and democratisation in perspective 
 
 
‘What those whites did was to occupy us. It was not only the 
land: they occupied us, they camped in the middle of our 
heads. We are wood that caught rain. Now we don’t provide 
fire nor shade. We have to dry in the light of a Sun that does 
not yet exist.  That Sun can only be born inside us.’  
 
Zeca Andorinho, a Mozambican fiction character from 
the novel the Last Flight of the Flamingo, Mia Couto, 
Ch14, p.158  
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The historical background to Mozambique’s security and justice institutions 
introduced in chapter IV (1975-1992) established that the country has been 
immersed in a series of successive transitions, with short intervals of stability, 
since the beginning of the liberation struggle in the 1960s.  Despite the critical 
juncture epitomised by independence in 1975, patterns of continuity with old 
governing practices asserted themselves.  In this chapter three major 
transitions which marked the late 1980s and 1990s are examined, namely, the 
change from a central planning model to a market economy, from one-party to 
multiparty politics, and from war to peace (referent to the civil war).  The 
analysis focuses primarily on the driving forces and sequence of events that 
unfolded during this triple transition in order to understand the outcomes.  
 
The chapter draws on a macro level analysis of the power dynamics prevalent 
from the late 1980s to 2009 and then goes on to portray the context behind the 
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post-civil war security and justice reforms to be discussed in Chapters VI and 
VII.  It starts by discussing the priority accorded to economic liberalisation over 
political change immediately prior to the end of the civil war through the late 
1980s and 1990s.  It then pays attention to the impact of the IFIs prescribed 
policies on peacebuilding, including changes in the security establishment.  
Finally, the medium to long-term impact of the prioritisation of economic 
liberalisation over peacebuilding and political liberalisation on wider 
democratisation up to 2009 is considered.  
 
This triple transition has been referred to elsewhere as ‘total transition’ (Lundin 
2002: 135). It was underpinned by high levels of social engineering typical of 
the post-Cold War period, where dominant international reconstruction players 
often experimented in post-conflict environments (Paris and Sisk 2009: 1).  
However, in Mozambique, the critical juncture symbolised by rapid changes 
started to wane towards the end of the first decade of transition (1990s), giving 
way to a period (2000s) when a mixture of change and continuity came to 
light.  This was represented by an increase in signs of path dependence, 
characterised by slower change and enduring legacies in politics and in policy-
making, bringing into question the true extent of the transition.  In addition, 
whilst sequencing was crucial, especially at times of critical junctures, it was 
not an isolated factor in shaping the direction of events in Mozambique.  
Rather, it was interlinked with internal politics, including the tactics of 
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adaptation and accommodation of the national leadership to the fast and 
externally driven changes.  
 
Hence, the main argument advanced in this chapter is that the sequence of 
events that led to economic liberalisation preceding and prevailing over 
peacebuilding and democratisation, significantly moulded the short, medium 
and long-term outcomes of the triple transition in Mozambique.  This specific 
sequencing of reform processes combined with elements of path dependence 
(e.g. the resurgence of Frelimo’s past behaviour) shaped a particular type of 
political bricolage that resulted in weak post-conflict state institutions, including 
those of the security and justice sectors.  It also led to growing structures of 
inequality and exclusion for the poorest in society, and sowed the seeds for 
the emergence of volatile and violent democratic politics. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8 Mozambique’s triple transition 
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5.2 Sequencing Mozambique’s triple transition   
The triple transition, from a central planning model to a market economy, from 
one-party to multiparty politics, and from war to peace, unfolded as a series of 
complex processes, which were each symbolised by specific events.  These 
were, respectively: the adoption of a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
in 1987; the approval of a democratic Constitution in 1990 and the holding of 
the first multi-party elections in 1994; and the signature of a General Peace 
Agreement (GPA) in 1992.  Despite the involvement of diverse practitioner 
communities, the various philosophies behind each specific process, and the 
different scheduling of each transition, they nevertheless overlapped enough 
to warrant bundling them conceptually into a single, large-scale process of 
change.  
  
The onset of economic liberalisation was a direct response to Mozambique’s 
devastated financial and economic situation throughout the 1980s and 
followed the refusal of the COMECON to accept Mozambique as a member 
(Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 110).  This led to the realisation among the 
governing elites that a strategy of rapprochement with the West was 
unavoidable, as the country grew increasingly reliant on emergency food aid 
(Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 108).  Whilst Mozambique had enjoyed the 
support of donors such as the Nordic countries since independence, 
reconciliation with more mainstream donors such as the US and the UK 
became vital.  This led to a rapprochement that carried with it an implied trade-
off in the form of economic liberalisation, resulting in the ‘normalisation’ 
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process of a country previously associated with the Eastern bloc (Duffield 
2001: 7-8, Macamo, 2005).  Specifically, Mozambique adopted a SAP called 
the Economic Rehabilitation Programme in 1987, followed by an Economic 
and Social Rehabilitation Programme (ESRP) in 1989 (Hanlon 1991: 113, 117, 
120-122, 164, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996: 69).  Yet, the economic 
liberalisation process really began with Mozambique’s admission as a member 
of the WB and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1984, which 
incidentally was the year the N’komati agreement with the RSA was signed.  
This suggests that membership of the referred IFIs was a political reward for 
Mozambique’s efforts towards regional peace and re-alignment with the West 
(Hanlon 1991: 114, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 141). 
 
Mozambique’s SAP was comparable to that adopted by other severely 
indebted countries (Wuyts 1989: 16, Marshall and Lester, 1992, Arndt 1999: 5) 
and corresponded to the IFIs policy blueprint in use at the time (Abrahamsson 
and Nilsson 1996: 30).  It aimed to bring about macroeconomic stabilisation, 
prioritising measures such as the control of inflation through currency 
devaluation and credit restriction; it liberalised trade by removing restrictions 
on imports and exports, and eliminating price fixing and state subsidies.  It 
also intended to reduce the role of the state in the economy through asset 
privatisation, and envisaged the control and monitoring of government 
spending through cuts and caps on public expenditure (Hanlon 1991: 133-144, 
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Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996: 38, Arndt 1999: 5-9, African Development 
Bank Group - AfDB 08/10/99: 4).  
 
However, whilst most other African countries applying those programmes were 
similarly facing political and economic transitions as was the case in Kenya, 
Ghana, Tanzania and Malawi, none were at war when the implementation of a 
SAP began, unlike Mozambique (Wuyts 1989: 16, Hanlon 1991: 128).  The 
argument advanced by the WB was that the economic growth foreseen with 
the implementation of the SAP would emerge in the medium and long-term, 
after ‘exogenous factors’ such as security concerns had been resolved (World 
Bank 1987: 4 quoted in Wuyts 1989: 16, Hanlon 1991: 130).  Yet, the SAP 
was also meant to restore productive sectors through specific funding 
allocations and that required the rehabilitation of the production structure and 
the circulation of goods and people, including those in the rural areas (Hanlon 
1991: 129, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996: 38, AfDB 1999: 4-5, 4.3.3.5-
20/05/05, 4.1.2-25/02/09).  With an ongoing war, the basic economic 
conditions for the execution of the SAP in Mozambique were absent (Wuyts 
1989: 22, Hanlon 1991: 129-131, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995: 20-21, 
Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996: 33-40, Hanlon 1997: 161, AfDB 1999:  18). 
In one interviewee’s words: 
Regardless of the merit of the theoretical construction of the SAP…one 
has to question how it can be applied in a context where the war is at its 
peak… significantly affecting communication routes, destroying 
infrastructure and productive capacity, and turning populations into 
refugees or internally displaced people…were people idiots to apply 
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such a programme in a Mozambique at war or were there ulterior 
motives? (4.1.2-25/02/09). 
 
This type of questioning reinforces the view that Westen countries were 
ideologically motivated by their faith in neoliberalism and therefore facilitated 
and accelerated liberalisation (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996: 41-43) in a 
country experiencing a fully-fledged armed conflict when, in principle, conflict 
resolution should have been given precedence in order to end the war and 
establish a minimumly favourable economic environment (Mhone, 1992). 
 
In retrospect, it is obvious that the inappropriate sequencing of events 
reflected the priorities of Mozambique’s western donors, including the 
reinstatement of capitalism accompanied by the introduction of a market 
economy, as indicative of their Cold War ideological victory.45  Nevertheless, 
economic liberalisation and conflict resolution were not entirely working at 
odds (Saul 2005: 311), as happened in Sierra Leone where the 
implementation of the SAP had the perverse effect of setting the stage for war 
(Gbla 2006: 80).  In Mozambique, the SAP provided an incentive to local 
elites, signalling that financial aid would be available in the post-conflict phase, 
and that the end of the war was in their interest.  Yet, the donors’ objective of 
                                                
45 Herman Cohen, the US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the time, emphasized the active 
support of the US for economic reform and democracy by stating that ‘…we are as pleased by the steps 
African countries are taking to discard outworn ideologies for free markets and democratic reforms…’ 
(Cohen, 1990).  Also revealing is Saul’s account of the discussions carried out in an international 
conference entitled ‘Rethinking Strategies for Mozambique and Southern Africa’ held in Maputo in 
24/05/1990.  On this occasion, Mozambique’s leadership reiterated its commitment to liberalisation in 
exchange for the promises they were made by Western donors; at the same time, they also demanded 
better results from the economic policies being implemented (Saul, 1991). 
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economic liberalisation had to be implemented in such way as to bind the 
country’s incumbent and future decision and policy-makers to the policy 
agreed upon, independently of the ‘winner’ of the subsequent peace 
negotiations and democratisation process.  Hence, this goal was achieved 
through the sequencing of processes adopted, which prioritised economic 
liberalisation over the more pressing and immediate conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding needs.   
 
It can be argued that even if conflict resolution efforts had been prioritised, 
Western goals would have been equally achieved given that Mozambique’s 
finances had already collapsed, and the country was left with no alternative 
but to adhere to the SAP.  Nonetheless, it is plausible to consider that if a 
more concessional financial aid process had occurred during the last phase of 
the war (Hanlon 1991: 117, Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996: 43), with 
simultaneous priority afforded to peace negotiations, outcomes might have 
been different.  An opportunity might have arisen for the Government of 
Mozambique (GoM) not to act as hastily as it did in forging ahead with the 
introduction of its own SAP before the IFIs approval, in a bid to show to 
Western donors its willingness to embrace economic liberalisation.46  Yet, at 
the time, a more concessionary position towards Mozambique would have 
                                                
46 Hanlon argues that, given the numerous meetings in the previous years between the IFIs and the 
GoM, the latter knew what was expected of them policy-wise.  However, the WB and the IMF felt that the 
GoM programme was still insufficient, hence Mozambique’s decision to launch it without previous IFIs 
approval.  Although this could be interpreted as a position of Mozambique’s policy independence, in fact, 
the generalised context of overall power relations contradicts such an interpretation.  The GoM had to 
make further policy concessions during implementation and actually had little room for manoeuvre to 
counter the IFIs prescriptions (Hanlon 1991: 117-122, Wilson, 1995). 
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meant boosting the position of a government then seen by western donors, 
and in particular by the US, as rogue due to its association with the Eastern 
bloc (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996: 85, Hanlon 2010: 85-87).  It would also 
have unbalanced the peace negotiations to the advantage of Frelimo, who 
could have flaunted such support and provided humanitarian relief to the 
people. This was not the intention of influential donors, who envisaged a 
power sharing agreement with the formation of a government of national unity 
(Saul, 1994, Synge 1997: 48, 116, 123-126, 4.5.1.5-05/05).  
 
5.2.1  Sequencing and Institution Building 
Against this background, it has to be acknowledged that whilst the sequencing 
of the transitions significantly affected results, simply following a different 
sequence may not have fully altered the outcome.  A distinct balance in the 
prioritisation of the processes would have been required, with conflict 
resolution and political liberalisation not only preceding economic 
liberalisation, but also being awarded enough time to progress (medium to 
longer-term), whilst receiving sufficient donor support for the promotion and 
consolidation of democratic institutions. Had this occurred, more room for 
manoeuvre would have been created for embryonic democratic institutions 
such as political parties, media, parliament, civil society and religious 
congregations to develop and contribute to the discussion of economic 
development.  It would also have created circumstances favourable to the 
boosting of social alliances, the capacity for negotiation and the ability to 
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effectively debate the orientation, pace and sequencing of economic 
liberalisation.  This thinking is in line with the argument that capable and 
legitimate national institutions must be in place for sensible peacebuilding to 
occur and that more time and attention should have been devoted to institution 
building prior to full-scale liberalisation (Paris 2004: 7-8).  Nevertheless, in 
Mozambique, prominent researchers observed in the immediate transitional 
phase that: 
At the same time that the programme [the SAP] creates social 
differentiation and new contradictions of interests, it does not allow the 
possibility for the emergence of new political parties, which, with the 
help of different economic programmes, could attempt to provide 
answers to the needs of the different interest groups…the conditionality 
of the Bretton Woods institutions does not allow any other economic 
policy, beyond the one that is exerted currently.  It looks like no one 
wants to carry-out the demand of breaking with Bretton Woods and the 
PRES (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994: 303). 
 
This indicates that, whilst Mozambique’s social fabric was damaged by the war 
and its national CSOs were unable to launch a protest against donors’ and 
government adopted policies, donors purposefully exploited the context by 
prioritising economic liberalisation over conflict resolution and democratisation.  
This argument is supported by Hanlon’s position that the US controlled the 
IMF and the money as well as Renamo and, therefore, the duration of the war 
(Hanlon 1991: 256, 259).  In addition, Mazula’s question about why an 
important subject like the development of the country was not raised during 
peace negotiations implicitly suggested that it was because the answer had 
been pre-empted by prescriptions determined earlier by the IFIs (Mazula 1995: 
34).   
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Hence, stronger institutions better able to manage change might have resulted 
from an inversion of the order, prioritising ‘institutionalisation before 
liberalisation’ (Paris 2004: 179-211), or even of ‘institutionalisation to resist 
liberalisation’.  However, the donors did not opt for such an order.  Indeed, 
whilst Mozambique’s triple transition was rooted in a neoliberal framework, the 
specific succession of processes did not merely represent a procedural 
sequential model of reconstruction.  Instead, the primacy of economics over 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding, as well as in relation to political 
liberalisation, ultimately reflected Western donors’ strategic goal of 
reintroducing capitalism.  This suggests that the type of institutionalisation or 
‘de-institutionalisation’ promoted in the earlier phases of reconstruction, for 
example, the shrinking of the already weak civil service, served to advance 
donors’ agendas.   
 
Equally, at a subsequent peacebuilding stage, and in the context of economic 
liberalisation, donors’ minimalist understandings of change determined that 
support was first given to revenue generating areas such as customs and tax 
reforms (Hanlon, 1999, Diogo 2002: 219, Savana 15/08/2008).  Regarding 
political liberalisation, support for electoral institutions pre-dated broader 
reforms aimed at building up democracy.  This particular choice of areas over 
others within the economic and political fields reinforced the priority of 
economic liberalisation, given donors’ contemporary perception that multi-
party elections created the required stability for attracting foreign investment.  
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Hence, institutionalisation (or the lack thereof) developed as a function of the 
particular kind of liberalisation being carried out rather than independently of it.   
 
So far, we have argued that the particular sequencing of processes 
deliberately fostered by dominant donors at this stage of Mozambique’s 
transition, ultimately subordinated politics to the expansion of global neo-
liberal capitalism.  In addition, the specific type of liberalisation approach 
adopted, mainly based on ‘de-institutionalisation’ resulted in weak post-civil 
war state institutions, including those of the security and justice sectors. 
 
5.3 Economic liberalisation, peacebuilding and security dynamics 
The previous section highlighted how the sequencing of processes prioritised 
economic liberalisation over conflict resolution and political liberalisation, due 
to donors’ ultimate goal of reinstating capitalism.  It also posited that the 
specific sequencing and the particular kind of liberalisation promoted a 
peculiar type of institutional reform that hindered the development of state 
institutions.  These important assertions are nonetheless insufficient to explain 
the change dynamics that impacted on the security sector in Mozambique. 
Thus, this section details how economic liberalisation impacted peacebuilding 
and security reforms, demonstrating the disconnected and piece-meal 
approaches, as well as the contradictory policies that bedevilled 
reconstruction.  
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5.3.1 Reconstruction and Structural Adjustment at Odds 
Mozambique’s transition from war to peace represented a critical juncture 
marked by the introduction of a democratic Constitution in 1990.  This paved 
the way for the signing of the peace agreement between Frelimo’s 
Government and Renamo in 1992.  The subsequent peacebuilding process 
took place during a post-Cold War global transition in which international 
development was still caught between the immediacy of humanitarian aid and 
the longer term commitments to development aid and security (Duffield 2001: 
98-100, Junne and Verkoren 2005: 3-5, Pupavac 2006: 258).  Moreover, 
unlike the more recent peacebuilding experiences of Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Central African Republic (CAR), 
where Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) considered post-conflict 
recovery needs, attempting to align security and economic requirements, in 
Mozambique that did not take place.  On the contrary, multidimensional 
peacebuilding as an agenda was still in its infancy, facilitating the primacy of 
economic liberalisation policies.  Meanwhile, due to Mozambique’s 
simultaneous transitions, peacebuilding took the form of a multitude of 
programmes rather than a coherent plan, although the same is still observable 
in most current post-conflict settings.  In the words of one interviewee:  
in Mozambique’s post-peace agreement era there were no 
reconstruction policies, there were only emergency projects from which 
lessons were extracted and picked-up by the Government to formulate 
its subsequent programmes, with the aid of donors (4.1.2.5-05/05/05).   
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Yet, even in the absence of a coherent reconstruction strategy, peacebuilding 
efforts did take place, even though some were at odds with the requirements 
of the SAP.  This confirms existing research that found that one of the most 
evident areas of contradiction is that of employment (Woodward 2002: 201-
203).  In Mozambique the SAP mandated privatisation of state assets drove 
significant numbers of formally employed people into the informal economy.47  
The downside was that in terms of sequencing, this measure was carried out 
on the eve of a massive military demobilisation, which exacerbated even 
further the number of people unemployed (Cramer 2001: 103).  Thus, by 
driving a portion of the labour force into the same precarious and growing 
informal market, the already sparse opportunities for economic reintegration of 
ex-combatants, refugees and the internally displaced were diminished.  In 
addition, the fall in civil servants’ salaries that resulted from the adjustment of 
the economy (Wuyts 1996: 743, Arndt 1999: 20, Hanlon 2004: 7) reduced the 
likelihood of the abovementioned groups obtaining support from their extended 
families, given the rising number of people dispossessed.  An area that 
potentially could have absorbed some of the war-affected populations into 
gainful employment was that of infrastructure recovery in the form of 
emergency relief and state reconstruction programmes.  However, according 
to an interviewee employed by humanitarian organisations at the time: 
                                                
47 A number of 38,000 lay-offs were reported by unions in the Mozambican media in October 1995 
(Hanlon 1997: 96).  However, it was difficult to find official primary data on the numbers of people laid-off 
and realistic estimates about the ratio/proportion of the formal/informal economy during that decade.  In 
fact, the lack of accurate data about the economy underlined the flaws of the SAP design and the 
Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE) (National Statistics’ Institute) became a priority in terms of 
receiving donor capacity-building support.  Regardless of the dearth of data, a common public perception 
existed about the worsening of living conditions as a result of the adjustment of the economy, the rising 
number of unemployed in urban areas, and the deterioration of the terms of trade in rural areas (Hanlon 
1991:145-154, Marshall and Lester 1992: 26, Hanlon 1997:1-5).   
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the populations were only hired to work on the rehabilitation of tertiary 
roads and small bridges in the context of humanitarian projects…at the 
beginning this engagement was random, although with time it became 
more of a practice in the context of emergency relief programmes” And 
he added “…the state? Authorities existed in Maputo…ok mostly in the 
cities…but you do have to realise that those were the days of the SAP, 
meaning that the state had to cut, cut, cut (4.6.4.5-05/05).   
 
As part of the economic liberalisation, the Mozambican state was required to 
scale down spending, which meant that it was unable to launch programmes 
that might have actively aided people’s recovery from the devastating 
economic effects of the war.  Yet, this was not simply a case of state default 
as a consequence of IFIs diktats.  Reconstruction was actively hindered by the 
IMF orthodoxy that money should not be channelled into the economy until 
inflation had been brought under control.  This stance was only softened in 
1995 when, in an unprecedented move, donors publicly opposed the IMF, 
given that its policies also precluded them from providing aid funding for post-
war reconstruction, whilst they had large budgets to spend (Hanlon, 1999, 
Hanlon 2004: 7, Manning 2009: 9).  
 
Further to this, market liberalisation constrained the contribution of state 
institutions such as the armed forces towards public works like demining, 
rebuilding of roads, bridges, etc., although the GPA had originally foreseen 
their participation in activities of national reconstruction (GPA 1992: Protocol 
IV.I.2a).  In the opinion of one interviewee, this was because their participation 
in these activities was considered by the IFIs to be ‘a state subsidy that 
distorted the workings of the free market’ (1.2.2.5-05/05).  Hence, if the state 
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wanted to participate it had to do so by competing with alternative market 
suppliers in a given area.  
 
In general, and given that at the national level the private sector and the NGOs 
community were embryonic or considered inefficient or corrupt, the main 
beneficiaries of post-war reconstruction, humanitarian activity and subsequent 
development aid were foreign organisations (4.1.1.5-05/05, Hanlon 1997: 65, 
Matusse 2000: 50-53, Alden 2001: 94-96, Negrão 2003: 4, Tollenaere 2006: 
3).  Demining provided an example of a sector where significant external 
financing resulted in donors determining which foreign commercial contractors 
and charitable international NGOs benefited the most from access to funding.  
Data from successive annual Landmine Monitor Reports confirmed that 
amongst the former were companies like Ronco, Mechem and Minetech, and 
amongst the latter were organisations such as The Halo Trust, Norwegian 
People’s Aid and Handicap International (Landmine Monitor Reports on 
Mozambique, 1999-2005).  
 
In light of the above analysis, it can easily be seen that Mozambique 
represented an excellent example of the argument that ‘economic policies that 
guide international implementation of peace agreements are often the weakest 
link, running at cross-purposes with the needs of war termination’ (Stedman et 
al 2002: 20). 
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Nonetheless, on a positive note, Mozambique’s peacebuilding was backed by 
generous contributions from donors, including financing for the United Nations 
Operations in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) as well as for other bilateral and 
multilateral reconstruction programmes.48  By promoting the development of 
political parties in general, and in particular the transformation of Renamo into 
a political party, a new form of democracy assistance was pioneered for 
subsequent peacebuilding contexts, and precedent was set with the creation 
of multi-donor trust funds to finance reconstruction programmes (Manning, 
2002, Manning and Malbrough 2009).  An example of a well-funded 
programme was DDR which took into account similar contemporary 
experiences elsewhere.49 Whilst implementation suffered from poor 
coordination and mismanagement (Ball and Barnes, 2000, Clark 1996: 18-21, 
Lundin et al 2000: 173-212, Manning 2009: 85) as well as shortcomings in 
terms of medium to long-term reintegration outcomes (Coelho 2002: 141-236, 
Lalá 2005: 155-185, Alusala and Dye, 2010), the sizeable funding was 
motivated by the recognition on the part of bilateral donors that the DDR 
                                                
48 A donor conference and a subsequent meeting took place in Paris in June 1993 in order to obtain 
funding for the implementation of the GPA and to finance the remaining transition programmes.  Whilst 
the GoM originally requested 412 million USD, the total donor pledge amounted to 450 million USD (Ball 
and Barnes 2000: 177).  In addition, after the first multi-party elections were held in 1994, a World Bank 
Consultative Group Meeting dated March 1995 pledged 780 million USD, excluding debt relief (Alden 
2001: 83). 
 
49  There is data discrepancy concerning the full cost of DDR programmes in Mozambique.  One article 
based on UNDP data states that the total amounted to 100,713 million USD, of which 26,045 million 
were paid by the GoM, with the rest coming from different donor sources (Lundin et al 2000: 186).  
Another work based on a report prepared for the International Organisation for Migration by Creative 
Associates International presents the total figure of 112.9 million USD (Ball and Hendrickson 2005: 33).  
Despite difficulties with data availability and accuracy, the numbers presented by Ball and Hendrickson 
for similar contemporary experiences - for instance Uganda with an amount of 43.2 million USD, Eritreia 
with 68.8 million USD, or Rwanda with 19.4 million USD - show that Mozambique’s DDR funding was 
substantial.  In addition, the percentage paid for by donors matters, given that for example in Eritreia and 
Rwanda donor contribution was minimal, with most costs being supported by national governments for 
political reasons (Ball and Hendrickson 2005: 33-42). 
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programme was crucial to ensuring peaceful elections. The programme also 
represented an exceptional instance when the IFIs agreed not to cut the state 
budget or security expenditure during the transitional phase (Mohn 1994: 18).  
The cut was delayed instead until after the 1994 elections,50 denoting an 
economic liberalisation model with short-term security modifications to shore 
up liberalisation. 
 
Regrettably, these positive aspects were the few silver linings in a series of 
political and economic conditionalities that included the withholding of 
humanitarian aid (during the early 80s), the introduction of the SAP (in the late 
80s), and the disregard for profoundly needed security reforms (in the early 
90s).  The neglect of this area led to recurrent political tensions around the 
role of the post-war state security institutions, affecting in particular their 
medium and longer-term capability and effectiveness, as discussed in 
Chapters VI and VII.   
 
                                                
50 The defence and security expenditure data presented in academic research differs, although all 
feature a downward trend after the 1994 multi-party elections.  For example, whilst using recurrent 
expediture data, Wuyts presents a defense and security expenditure of 33.9% in 1992 (Wuyts 1996: 
736), whereas Arndt offers the figure of 34% for the same year (Arndt 1999: 13).  In addition, Arndt 
stated that defense and security expenditures accounted for the following percentages of the state 
budget: 34% in 1992; 38% in 1994; 23,24% in 1995-1996 (Arndt 1999: 13); whilst Chachiua, using total 
budget expenditures, cited the following: 18.5% in 1992, 18.5% in 1994 and 10.1% in 1995 (Chachiua 
2000: 59).  Chachiua’s data was consistent with that advanced by Lundin et al, and both report a slight 
military budget rise in 1996 and 1997 to 15% and 14.2% respectively (Chachiua 2000: 59, Lundin et al 
2000: 179), before dropping again to 9% in 1998 and 11.1% in 1999 (Chachiua 2000: 59).  In 2001 
recurrent expenditures with defence fell to 0.9% of the GDP (Diogo 2002: 218).  
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However, despite widespread rhetoric to the contrary, the lack of concern with 
institution building until around the year 2000 reflected the predominant 
paradigm adopted by donors in the previous two decades.  It posited that less 
state was more (van de Walle 2003: 1-33).  The rebuilding ‘package’ adopted 
by donors meant that the UN and international NGOs were largely responsible 
for the delivery of immediate reconstruction projects, as mentioned previously.  
This served to drain capacity from the Mozambican state as the best-trained 
civil servants were attracted to work at the UN and NGOs because of higher 
salaries and better working conditions (Wuyts 1989: 25-26, Abrahamsson and 
Nilsson 1996: 51, Hanlon 1997: 61-62, Hodges and Tibana 2005: 146, Hanlon 
and Smart 2008: 240).  
 
In addition donors co-opted different ministries for different strategic purposes 
(Harrison 1999: 329), and co-opted civil servants to serve their purposes whilst 
working on projects institutionalised within Mozambique’s ministries (Hanlon 
1991: 254). This furthered the structural shortage of qualified human capital in 
both the public and private spheres.  The de-institutionalisation practices had a 
significant impact on public sector planning and service delivery capacity in the 
post-conflict period, raising the need for foreign technical assistance (4.3.2.5-
18/05/05, 4.3.3.5- 20/05/05, 4.3.1- 26/08/08, 4.5.1- 27/02/09, Hanlon 1991: 
254, Hodges and Tibana 2005: 146-152).  This structural weakness favoured 
a path dependence stance, where advisors from the West replaced those from 
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the Eastern bloc, whilst the pattern of the GoM reliance on public policy 
transfer persisted. 
 
The multiple tensions identified above confirm that, in theory and in practice, 
peacebuilding did not encompass a comprehensive reconstruction strategy 
integrating political, security, economic and social aspects (4.1.2.5-05/05/05, 
4.3.1.5-05/05, 4.6.1.5-05/05, 4.6.2.5-05/05, 4.5.4-09/09/08).  It was delivered 
instead through a panoply of contradictory policies and actions, which 
prevented the emergence of a coherent and adequate process to address the 
needs of a country transitioning from war to peace.  
 
5.3.2 The Influence of Economic Liberalisation on Security Changes 
 
The preceding analysis illustrated how the economic liberalisation imperatives 
of Mozambique’s SAP were in conflict with peacebuilding requirements, mainly 
resulting in incoherent and disruptive dynamics for the post-conflict recovery 
process.  These dynamics are analysed with regards to their impact on the 
security changes. 
 
The UN peacebuilding missions of the early 90s did not include SSR as one of 
their formal programmes, given that security reforms had not yet formally 
adopted such nomenclature.  Components such as the UN civilian police 
(CIVPOL) were in their inception, but there was rising awareness at the 
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international level of the need for support of security reforms beyond the 
implementation of DDR programmes (UNSG Report 17/06/1992, Doyle 1996: 
532).  Those were the early days of putting together security reform 
approaches to adopt in post-conflict environments, which meant that 
Mozambique did not benefit from such programmes.  The neglect of the 
security sector started as early as during peace negotiations, when donors 
proposed a peace agreement that determined that Mozambique’s new armed 
forces should comprise a small number of military staff, with a maximum of 
30,000 men (Synge 1997: 103).51  According to Mozambican interviewees this 
number was introduced without previously carrying out any threat analysis, 
national security assessment, or any other kind of evaluation to establish the 
needs of security institutions during peacetime (1.2.2.5-05/05, 1.1.1-01/09/08).  
However, certain publications stated that after the US was admitted as an 
official observer in the peace negotiations,52 an American team of military and 
legal staff provided technical support (Cohen 1993, della Rocca 1998: 205-
206, Hume 1994: 118-119) and demonstrated how expensive it was to 
maintain an army (Abrahamson and Nilsson 1996: 25).  When questioned 
                                                
51  Cameron Hume presented the figure of 27,600 men (Hume 1994: 125-127). 
 
52 It needs to be factored in that the bilateral governments that would subsequently provide some sort of 
security assistance - France, Portugal, the U.K - together with the U.S and the UN merely became official 
observers (Hume 1994: 102) in Mozambique’s peace negotiations in June 1992, when the process had 
formally started two years earlier.  Keeping these actors at arms length from the peace negotiations, 
given their history of strong interference, had paid off clearing the way to a successful mediation by the 
Italian religious Community of Saint’Egidio, with the backing of the Italian government.  However, the 
drawback was that the observers only had four months to actively prepare technical advice and 
documentation before the agreement's signature.  This late addition might also have contributed to the 
absence of the UN from the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defense Forces 
(Alden 2001: 42). On the other hand, this could have been deliberate, given that the GPA stated that the 
countries to provide support in this area were to be selected by the conflicting parties (GPA 1992: 
Protocol IV.6.iii.1)c). 
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about this, Mozambican interviewees involved in the process suggested that a 
comprehensive study taking into account the defence and military 
requirements of the country was not carried out, and what was put forward 
was based on general military models and did not necessarily reflect 
Mozambique’s needs (1.2.2.5-05/05, 1.1.1-01/09/08).  Furthermore, the 
neglect of a security needs assessment coupled with military staffing numbers 
had two distinct advantages.  The first was ‘… to disband the armed forces, 
which were viewed as the machinery of war, and leave them inoperational for 
years…’ (1.2.2.5-05/05).  This perception was shared by two other 
interviewees who pointed out that the course of action adopted by Western 
donors derived from their view of the armed forces as the primary instrument 
of Mozambican communist political power.  Hence, Western donors needed to 
assert their Cold War victory in the context of Mozambique’s peace 
negotiations and of the subsequent peacebuilding phase (4.1.2-25/02/09, 
1.1.1-01/09/08).  
 
The second advantage was that the armed forces were perceived to be over-
spenders and corrupt (Saul 1991: 108, Human Rights Watch 1992: 57, 
Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1996: 27, Harrison 1999: 325, 1.1.1-01/09/08) and 
there was a need ‘…to guarantee that economic resources necessary for the 
recovery of the country were not spent on the military’ (1.2.1.5-27/05/05).  
Thus, besides political reasons, the lack of concern with the reform of the 
security sector served mainly to guarantee that military expenditures remained 
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low, in line with the prescriptions of the SAP (Synge 1997: 64, 105), which also 
hindered the possibility to carry out human rights and prisoner treatment 
training initiatives (Human Rights Watch 1992: 168).  This neoliberal position 
stemmed from the understanding that military expenditure was unproductive, 
diverted resources away from growth-generating sectors of the economy, and 
diminished the resources available for social welfare, while at the same time 
adding to external debt (Ball 1988: 161-211).  
 
Undoubtedly, the sequencing of processes, implying the unfolding of the 
peace negotiations simultaneously with the implementation of structural 
adjustment in Mozambique meant that the latter affected the former.  This was 
particularly so since these events took place at a time when donors were 
focused on fostering on-going economic reforms, transparent budgetary 
procedures, corruption control, and reducing military expenditure (Synge 1997: 
142).  The most significant impact came from expenditure restrictions that 
negatively affected not only security reforms but also the future capability and 
effectiveness of the security institutions, especially those of the military, as 
described above. 
 
However, the predominant focus on the armed forces also had negative 
implications for the police and intelligence services, who received only residual 
attention in the peace agreement.  The provisions for these areas were 
confined to prescriptions about respect for the civic, political and human rights 
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of citizens, and for impartial and non-partisan behaviour (GPA 1992: Protocol 
IV/IV, IV/V).  No other mention was made about re-structuring these sectors, 
although admittedly these were areas where the Frelimo Government 
effectively resisted the inclusion of reform plans in the peace agreement 
(3.1.3.5-19/05/05, 4.1.1-26/02/09, 4.5.1-27/02/09, Chachiua 2000: 56).  The 
Justice sector remained outside the framework of the agreement because 
none of the parties, mediators or the donors at large saw it as important for the 
resolution of the conflict in light of the more prominent political issues (2.1.2.5-
18/05/05).  Up to the writing of this thesis, and following twenty years of peace, 
a major strategic review of the security sector has yet to take place. 
 
Whilst there was a notable lack of SSR, according to the notion of the security 
and justice institutions making up an integrated system, some aspects of 
security reform did take place, although they could have been better 
coordinated with other peacebuilding components.  Nonetheless, issues were 
compartmentalised during peacebuilding, and therefore, potential embryonic 
security reforms were awarded low priority by UNOMOZ.  In fact, the leader of 
UNOMOZ and UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in 
Mozambique, Aldo Ajello, prioritised the political aspects of the transition in the 
belief that they best represented the formula for enduring peace (Ajello 1995: 
129).  Despite the impracticality of an agreement between Frelimo and 
Renamo in the form of a government of national unity, results demonstrated 
that his strategy paid-off in the short and medium term, even if it had to be 
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accompanied by a constant mixture of conditionality and monetary ‘buy off’ of 
the parties.53  According to Ajello mission delays prevented any careful 
attention to crucial and immediate security issues such as disarmament (Ajello 
1995: 129), and even less so to the reform of security institutions, as is 
discussed further in chapter VI.  
 
‘Guns or Butter’ and other Idiosyncrasies 
 
Whilst the GPA was considered a political success, the process suffered from 
several shortcomings regarding security provisions and their poor execution, 
sowing the seeds for skewed reforms of the security sector.  This specific 
outcome of the implementation of the GPA was embedded in the post-Cold 
War donor discourse of ‘peace-dividend’, based on the premise that resources 
released by the security establishment would directly revert towards social 
areas and the economy.  Whilst encompassing valid points, in Mozambique 
this discourse was based on the premise that state security and human 
security were mutually exclusive outcomes, favouring a zero-sum dichotomy 
between security spending and social spending (Lalá 2003: 146).  The 
following public statements by Mr Dennis Jett, the American Ambassador in 
Mozambique at the time, were illustrative of the orthodox thinking of dominant 
                                                
53 Conditionality emerged on the donors’ part mostly due to the need to make the parties advance with 
the demobilisation process.  As to any monetary ‘buy off’, it concerned both private and other donors’ 
generous financing of the peace process and the transition.  For example, donors provided incentives to 
the GoM by making generous aid pledges.  In addition, Tiny Rowland, chief executive of the British 
Multinational Lonrho provided significant resources in order to ensure Renamo’s participation in several 
talks (Vines, 1998).  Renamo’s open request for financial assistance started early during the peace 
negotiations, stalling the process at certain points (Vines 1998: 73-74), given that this organisation was 
poorly resourced in everything, from daily basic logistics to means of transport and communications 
(Hume 1994: 100, della Rocca 1998: 197).  Furthermore, after the signature of the GPA, a trust fund was 
created to support the transformation of Renamo from a guerrilla movement into a political party, and 
Renamo threatened to boycott elections, backing down only when the funds were effectively contributed 
(Synge 1997: 119, 126).  
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donors: ‘It is always a matter of choosing between social expenditures and 
military expenditure.  Choosing between guns and butter.  You can’t have both 
at the same time’ (Mozambique File 1995: 15). 
 
Accordingly, no consideration was awarded to the potential contribution of the 
security forces to Mozambique’s economy, for example through tackling newly 
emergent regional and transnational threats via adequate control of the 
country’s porous borders or through the protection of its maritime resources 
and aerial space.  The role of the armed forces in natural disaster times and 
their regional duties concerning peace operations (1.2.2.5-05/05, 1.2.2-
14/09/08) were similarly overlooked.  Even the conventional economic 
assumption that a modicum of security is necessary to attract foreign 
investment and generate economic growth was ignored (3.1.1-03/09/08).   
 
Entrenched ideas of security dating back to the Cold War were also partly to 
blame for the neglect of proper security reform.  Earlier research showed that 
influential circles in Mozambique’s military and certain politicians, as well as 
some donors, displayed a view of security as something to be solely 
addressed by the national government, considering any involvement in the 
defence and security sector as constituting a breach of state sovereignty (Lalá 
2001: 88).  This was paradoxical, given donor support for UNOMOZ, which 
implemented its mandate through a significant amount of external interference 
in the internal affairs of the Mozambican state (Ajello 1995: 129, Cabaço 1995: 
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96), and effectively ‘dictated the direction of most contemporary policy options’ 
(4.5.1-27/02/09).  This inconsistency between donor discourse and practice 
epitomised the global transitional context at the time where concepts of state 
sovereignty and national security were being reconsidered.  Humanitarian 
reasons called for more intrusive measures in peace operations, and a serious 
international debate was being held on the issue.  Furthermore, 
multidimensional peacebuilding was being conceptualised, encompassing the 
need for an increased component of security assistance from UN missions to 
the security institutions of the states hosting the operations.  However, these 
concepts had not yet crystallized into formal institutional policies. 
 
In Mozambique most bilateral donors, not just the UN, were reluctant to 
become involved in the security arena.  They did not view defence reform as 
important beyond demobilisation and installation of a new and merged 
defence force, nor did they maintain an open channel for supporting future 
police reforms (4.5.1-27/02/09).  On the one hand, the security sector, and 
especially the military, was regarded as a problem and as incapable of being 
part of the solution.  On the other hand, with the end of Apartheid in South 
Africa, the peaceful regional environment led to a perception of ‘the end of 
threat’ in Mozambique, akin to the thesis of ‘the end of history’ or the ‘end of 
ideology’.  According to one interviewee, the combination of these two factors 
prompted serious donor suggestions that ‘a country such as Mozambique did 
not need armed forces’ (4.5.1-27/02/09).  Such donor contempt for the armed 
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forces stemmed from its view of the former FPLM-FAM as the icon of ‘the 
nationalist and revolutionary character of Frelimo as a vanguard party’ 
(Honwana 1995: 559).  Admittedly, many cadres of Frelimo acquired their 
political beliefs during military training (Cabaço 1995: 84) within the FPLM 
during the liberation struggle.  However, after independence, the FPLM-FAM 
was clearly subordinated to Frelimo’s political and ideological control, turning it 
more into an instrument of the regime rather than its driver; yet donors failed to 
grasp this nuance.  
 
Mutual distrust between donors and Mozambique’s leadership at the time of 
the GPA led to the dismantling of the FPLM-FAM, and the creation from afresh 
of the new Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (FADM) integrating 
former Government and former Renamo military staff (4.3.1-26/08/08).  This 
situation, typical of a critical juncture, was further complemented by a strategy 
of not maintaining existing operational military equipment and letting it become 
obsolete, in order to make it impossible for the GoM to return to war.  An 
interviewee claimed that the ‘advantage of such a draconian approach was 
realised only by the international community, which saw this as the sole 
solution to stability’ (4.1.2.5-05/05/05).  Indeed, resources that could have 
been converted for civilian use such as air force planes were wasted, despite 
their huge cost and contribution towards Mozambique’s external debt.  In 
addition, careful oversight of the handling of the equipment could have allowed 
the new FADM at least some foundation to build from.   
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Engaging in Bricolage 
 
In light of these circumstances, and taking into account the overwhelming 
scale of social, economic and infrastructure rebuilding needed, together with 
the enormous dependence on foreign aid and the highly asymmetrical 
environment (Hanlon, 1991, 1997, Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1994, 1995, 
1996, Saul, 1991), the GoM downplayed the importance of security and 
prioritised the predominant concerns of the IFIs (4.5.1-27/02/09).  Yet, whilst 
initially perceived by Mozambicans as an imposition given the devastating 
implications for the security sector, conditionality ended-up playing into the 
hands of successive Frelimo governments.   
 
Firstly, given that the security forces were traditionally subordinated to the 
political power (1.2.1.5-27/05/05), it was possible for Frelimo’s GoM to deplete 
the sector's resources without disruptive protest, because the matter had been 
previously discussed at the party level to appease the more orthodox 
members (4.5.4-09/09/08).  In addition, what became ‘non-refundable’ loans 
from public commercial banks and from an Agriculture and Rural Development 
Fund appear to have been offered to the higher echelons of the military and 
party officials as incentives for the trade-offs, with donor knowledge (Hanlon 
1991: 221,233, Hanlon 2004: 5, Hanlon and Smart 2008: 106, 4.6.2.5-05/05). 
 
Secondly, a growing number of voices in Mozambican society, including the 
political reformist leadership, the emergent civil society and the nascent 
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business community expressed the view that the country ought to have 
dedicated more capacities and energy towards development, rather than 
security as had happened in the past (4.1.4.5-23/05/05, 4.6.2.5-05/05, 1.2.2-
14/09/08). 
 
Thirdly, whilst conceding on the dismantling of the armed forces, the Frelimo 
Government protected certain sections of the security sector by not allowing 
the police and intelligence to become the target of peace agreement reforms.  
Also, the GoM obtained the acquiescence of those in the security sector who 
did not welcome the intervention of the international community in reforming 
‘sovereign’ areas and who believed that, upon regaining some economic 
stability, the Mozambican state would invest in the sector again (3.1.3.5-
19/05/05, 4.3.1.5-05/05).   
 
Fourthly, the peace agreement did not include provisions for support of 
institutions responsible for democratic oversight of the security forces.  This 
was reinforced by an absence of systematic donor and NGOs efforts to 
support the emerging entities of democratic oversight (Ball and Barnes 2000: 
196), whether in immediate peacebuilding or in subsequent democratisation.  
This sent a message to the GoM that such institutions would not pose a real 
challenge. 
 
Fifth and most importantly, by being the donors’ ‘good pupil’ more aid and 
financial support was guaranteed to Frelimo for governing the country, and in 
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the context of the on-going SAP, the phase of primitive capital accumulation 
by the Mozambican elites initiated in 1987 could continue, ‘enabling the 
openness and the enlargement of the elite’ (4.1.3.5-18/05/05).  This clearly 
indicated tactics of accommodation through political bricolage. 
 
The assessment provided in this section has shown, through the illustration of 
contradictions between the prescriptions of economic liberalisation and the 
requirements of post-conflict reconstruction, that a comprehensive 
peacebuilding strategy was absent in Mozambique. It has further 
demonstrated that the simultaneous occurrence of economic liberalisation and 
of peace negotiations, even if managed as two independent processes led by 
different communities of practitioners, had significant implications for 
Mozambique’s security institutions.  The priorities set by the SAP in relation to 
expenditure levels significantly affected the role of the new armed forces, 
restraining their future capabilities and effectiveness.  However, what was 
initially SAP driven conditionality imposed by donors onto the GoM, became a 
coinciding interest, allowing both parties to advance their purposes at the cost 
of forfeiting a much-needed re-thinking and reform of the security sector.  This 
represented a visible instance of political bricolage by the GoM, whose 
capacity to adapt, even if constrained initially, was present from the earliest 
stages of the triple transition.  
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5.4 Economic liberalisation and democratisation 
The analysis has so far discussed sequencing and institution building during 
the triple transition marked by the prioritisation of economic liberalisation over 
political change, peacebuilding and security reforms.  In doing so, it has mainly 
stressed the prominence of critical junctures during the early peacebuilding 
phase of the 1990s, when change was fast paced in Mozambique.  In this 
section, the impact of the previously mentioned prioritisation on wider 
democratisation is examined in an extended period until 2009, in order to 
show the lasting effect of the initial sequencing. The analysis of interaction 
between change and continuity in this longer period identified an emerging 
pattern of slower change and enduring legacies in politics and in policy-
making, denoting path dependence and questioning the full extent of the triple 
transition.  It also underscores the importance of the type of response adopted 
by national players, in face of an environment heavily influenced by donors, as 
another crucial variable underpinning the triple transition besides the 
sequencing factor.  The past experience and the values of Mozambican local 
actors surfaced, throughout time, shaping their resistance and accommodation 
tactics, oftentimes encompassing political bricolage. 
 
5.4.1 Democratisation of Corruption 
 
The promising narrative of democracy and development as mutually 
reinforcing processes ‘sold’ to Mozambique has, in practice, been 
characterised by conspicuous capital accumulation and the shrinking of 
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democratic politics.  The fast pace of the initial stages of privatisation (Cramer 
2001: 80-82), fostered by donors in the context of the SAP, created a ripe 
environment for corruption, which in time ‘developed into routine and 
afterwards into institutionalised culture’ (4.1.2.5-05/05/05).54  The illicit 
accumulation of wealth or the ‘democratisation of corruption’ (4.1.3.5-
18/05/05) became a generalised process that occurred at the upper, middle, 
and lower levels of state administration, accompanied by growing impunity, 
owing to the weakness of the judiciary.  These views are corroborated by the 
Corruption Perception Index which ranked Mozambique 130th out of 180 
countries in 2009, awarding it 2.5 points on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is 
highly corrupt and 10 represents very low level of corruption (Transparency 
International, 2009).   
 
At the political level, the liberalisation process revolved around different wings 
of the Frelimo elite who gained political power through elections, but used their 
positions to develop a neo-patrimonial system that secured access to lucrative 
economic opportunities for themselves and their networks.  This was facilitated 
by the fact that they no longer faced the socialist-era legal restrictions on the 
accumulation of business interests and state positions.   
                                                
54 There was no endemic culture of corruption in Mozambique prior to economic liberalisation.  Whilst it 
cannot be affirmed that it was a corruption free country, this was not a generalised trend amongst 
political leaders, state institutions and society at large (at least during Machel’s rule 1975-1986).  At the 
social level the main problem was perhaps that of smuggling of food and other goods to be sold at 
speculative prices, when they were scarce in the country.  At the level of political leadership corruption 
was severely condemned and punished, and at the level of state institutions the phenomena started to 
grow from 1986 onwards.  There were growing reports of corruption in the military and other state 
institutions’ recipient of foreign aid such as the unit responsible for assisting populations in cases of 
natural disaster (Hanlon 1984: 194-5, 241-2, 1991: 151, 230-8, Dinerman 2006: 11, 287). 
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At the economic level the process at stake was the creation of a national 
bourgeoisie, which following donor logic represented an essential condition for 
the development of the national economy (Rapley 2002: 143-146), but which 
was also threatened by a globalised context that favoured only large external 
investors.  In hindsight, it might be said that if the process of privatisation had 
initially been more regulated, it might have produced more equitable 
opportunities for emerging Mozambican investors.  In practice, nationals faced 
credit limitations deriving from the IFIs impositions, which created a bottleneck, 
forcing most Mozambicans to accept partnerships with foreign private 
investors.  This lack of opportunity for nationals (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 
1996: 40, 52, Hanlon 1997: 96, Ratilal 2002: 269) and the lack of concrete 
regulation (Cramer 2006: 271) led the process into disarray.  As one 
interviewee pointed out ‘if some of the partnerships were genuine investment-
wise, most were agreements of convenience whereby Mozambicans got cash 
flow in return for opening channels for foreigners to invest’ (4.6.1.5-05/05).  
This resulted in a variety of deals, ranging from facilitating access to privileged 
government information about privatisation investment opportunities, to 
bureaucratic contacts to speed legal and business set ups, to simply offering a 
local name for partnership purposes in order to meet foreign investment 
requirements in place at the time (Law 4/84 of 18/08, By-law 8/87 of 30/01). 
 
Given the environment, Frelimo party members who thought they had 
dedicated their lives to liberating the country were unhappy to lose out in a 
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process where the national economy was handed over to foreign groups.  
Hence, even if some members of the Frelimo elite agreed to take a back seat 
at the party stage or at the government level (4.1.3.5-18/05/05), those in the 
GoM, unable to favourably negotiate the settings imposed by the IFI, allowed 
them alternative means of accumulation, resulting in Frelimo’s ‘transformative 
preservation’ strategy  (Pitcher 2002: 6).  Regrettably for Mozambique, this 
strategy surpassed the use of political access to obtain shares in major 
investments. It went on to include the embezzlement of state resources and 
administrative corruption, resulting in the unintended consequence of 
generalised corruption in state and society (4.1.1.5-05/05, 4.1.2.5-05/05/05, 
4.1.3.5- 18/05/05, 4.6.1.5-05/05).   
 
This situation has been extensively depicted by national and international 
media and scholars, and clearly showcased with the murders of investigative 
journalist Carlos Cardoso and bank official manager Siba Siba Macuacua.  
They had discovered fraudulent schemes and scandalous unrepaid loans to 
members of the upper echelons of Frelimo that led to the bankruptcy of two 
major banks that the state had to subsequently bail out (for e.g. Committee to 
Protect Journalists 22/11/2000, AIM 05/09/2001, Zambeze 14/11/2002, BBC 
News 25/05/2003, Savana 19/09/2003, Zambeze 29/01/2009, 09/04/2009).   
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Fig. 9 Carlos Cardoso memorial: the banner reads ‘Weapons do not silence the voice’ 
 
The Mozambique public was appalled at the situation and widely held that it 
was too high a price to pay to create an exhibitionist national bourgeoisie 
displaying conspicuous consumption in the form of luxury houses in upmarket 
areas, the latest model car and designer apparel, and which in most cases did 
not reinvest proceeds in the economy. The media, despite the subsequent 
level of intimidation by criminal networks, also derived greater inspiration for 
investigative journalism and the denouncing of corruption, a role supported by 
59% of Mozambicans (Afrobarometer 2008: 18, Q35) and that earned them, 
over time, the status of the most trusted national institution to fight corruption 
(Transparency International, 2011). Yet, none of this was enough to make the 
GoM responsive to the appeals of society for justice. As a result, a generalised 
feeling of impunity prevailed. 
 
Faced with the overall spread of corruption, the bank scandals and the killings 
of Cardoso and Macuacua, donors largely condoned the situation (Lalá and 
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Ostheimer 2003: 59) not only continuing to accept the lip-service paid by the 
GoM to keep the inflow of resources, but actually rewarding it with increased 
aid (Harrison 1999: 327-328, Hanlon 2004: 5).55  Even considering that 
additional donor contributions might have been prompted by the economic 
devastation caused by the severe floods that coincidentally occurred in 
Mozambique in 2000, it is clear that donors stayed the course to prop up the 
myth of the Mozambican success story, which supported the appropriateness 
of economic liberalisation, peacekeeping and of the development aid industry.  
In the longer-term, the end result has been that donors have been caught in a 
‘pathological equilibrium’, sustained by a symbiotic relationship they developed 
with predatory factions of the Mozambican elite (Hanlon, 2004a, Hanlon, 
2004b).  As such, they were satirically coined as ‘Perfect Partners’ (Killick et 
al, 2005). 
 
 
Fig. 10 Evolution of disaggregated donor aid funding 
Source: Author’s graphic built with data sourced from the Bank of Mozambique 
 
                                                
55 According to data sourced from the Bank of Mozambique, programme funding increased from USD 
million 30 in 2000, to 63.8 in 2001, and 106.2 in 2002.  These came in the form of credit provided by 
multilateral development aid funds (FAD).  However, programme donations decreased from USD million 
188.9 in 2000, to 171.1 in 2001, and 118.3 in 2002. Official Development Assistance (ODA) data 
provided by the WB corroborates the rising tendency of programme funding since 1999, and reaching a 
peak in 2002. See figures 28 and 29. 
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Fig. 11 Evolution of ODA 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank online databank 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/chart.aspx 
 
 
Mozambique is therefore a typical case where, from the viewpoint of 
sequencing and coherence, the prioritisation of economic liberalisation, 
instead of producing the optimal market economy, actually resulted in the 
unintended consequence of the emergence of neo-patrimonial networks. 
Pervasive corruption in public and private affairs spread in a manner similar to 
what happened in countries like Uganda (Watt et al, 1999) and Bosnia (Divjak 
and Pugh, 2008) during similar transitions, in a trajectory clearly rejected by 
Frelimo in the post-independence period. 
 
5.4.2 Political Expediency and Survival Tactics 
   
The initial and unfeigned subservient attitude of the GoM in relation to donors 
was gradually transformed into ‘strategic subservience’, i.e., along the process 
and upon realising an opportunity to extract benefit from this posture, the GoM 
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started using it as part of its political bricolage strategy.  As such, the GoM and 
therefore Frelimo, used it to guarantee uninterrupted funding for its political 
projects, and more specifically to deliver on the promised expansion of health 
and education to rural populations (Castel-Branco, 2008).56   
 
This has garnered Frelimo enough support or absenteeism - voter turnout in 
national elections dropped from around 87.9% in 1994 to 44.44% in 2009 
(Comissão Nacional de Eleições- CNE/ Secretariado Técnico de 
Admnistração Eleitoral- STAE, Mozambique) - to keep winning general 
elections and securing parliamentary majorities.  The consequence has been 
that the latest two legislatures, in particular since the accession of Armando 
Guebuza to Mozambique’s presidency, have been characterised by an 
absence of genuine dialogue between Frelimo and Renamo (the larger 
opposition party), especially at the leadership level, heightening political 
tension.   
 
Renamo, excluded from access to political power and from major economic 
opportunities, has kept searching for a revalidation of the GPA, as its 
grievances have continued to mount since the early days of the transition 
(Manning 1998: 161-189, Naidu 2001: 8, Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 
                                                
56 In 1975 the illiteracy rate was of 93%.  It lowered considerably in the 5 years following independence 
to 72% in 1980, and dropped again to 50.4% in 2007 (INE 2010: 12). In addition, in 1980 there were 
5,730 public primary schools, whilst in 2009 the number had grown to 10,027 (INE 2010: 12).  
Concerning healthcare, in 1975 there were 113 hospitals, 120 health centres and 326 health posts, in 
contrast to only 52 hospitals, 1018 health centres and 254 health posts in 2009 (INE 2010: 23).  The lack 
of faster progress in the education and health sectors denote the level of destruction to which these 
instituions/services were subjected during the civil war. 
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nr 26, 2001, Jornal A Verdade 08/03/2012, Canalmoz 13/11/2012, allAfrica 
14/11/2012).  A failure to understand that electoral democracy would not bring 
them political equality was part of the problem as one interviewee observed: 
‘Renamo failed to adopt a long-term vision in its position at the Rome 
negotiations, and keeps running after its damages till today’ (4.1.3.5-18/05/05).   
 
The grievances refer mostly to failures to convince Frelimo governments to 
award them high-level state posts57 and to overhaul the political system, and, 
in particular, to enact significant changes in the electoral law (RDP África 
13/11/2012).  They have demanded the integration of non-demobilised 
Renamo armed men into the security forces,58 the fostering of a non-partisan 
public service, and a more equitable income distribution (Jornal A Verdade 
18/10/2012, DefenceWeb 19/11/2012, Zambeze 06/12/2012).  
 
However, the propensity of its leader, Mr Dhlakama, to regularly create 
political crises that end suddenly and without noticeable political 
accomplishments, have contributed towards Renamo’s loss of credibility, 
mirrored in diminishing voting results after the 1999 general elections.  It has 
                                                
57 Renamo had an opportunity to play an active role in the choice of governors for six provinces after the 
1999 elections, and more specifically in the course of negotiations held with Frelimo after the eruption of 
violent manifestations by Renamo protesters at the end of 2000.  However, since the proposed criteria of 
appointment of governors did not fully meet its desired requirements, Renamo altogether rejected the 
opportunity (Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin 26, April 2001). 
 
58 In the context of the GPA and its implementation, out of distrust for the PRM, Renamo extracted the 
concession from the GoM that it could maintain around 200 armed men to serve as a personal protection 
guard for Renamo’s leader Afonso Dlakhama.  This situation remains up to this day and has been the 
cause for several recurrent political tensions. This issue is further analysed in Chapter VI. Vines 2013: 
375-393 also analyses this matter. 
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been suggested that the crises end when Mr Dhlakama obtains material 
benefits from Frelimo to resolve these episodes, and he acknowledges 
accusations by his peers whenever he demonstrates a lenient attitude towards 
the solution of the conflicts (Lusa 21/04/2012, 02/10/2012).  Renamo’s 
reputation as a party that accepts peace in return for financial reward59 (Vines, 
1998, Manning 2002: 103, 4.1.1.5-05/05, 4.5.1.5-05/05) still looms and has 
been further reinforced by its inability to produce a politically strong 
programme over the years.  Nonetheless, research on multiparty democracy in 
Mozambique and on Renamo’s performance as a political party points out that 
the party’s main flaw stems from the fact that it only mimics and intends to 
replace Frelimo in power, reproducing a pattern of clientelism instead of 
constituting a viable political alternative (Nuvunga 2005: xiv, Cahen, 2011).60  
In addition, Mr Dhlakama has never taken office as the opposition leader in 
parliament, allegedly because that would have reduced his time, and therefore 
ability, to control Renamo party matters (Cahen 2011: 7).  Over time he has 
centralised power around himself (Naidu 2001: 23, Lalá and Ostheimer 2003: 
25, Cahen, 2011), resorting to expelling potential future replacements from the 
party, allegedly on the basis that they had been financially co-opted by 
Frelimo.  All in all, Renamo’s political adventurism stands in stark contrast to 
its electoral manifesto of 2004 ‘Renamo, for a quiet change’ (Renamo, 2004), 
                                                
59 See footnote 9 above. 
 
60 Two crucial factors have been identified for Renamo’s decline as a political party.  The first is that 
Renamo displays a notorious lack of intra-party democracy, a characteristic common to all Mozambican 
political parties (Nuvunga 2005: 80) whilst related to this are its shortcomings in the management of 
political appointments (at all echelons and not just the top) (Cahen, 2011).  In addition, its diminishing 
capacity for creating economic rewards for its political network (Manning 1998: 189) - mostly due to the 
loss of many positions in the parliament and in municipal elections - reinforces the pattern. 
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given the reality of cyclical and violent crises surrounding the party’s strategy 
for political survival and enhanced societal relevance and visibility. 
 
The sum of these shortcomings resulted in Renamo depriving the country of a 
viable and strong political opposition, which is essential to the development of 
democracy.  For instance, members expelled went on to create their own 
political parties, further fragmenting opposition to Frelimo, in a period when 
this party is headed in the direction of growing authoritarianism.  The 
remaining opposition parties, alone, are not strong enough to challenge 
Frelimo, although the creation of the Movimento Democrático de Moçambique 
(MDM) may come to represent a step in that direction (Nuvunga and Adalima, 
2011).  Whereas Frelimo has experienced electoral defeats in some municipal 
elections, these are likely to remain exceptions, even if there has been 
growing dissatisfaction with the party’s performance in urban areas.  As one 
researcher noted, these constituencies are unlikely to penalise Frelimo in 
electoral terms (Sumich 2008: 111-125) at least until they see that a viable 
alternative exists, i.e. one that will deliver the services required without 
replicating the exclusionary model of financial accumulation through political 
power.    
 
In addition, a survey conducted in 2008 demonstrated that 61% of 
Mozambicans believe that the GoM is ‘like a parent that needs to take care of 
their children’, reinforced by the view of 44% who think that citizens should 
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show more respect for authority (Afrobarometer 2008: 10, Q16 and Q18).  In 
contrast, only 29% thought that ‘the GoM is an employee of the people, and 
that therefore should be controlled by them’, supported by 41% who believed 
that citizens should be more active in questioning the actions of their leaders 
(Afrobarometer 2008: 10, Q16 and Q18).  This conservatism and lack of 
predisposition on the part of Mozambicans to demand accountability from the 
GoM further reinforces the view that the pattern of Frelimo’s consolidation of 
power is likely to continue at the same time that democratisation fades.  The 
party’s growing tendency towards intolerance, centralisation of power and 
absence of meaningful dialogue with other political and societal actors is a 
telling sign.  An example of such boldness is the open fostering of Frelimo 
partisanship amongst the civil service (4.3.2.5-18/05/05, African Peer Review 
Mechanism or Mecanismo Africano de Revisão de Pares - MARP 2009: 23, 
101-103, 217-218, Canalmoz 29/04/2012, 21/05/2010, Hanlon and Mosse 
2010: 7, Forquilha and Orre 2011: 39), breaking with the policies advanced 
under the leadership of former President Chissano.  This has been a 
generalised trend in society (Agenda 20-25 2003: 66), as shown by the use of 
‘sticks and carrots’, such as speeches attempting to pressure university 
students into seeking formal membership of the party, or the speedier 
resolution of administrative processes of people holding Frelimo membership 
cards (Hanlon and Smart 2008: 217), whilst those of others are delayed and/or 
even obstructed.  This tendency towards aggressive and intolerant political 
behaviour on the part of Frelimo resonates with path dependence, insofar as 
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this course of action resembles that of the post-independence period, when 
revolutionary violence was used as a common governing method, as analysed 
in Chapter IV.  It is no coincidence that some members of the older 
conservative Frelimo wing are back in decision-making roles, or that the 
president Guebuza’s centralising political style government has resurfaced. 
 
At the local level, the party’s consolidation of power has been enhanced by 
encouraging Frelimo membership as a means of obtaining privileged access 
to the District Development Funds (DDF) (Tvedten et al 2009: 6, Forquilha 
2010: 43, Orre 2010: 13).  This initiative has been plagued by lack of 
transparency and corruption in fund allocation (Tvedten et al 2009: 21, 
Tvedten et al 2010: 51, Tvedten et al 2012: 37, Maschietto, 2012), despite the 
good intention of making much needed credit available in the rural areas.  
Whilst the enterprise has been surrounded by much controversy due to 
shortcomings in planning and implementation (Sande, 2010, Orre 2010: 13, 
CIP 2012: 19), the injection of cash has had a revitalising effect on local 
economies, as was observed during fieldwork for this project in the rural 
districts.  However, an interviewee who held a high state position at the 
provincial level noted that: 
…when the Administrator has some acceptance from the populations 
and has persuasive capacity, he is able to manipulate the consultative 
council that analyses the projects submitted for funding… and it is not 
rare to see the members of this council or their relatives and friends 
benefit before the general population (4.3.3-14/08/08).   
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Thus, in practice, the DDF initiative does not appear to have benefited the 
poorer populations (Tvedten et al 2010: 51), pointing instead in the direction of 
an extension of Frelimo patronage networks to the rural areas (4.3.3-
14/08/08).   
 
Together with the earlier recognition of the role of traditional authorities in local 
governance (Decree 15/2000) by the GoM, the introduction of the DDF 
demonstrated a lesson learnt from post-independence and the civil war, 
regarding the exclusion of local authorities and rural areas.  Hence, path 
dependence is not inescapable and learning occurs within Frelimo and the 
GoM.  Frelimo placated the local authorities by breaking the precedent of 
unshared wealth accumulation by elites at the national level.  Whilst this may 
have partially boosted its legitimacy in rural areas, it concurrently created new 
spaces of inclusion/exclusion within the communities (Kyed and Buur, 2006, 
Maschietto, 2012).  Furthermore, the expansion of this rentier model of 
governing the country to lower admnistration echelons has also aggravated 
the already acrimonious relations with Renamo, whose affiliates lose out in all 
profitmaking and development opportunities. 
 
This perilous strategy, alongside the exclusionary creation and consolidation 
of Mozambique’s business elite in a neo-patrimonial model has resulted in 
societal marginalisation and the perpetuation of poverty and destitution, as 
evidenced by the eruption of violent societal conflict.  Manifestations of direct 
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violence, whether linked to elections, issues of justice, or social and economic 
concerns have been present during the entire post-civil war transition in 
Mozambique.  Illustrative of this were the demonstrations against Frelimo’s 
electoral victory by Renamo supporters in November 2000, which ended with 
over 80 people dead from asphyxia, due to imprisonment in cramped cells by 
the police (LA Times, 25/11/2000, Aim News 18/12/2000).  Other examples 
include the assassinations of professionals investigating corruption, such as 
journalists, bank employees or customs officials (The Guardian, 24/11/2000, 
SADOCC 01/05/2003, allAfrica 27/04/2010, Aim News 28/04/2010, Savana 
30/04/2010).  Demonstrations by a group of citizens who used to work in East 
Germany and who demanded the payment of their pensions by the 
Mozambican state also led to police repression, resulting in deaths on at least 
one occasion (Taipei times 16/07/2004, IPS News 11/07/2012).  Instances of 
lynching and other forms of spontaneous justice have been recurrent (A 
Tribuna Fax 24/02/2010) and are recognised in public official speeches 
(Informação da Situação Geral da Nação 13/12/2007, 22/06/2009).  Cyclical 
urban riots have taken place in February 2008, September 2010 and 
November 2012 and have also been met with violent police responses 
(Zambeze 07/02/2008, BBC News 01/09/2010, SABC 15/11/2012).  
 
The GoM has treated these signs of intense societal conflict with 
condescension and as isolated and controllable events.61  This stance is 
                                                
61 For example, Mozambique’s Deputy Minister of Interior claimed that the majority of rioters were 
criminals (Zambeze, 07/02/2008), suggesting a certain level of denial about the social unrest.   
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probably reinforced by perceptions of almost parity between the 42% of 
Mozambicans that think that ‘the GoM has helped most people, with only a few 
suffering’, and the 44% that believe that ‘GoM policies hurt most people, 
benefitting just a few’ (Afrobarometer 2008: 8, Q11).  Nonetheless, the GoM is 
taking a risk by ignoring the growing number of those who fall into the latter 
category. Another menace is the fact that 55% think that the GoM is 
performing poorly in terms of narrowing the gap between rich and poor, 
against only 33% who think it is doing well (Afrobarometer 2008: 33, Q57e).  
This demonstrates that part of the Frelimo elite is only selectively learning (or 
is indeed choosing to ignore) the lessons from the armed conflict between 
Renamo and Frelimo, namely that disregard for inequality and political 
intolerance in the absence of genuine societal dialogue can act as a powerful 
trigger for violent conflict. 
 
Under these conditions, it is clear that, in addition to the negative setting 
created by donor prioritisation of economic over political liberalisation, these 
domestic elements of the politics of expediency and the recourse to survival 
tactics by Mozambique’s main political parties constitute permanent and 
powerful challenges to the consolidation of democracy in the country.  Whilst 
donors’ sequencing contributed to heightening political competition for power 
and economic opportunity, a phenomena that has intensified due to the 
expansion of natural resource extraction in recent years, national players 
could choose alternative paths to those of creating heightened political tension 
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as a means of securing their own interests.  This combination of factors has 
resulted in a polarisation of politics and society in which growing intolerance is 
constraining dialogue and peaceful conflict resolution (Agenda 20-25 2003: 
85). 
 
The shortcomings of Mozambique’s democratic process are reflected in the 
low positions occupied in the 2009 Legatum Prosperity Index (LPI)62 as 
regards democratic institutions and governance, with ratings of 73 and 78 
respectively, out of a total of 104 countries (LPI, 2009).  However, in the same 
year, the Global Peace Index (GPI) ranked Mozambique as 47 out of a total of 
143 countries, meaning that it is placed in the second group (in five) of the 
most peaceful countries globally (GPI, 2009), a finding somewhat surprising in 
light of the previous qualitative analysis of the negative developments.  Closer 
observation of the detailed indicators of this Index shows a more nuanced 
picture in terms of political tension.  For instance, on a scale where 1 
represents very low and 5 very high, Mozambique is awarded 3 in terms of 
organised internal conflict, 2.5 concerning likelihood of violent demonstrations, 
and 2.25 concerning political instability (GPI, 2009).  In 2010 the ranking of 
political instability increased to 2.5 (GPI, 2010). Whilst this is still an 
                                                
62  The Legatum Prosperity Index intends to foster a holistic view of prosperity encompassing also non-
material wealth such as social capital, health, opportunity, security, effective governance, and human 
rights and liberties, and overall quality of life (LPI 2009: 2).  
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intermediate position,63 it should make those affected, including investors, 
cautious.  
 
5.4.3 Democratic Deficit and Political Bricolage 
 
The previous section highlighted the challenge of ensuring the irreversibility of 
democracy, taking into account that Mozambique has not yet been able to 
overcome the ‘permanent entrenchment of democratic minimalism’ 
(Ostheimer, 2001).  Thus far, the country has failed to make a ‘qualitative leap 
from a procedural into a substantive approach of consolidation of national 
democratic institutions’ (4.1.2.5-05/05/05) and the likelihood of this happening 
is low.  Despite the existence of a vocal media that contributes to this goal with 
permanent questioning, the Parliament has been turned into the hegemonic 
site of Frelimo’s power and CSOs, albeit stronger, remain heterogeneous and 
oftentimes dubiously aligned with the GoM (Homerin 2005: 5, Tamele 2007: 6, 
Hanlon and Smart 2008: 218). 
 
A pattern of path dependence emerges in that Frelimo keeps returning to its 
previous methods of monopolising and centralising political power that 
characterised post-independence.  This is not to claim, however, that the 
situation remains unchanged.  In the post-conflict era, Frelimo has been 
                                                
63 The score is high given the growing level of internal political and economic tensions described in this 
chapter.  However, this rating may reflect the fact that the GoM strategy was still holding out and that 
people were still complacent with the direction of developments as revealed by the Afrobarometer 2008 
Survey quoted above. 
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managing change through a working method of political bricolage that allows it 
to adopt new procedural means such as elections to obtain external and 
internal symbolic legitimacy, even if the quality of the process sheds doubt on 
its substantive result.  Similarly, by adopting new democratic values, many 
improvements are in place: people are allowed the freedom to join the political 
party and associations they wish;64 and a vibrant and outspoken media is 
allowed to continue denouncing malpractice, including that of Frelimo 
members and the GoM, provided such denunciations do not cause true harm 
to the core of the regime.  From the viewpoint of national politics, Frelimo has 
not been oblivious to indications that Mozambicans are already incorporating 
important democratic values.  For instance, a survey found that 59% of the 
population perceive democracy as the best kind of government (Afrobarometer 
2008: 16, Q30), whilst 71% consider elections a necessary step for legitimising 
power (Afrobarometer 2008: 16, Q31) and 57% value freedom of expression 
(Afrobarometer 2008: 11, Q21).  Therefore, Frelimo knows it could damage 
itself politically if these values were openly and fully reversed.65 However, 
                                                
64 No direct coercive security strategies exist to prevent this, although connotations with other political 
parties than Frelimo may render ‘invisible’ obstacles in a whole range of economic, political and 
administrative spheres. In the Afrobarometer 2008 Survey 47% of Mozambicans stated they were free to 
say what they thought and another 15% added they were somewhat free (Afrobarometer 2008: 9, Q15a); 
50% confirmed they had freedom to join any political organisation they wanted, plus 15% alleged they 
were somewhat free to do so (Afrobarometer 2008: 9, Q15b). 
 
65 In 2009 Mozambique was considered ‘Partly Free’ by Freedom House standards.  It scored an overall 
value of 3 in a ranking where 1 represents greatest freedom and 7 represents the least freedom 
(Freedom House, 2009).  Yet, in 2010, its score changed to 3.5, given what was considered a decrease 
in the level of political rights (Freedom House, 2010).  Confirming the trend of deterioration, the Mo 
Ibrahim Index of African Governance features Mozambique’s largest six-year score decline (2006-2012) 
in the component of ‘Participation’, from 63.4% to 49.3% (IIAG, 2013).  In contrast, the Legatum 
Prosperity Index classified Mozambique as 49th out of a total of 104 countries, concerning ‘Personal 
Freedom’, meaning that it is amongst the average country ranking in this factor, in contrast with the low 
overall country position of 91 in 104 (LPI, 2009).  
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given its current political hegemony, the changes that have occurred will only 
continue to the extent that the party perceives the gains to outweigh the costs. 
 
Taking into account this evolving state of affairs and looking at donor/GoM 
interaction as far as democratisation is concerned, what stands out is the 
shallow nature of democratic reform. For instance, it is noticeable that, on the 
one hand, donors vowed to strengthen democratisation by promoting national 
ownership of different policy initiatives and documents, including ‘arm-twisting’ 
the GoM into accepting CSOs participation in policy-making processes. On the 
other hand, they were less keen to advance a similar agenda with regards to 
resource negotiation and financial allocation for implementation.  An illustrative 
example was the decision to hold crucial IFIs/donor/GoM negotiations about 
resource allocation simultaneously with the GoM’s presentation of the state 
budget to the Parliament. This compromised the Parliament’s oversight over 
government financial management, given that the budget presented was not 
the final version agreed upon with donors (4.3.3.5-20/05/05, 4.6.2.5-05/05, 
Hodges and Tibana 2005: 80-81, de Renzio and Hanlon, 2007, Hanlon and 
Smart, 2008).  In addition, neither previous nor recent frameworks of GoM 
accountability to donors on programme execution and financial matters include 
provisions for CSOs or Parliamentary participation.  For example, the Action 
Plans for Reduction of Absolute Poverty have never been subject to 
Parliamentary approval, even though they constituted the main source of 
Mozambique’s financing (Hodges and Tibana 2005: 83).  Thus, a paradox has 
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been created in which the GoM became more accountable to donors than to 
Mozambique’s domestic institutions, political actors and people (Agenda 20-25 
2003: 112).  This behaviour from donors facilitated the materialization of the 
scenario of co-optation and accommodation by the Frelimo elite, predicted at 
the start of democratisation by a prominent Mozambican scholar and 
denounced elsewhere (Mazula 1995: 66, Weimer 2002: 55-81). 
 
This lack of substantive accountability has deepened over time reinforcing the 
expanding democratic deficit and, at this stage, donors, even if willing to exert 
pressure, are progressively losing influence over the GoM for two main 
reasons.  On the one hand, Mozambique’s external debt appears to be 
shrinking in line with economic growth and the rise in GoM revenues.66   
 
 
Fig. 12 Evolution of Mozambique’s external debt 
Source: International Debt Statistics, World Bank online databank 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/chart.aspx 
                                                
66 It should be noted that Mozambique has benefited from debt relief in the context of the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative of the IMF since 1998.  In addition, significant debt forgiveness 
took place after the year 2000, given the success of the Jubilee debt campaign. 
  224 
On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, the General Budget 
Support scheme adopted in 2005 - in keeping with the spirit of the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness - encompasses a framework of shared 
responsibility between donors and receiving countries.  Although this 
framework appears to entail a trade-off between increased ownership and 
significant procedural burden on the GoM authorities (de Renzio and Hanlon 
2007: 15), in practice it also raises the stakes for donors should they decide to 
‘unplug the aid cable’  (de Renzio and Hanlon 2007: 16, Scholz and 
Plagemann 2008: 2, Astill-Brown and Weimer 2010: viii).  In particular, any 
decision of this nature would likely generate economic instability in the 
country, and donors do not wish to bear such responsibility, as they would risk 
losing credibility (de Renzio and Hanlon 2007: 16, Scholz and Plagemann 
2008: 2) and tarnishing Mozambique’s success story.  Further to the 
differences amongst Western donors on whether or not to consider such 
drastic measures, an additional important factor is the mounting investment in 
Mozambique of countries such as China, India and Brazil, which comes 
without ties to political indicators like good governance, accountability and 
democratisation.   
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Fig. 13 Evolution of foreign direct investment, 2003-2012 
              Source: Bank of Mozambique  
 
Another important feature contributing towards the lack of consolidation of 
democratisation in Mozambique concerns targeted donor support for this 
process, which has taken a minor role in comparison to revenue generating 
areas in the context of economic liberalisation.  Donor programmes comprising 
support for democratisation in the aftermath of the civil war lost momentum 
over time and have been replaced by feeble support for democratic 
governance programmes, particularly when compared to the level of rhetoric 
around them (Tollenaere 2006: ix).  An illustrative example is the intense focus 
on building technical electoral capacity, which, whilst laudable, has not 
addressed the controversial contents of successive elections’ management 
mechanisms, contested laws and electoral processes.  Hence, high levels of 
societal conflict persist and limited democratic progress has been attained, 
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with donors making an ‘unintentional move from good intentions to no 
intentions at all’ (Tollenaere 2006: ix,12).  
 
Symptomatic of the negligible support for democratisation is the low level of 
support for the institutionalisation of Parliament (Azevedo 2009: 12).  With the 
exception of the UNDP’s support, and in particular their programme focused 
on strengthening parliamentary oversight co-financed with Denmark from 2007 
to 2011, support from other donors has been negligible.  One parliamentarian 
noted: ‘The Parliament has not had many steady partners… I can recall 
support from the AWEPA and USAID on general issues, but what we need is 
targeted support with specific and technical legal matters, especially for the 
drawing up and analysis of laws’ (4.4.3.5-12/05/05).  Another member of 
parliament (MP) corroborated the need for support on specific matters, 
complaining ‘…who has the technical and financial means to propose a 
law…isn’t it only the Government?...it’s very difficult to be a good 
parliamentarian in Mozambique’ (4.4.1-21/09/08). 
 
Donors are thought to view Parliament as characterised by high turnover of 
MPs and high levels of conflict exacerbated by political party rivalry, and 
strong intra-party discipline.  From a donors’ perspective these factors render 
money spent on training parliamentarians as ineffective (4.2.1-24/02/09), 
since, even if willing, MPs are not able to translate new knowledge into 
meaningful change in their political behaviour, given the political parties’ 
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internal discipline.  In addition, Mozambicans feel distanced from their 
parliamentarians (MARP 2009: 112), with 47% claiming their elected MP never 
spends time in their constituency, against 20% who state that they visit only 
once a year (Afrobarometer 2008: 29, Q53b).  Moreover, 58% of people think 
that the MPs do not try their best to listen to ordinary people (Afrobarometer 
2008: 29, Q54a).  These insights are not encouraging from a donor’s 
perspective of programme output maximisation. 
 
As such, alternative donor programmes were designed to support the media 
(Tollenaere 2006: 19-23) and in recent years to train the youth within political 
parties and to support CSOs.  Examples include the Mechanism for Civil 
Society Support funded by DfID, USAID and Irish Aid, as well as other 
programmes supported by German political foundations like Friederich Ebert 
and Konrad Adenauer.  Yet, this should not have precluded robust support for 
strengthening parliamentary capacity and, specifically, that of their 
administration and staffers, but also to improve MPs’ education and skills on 
various subjects, given ‘the overall insufficient level of basic knowledge’ 
(4.4.1.5-05/05). 
 
Finally, with regards to a strong indicator of democratisation progress, i.e., 
justice reform, donor demands for a functioning judiciary and for anti-
corruption policies have fallen short of what was required, allowing successive 
Frelimo governments to cope by adopting palliative measures.  Examples 
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include the fostering of cosmetic justice reforms and the unleashing of Frelimo 
intra-party witch-hunting amongst its different wings, enacting criminal 
investigations, trials and condemnation of former GoM members on corruption 
charges (Notícias 23/09/08, Escorpião 30/09/2008, Savana 20/02/2009, 
allAfrica 24/05/2011).  In addition, several middle and lower management civil 
servants have also been brought to justice on corruption charges (BBC Africa 
09/01/2007, Canalmoz 27/04/2011, Canalmoz 18/05/2011) as part of an 
overall state and society moral and ethical campaign.  Resemblance with the 
post-independence approach was noticeable, at least from a rethorical point of 
view; in practice only symbolic progress has been achieved.  This is so 
because the process has taken place without sanctioning any Frelimo 
members, who in the post-2004 electoral period, and through the holding of 
public office, have continued to exert political influence to secure lucrative 
shares and partnerships in an increasingly oligarchical business environment.  
Mozambique’s Center for Public Integrity (CIP) report on ‘The business 
interests of public managers in the extractive industry: alliances with the stamp 
of trafficking of influence and conflicts of interest’ clearly documents this 
continuing trend (Machel, 2012). 
 
Overall, in terms of political liberalisation, donor support for the judiciary was 
neglected in the earlier stages of the transition comprising limited approaches 
towards the separation of powers and institution building, focusing mainly on 
building or rehabilitating infrastructure.  Wider approaches such as the rule of 
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law and access to justice were incorporated at a much later stage.  During that 
hiatus, however, the vulnerability of the justice sector increased, due to its 
penetration by illegal networks that captured, in particular, the criminal justice 
system.  Improvements in this field have been problematic over time, 
highlighting the cost of flawed donor sequencing between political and 
economic liberalisation in the earlier stages of transition.  Justice, and the rule 
of law approach in particular, ought to have functioned as a bridge between 
those two parallel processes, given that it is essential for business related and 
property rights that are pivotal in processes of economic liberalisation.  Still, 
democratisation requires that people increasingly gain access to justice to 
ensure their rights and resolve complex and growing societal, economic and 
political issues, a transformation that is occurring at a much slower pace than 
necessary.  These impediments not only undermine ongoing democratisation 
but also strike at the heart of the underlining liberal peace project.  
 
This section has shown that economic liberalisation and democracy, despite 
being part of the same liberal project, have not been mutually reinforcing 
paradigms in Mozambique.  The sequencing of events has meant that the 
primacy of economic liberalisation over political liberalisation produced an 
environment prone to a pernicious political bricolage by national elites, who 
used several tactics to circumvent conditionality and to strengthen political 
power at the expense of consolidating democratisation. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the sequence of events that allowed economic 
liberalisation to precede and prevail over political liberalisation and 
peacebuilding in the early days of the transition had a significant negative 
impact on democratisation in the short, medium and long-term during the 
intertwined transition in Mozambique.  The combination of this sequencing of 
processes and the path dependence manifested, through for example, the 
resurgence of Frelimo’s past behaviour, has shaped a particular type of 
political bricolage that has resulted in weak post-conflict state institutions, 
including those of the security and justice sectors.  It also produced growing 
inequality and exclusion of the poorest in society whilst also sowing the seeds 
of a volatile and violent democratic political situation. 
 
By mapping the driving factors as well as the sequencing and changing power 
dynamics of the triple transition starting in the late 1980s, this chapter has 
established that the introduction of liberalisation in Mozambique was heavily 
influenced by the dynamics of the Cold War, and its end, which implied the 
final victory of neo-liberal ideology. 
 
The sequencing of the transitions, mainly driven by donors’ strategic goals, but 
actively adopted by the GoM, consisted of prioritising economic liberalisation 
over political liberalisation.  This meant that peacebuilding and 
democratisation not only began at a slightly later point in time, but they also 
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took a back seat to economic liberalisation, implying that the objectives of 
economic liberalisation prevailed whenever in tension with the most immediate 
requirements of peacebuilding and democratisation.  This promoted an 
environment in which contradictory policies led to the creation of weak post-
conflict state institutions, including those of the security and justice sectors, 
undermining the liberal project.  
 
The diktat of economic liberalisation led to the downgrading of security reforms 
over time; they received little attention beginning with the peace agreement 
and continuing on through peacebuilding and subsequent democratisation 
phases.  The lack of support for security sector reform negatively affected the 
capacity and effectiveness of the post-war security establishment, as well as 
of those institutions responsible for democratic oversight of the security forces.  
As a corollary, after twenty years of peace, a major strategic review of the 
security sector has yet to take place.  This state of affairs evolved from what 
was strict conditionality imposed by donors onto a situation that later came to 
serve the interest of the Frelimo governing elite.  
 
This coincidence of interests between donors and Frelimo was based on the 
former’s interest in maintaining the myth of Mozambique’s success story, and 
the latter’s desire to guarantee the inflow of financial resources.  This 
produced serious unintended consequences, of which two stand out. The first 
was the spread of corruption, including the infiltration of an already weakened 
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justice system by criminal networks.  The second was that institutional reform 
and public policy-making fell prey to the dynamics of Frelimo's accommodation 
to donors’ demands.  
 
This chapter has also shown that, contrary to the prevailing rhetoric of the 
liberal project, economic liberalisation and democratisation have not unfolded 
as mutually reinforcing paradigms in Mozambique.  The primacy of economic 
liberalisation over political liberalisation created an environment prone to the 
use of pernicious political bricolage by the Frelimo governing elite, which, 
through its attempts to circumvent donors’ prescriptions and to consolidate 
internal political power, has jeopardized Mozambique’s democratisation.  This 
has been noticeable in the narrowing of the democratic space where national 
actors resort to political expediency and survival tactics, hindering political 
dialogue and calling into question the full extent of the transition.  
 
As in other countries, in Mozambique, the initial transitional and peacebuilding 
stages represented critical junctures, whereby the dismantling of the old 
system, institutions and modus operandi happened very quickly.  However, 
over time and as the new system became more institutionalised, patterns of 
path dependence became prominent, insofar as Frelimo’s political choices 
post-independence began to resemble those made in the post-civil war period.  
Increasing party centralisation, political power monopolisation, downplaying of 
political and societal dialogue, and growing political intolerance are examples 
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of such similarities, which have been gaining strength at the expense of 
reversing democratic gains secured earlier in the transition.  Yet, this pattern 
of path dependence is not inevitable, nor does it signify that the situation fully 
resembles the past.  Rather it means that, despite the similarities, the situation 
differed in that Frelimo has been able to manage change through the 
employment of political bricolage.  In practice this suggests that Frelimo has 
adopted some older tendencies while at the same time embracing new 
elements of democratisation, such as elections and media freedom, in a bid to 
maintain its internal and external legitimacy.  This strategy of adaptation 
through political bricolage has nonetheless demonstrated that the Frelimo elite 
is only selectively learning the lessons from the civil war, disregarding the 
weight of inequality and of political intolerance as potential triggers of longer-
term violent conflict.  Until now, this posture has rendered the Frelimo elite 
high financial and economic returns, but in the future it may put at risk the 
contested but promising peace. 
 
Taking into account the findings of this macro-level examination of the triple 
transition, the following chapter thoroughly analyses the security provisions 
and corresponding implementation of Mozambique’s General Peace 
Agreement, to provide particular insight on how the security and justice system 
was specifically affected over the medium and long-term transition.  
 
 
 
 
 
